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The past decade has seen a tremendous amount of literature on the im-
pacts of the global land rush. Much of the debates have been rooted in 
theoretical and analytical perspectives that speak particularly to the land 
question, with little emphasis on labour. Yet, support for large-scale agri-
cultural investments in Africa is largely premised on their labour prospects 
for local economic development. However, despite earlier calls by some 
critical scholars to centre labour in the land grabs debate, labour is gener-
ally invisible in both mainstream policy and academic research. Following 
through an example from rural communities affected by an oil palm land 
deal on Ghana's eastern corridor, which is characterized by migrants, set-
tlers and sharecroppers, this thesis examines the land grab-labour nexus. 
The central research question is: How and why do corporate large-scale farmland 
deals impact land access and control, labour relations of production and social reproduc-
tion, and what are the implications of this for rural politics and governance?  The 
study is situated within a broad agrarian political economy framework. Be-
tween 2018 and 2020, primary data was gathered through a mixed-method 
approach and in a four-phased field visit, spanning a total of six months. 
The study shows how land grab processes are directly linked to the 
complex dynamics of dispossession as powerful actors within the inter-
secting spheres of state, chieftaincy, family and farming institutions capi-
talize on the sudden commoditization of land to control and exclude cer-
tain groups of people from land entitlements and other material resources 
that accompany large-scale land acquisitions. The existing rent distribution 
process, which has also become a pseudo land-tenure formalization in-
strument, has immense implications for intergenerational land access for 
people with lineal and derived rights, communal and fragmented landhold-
ers, labouring classes and other social groups. Generally, women, youth 
and sharecroppers bear the brunt of land losses. Throwing light on labour 
contributes to a better understanding of the complexity of land grab-re-
lated impacts, especially one that presents a broader picture of socially 
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differentiated peasant communities, and thereby the varying benefits from 
land resources that a dispossession-centric framework may not be able to 
capture fully. 
This study contributes to the emerging but still thin body of knowledge 
on contemporary land rush that underscores the issues of labour prospects 
and gender disparities of plantation agriculture. Not only are employment 
opportunities minimal, but the precarious working conditions character-
ized by casualization, low incomes, indebtedness, and poor occupational 
health and safety are also a reminder of how and why capital's need to 
maintain its own reproduction does not cohere with purported social con-
tributions from land deals. The gendered disparities in incomes also rein-
force and widen the existing inequalities between men and women. At the 
same time, farmers and farmworkers, ardent to maintain their subsistence 
culture continue to produce staple food crops in spite of the competing 
demands for residual lands, and the division of labour between own farms 
and the plantation. The evidence of the labour competition between own 
farms and the plantation does not conform to any particular pattern partly 
because of the differences in household demographics/family labour 
availability, land access, farm locations, the types of crops farmed, the sea-
sonality of oil palm harvest and the casual nature of the plantation work. 
Nonetheless, there is a general perception indicating a decline in the yields 
and diversity of their own food production, and difficulties in maintaining 
their own farms, with women being significantly affected. 
Furthermore, placing peasants’ political reactions within the context of 
contemporary land grabs presents rural politics on two broad fronts. On 
the one hand against dispossession, and on the other hand against labour 
exploitation and for better terms of incorporation. In a context of relative 
land abundance, where land grabbing has not entirely disrupted the exist-
ing subsistence ethic, political reactions from the affected landholding 
families have been generally covert, contained and reactionary, and farm-
workers’ everyday politics through absenteeism, non-compliance, and the 
continuance of their own food production enable them to maintain their 
basic food sovereignty/security. Yet, considering the fragile livelihood sit-
uations of these remote communities, a corporate ‘investment’ discourse 
still overrides a land grab narrative; demands are directed more towards 
rents and labour than land reclamation, and farmworkers’ multiple and 
individualized everyday politics do not necessarily change the structure of 
social relations associated with capitalist agriculture. The main connecting 
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string to the land-labour nexus of land grab politics is the question of food. 
This is closely linked to the global food sovereignty narrative, or to bring 
it home to Ghana, a kind of local food self-sufficiency whereby almost all 
affected groups prefer that their food security is derived mainly from their 
own production and a satisfactory utility of their produce instead of food 
purchases. This reaffirms the importance of land access for farmers and 
farm workers, even if land deals create employment and generate income. 
Nonetheless, there are several points where interests diverge and compete 
on the grounds of social class, identity and generational differences. 
Finally, the study demonstrates that the problems of peasant farming 
and rural agricultural wage labour are not unconnected. Still, rural wage 
workers raise particular issues that, unfortunately, have fallen to the mar-
gins of both mainstream regulatory strategies that promote 'responsible' 
farmland investments, and radical anti-land grab civil society groups, in-
cluding the food sovereignty movement dedicated to campaigns against 
the threats of land dispossession. On the one hand, from a policy perspec-
tive, there are many legislative gaps in the governance of agricultural wage 
labour. In Ghana, there are no appropriate labour institutions to protect 
agricultural workers, and the few existent either maintain the status quo or 
are repressive. Investors, therefore continue to operate under laissez-faire 
business environments, prioritizing their economic viability often to the 
detriment of marginalized groups.  It is essential to have agriculture-spe-
cific legislations that deal with labour issues on both large and small-scale 
farms. For regulations to be effective, the rights of agricultural workers 
need to be secure. At the same time, statutory provisions for unionization 
must be supported by policies and programmes that build the capacities 
of these hard to organize casual workers. If any large-scale investment is 
to be justified, the 'why' question from the perspectives of landowners and 
those attracted to wage labour should not be ignored. Peasants move in 
and out of seasonal poverty, and desperation forces them to make con-
strained choices regarding land transfers, as well as inhibit their agency on 
capitalist large-scale farms. There is the need to address discriminatory ag-
ricultural sector policies that leave some small-scale farmers with very few 
alternatives. Effective investment and labour regulations should also re-
flect the contested spaces of unemployment, underemployment, rural-ur-
ban inequalities, the challenges of small-scale agriculture, fragile liveli-
hoods and power relations within which these investments are expected 
to take place. On the other hand, if food sovereignty is to realize its 
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potential power as a counter-narrative to neoliberalism, and as a possible 
democratic alternative for working people with differentiated and some-
times, competing socio-economic interests, then demands that adequately 
reflect the diverse agrarian struggles of the rural working people have to 






DE POLITIEKE DYNAMIEK VAN WERELDWIJDE 
LANDHANDEL: HET DWARSVERBAND TUSSEN 




De afgelopen tien jaar is er een enorme hoeveelheid literatuur verschenen 
over de gevolgen van de wereldwijde run op land. Het debat wordt gro-
tendeels gevoerd vanuit theoretische en analytische invalshoeken waarin 
de landkwestie centraal staat, en arbeid onderbelicht blijft. Toch is de steun 
voor grootschalige landbouwinvesteringen in Afrika vooral gebaseerd op 
de daaruit voortvloeiende arbeidsvooruitzichten met het oog op de lokale 
economische ontwikkeling. Ondanks eerdere oproepen van enkele kriti-
sche wetenschappers om de aandacht te richten op arbeid in het debat 
over landroof, is arbeid over het algemeen echter onzichtbaar in zowel het 
reguliere beleid als in wetenschappelijk onderzoek. 
Op basis van een voorbeeld van plattelandsgemeenschappen die ge-
troffen zijn door de verkoop van oliepalmgrond op de oostelijke corridor 
van Ghana, waar migranten, kolonisten en deelpachters wonen, wordt in 
dit proefschrift het dwarsverband tussen landroof en arbeid in kaart ge-
bracht. De centrale onderzoeksvraag is: wat is de invloed van grootschalige com-
merciële landbouwgrondtransacties op arbeidsverhoudingen en welke implicaties heeft dit 
voor de plattelandspolitiek en arbeidsgovernance? Het onderzoek is gesitueerd bin-
nen een breed agrarisch politiek kader. De primaire data zijn verzameld 
tussen 2018 en 2020 met een mixed-methodbenadering en veldonderzoek 
in vier fasen, verspreid over in totaal zes maanden. 
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Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat processen van landroof rechtstreeks verband 
houden met de complexe dynamiek van onteigening. Machtige actoren 
binnen de elkaar overlappende gebieden van staat, stamhoofd, familie en 
landbouwinstellingen grijpen de plotselinge vermarkting van land aan om 
controle uit te oefenen over bepaalde groepen en deze mensen uit te slui-
ten van eigendomsrechten op land en andere materiële hulpbronnen die 
samengaan met grootschalige landaankoop. Het bestaande pachtverde-
lingsproces, dat ook een verkapt instrument voor de formalisering van 
grondbezit is geworden, heeft enorme implicaties voor de toegang tot land 
door de generaties heen voor mensen met directe en afgeleide rechten, 
gemeenschapsgebonden en gefragmenteerde grondbezitters, arbeiders-
klassen en andere sociale groepen. Over het algemeen hebben vrouwen, 
jongeren en deelpachters het zwaarst te lijden onder het verlies van land. 
Door een beter begrip van de rol van arbeid ontstaat meer inzicht in de 
complexiteit van de gevolgen van landroof. Dit brengt sociaal gedifferen-
tieerde boerengemeenschappen beter in beeld en daarmee ook de verschil-
lende opbrengsten van toegang tot land die een op onteigening gericht 
kader wellicht niet volledig kan omvatten. 
Dit onderzoek draagt bij aan de groeiende, maar nog steeds geringe 
hoeveelheid kennis over de hedendaagse run op land, waarin de proble-
men van de arbeidsvooruitzichten en de genderverschillen in de plantage-
landbouw onderstreept worden. Niet alleen zijn de kansen op werk mini-
maal, maar ook de precaire arbeidsomstandigheden die blijken uit tijdelijke 
contracten, lage inkomens, schuldenlast en ongezond en onveilig werk be-
vestigen dat de instandhouding en vermeerdering van kapitaal niet samen-
gaat met de vermeende sociale bijdrage van de landhandel. De genderge-
relateerde verschillen in inkomen versterken en vergroten ook de 
bestaande ongelijkheid tussen mannen en vrouwen. Tegelijkertijd blijven 
boeren en landarbeiders, die hun zelfvoorzieningscultuur in stand willen 
houden, belangrijke landbouwgewassen produceren ondanks de concur-
rerende vraag naar landbouwgrond en de arbeidsverdeling tussen de eigen 
bedrijven en de plantage. Er is geen duidelijk patroon te ontdekken in de 
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arbeidsconcurrentie tussen de eigen boerenbedrijven en de plantage. Dit 
ligt deels aan de verschillen in beschikbaarheid van arbeidskrachten in het 
huishouden/gezin, toegang tot land, ligging van de boerenbedrijven, soor-
ten gewassen die worden verbouwd, seizoensgebondenheid van de olie-
palmoogst en het onregelmatige karakter van het werk op de plantage. 
Toch is de algemene indruk dat de opbrengst en de diversiteit van de eigen 
voedselproductie afneemt en dat het moeilijk is om het eigen boerenbe-
drijf in stand te houden, wat een grote impact heeft op vrouwen. 
Daarnaast wordt plattelandspolitiek op twee brede fronten zichtbaar 
door de politieke reacties van boeren in de context van de hedendaagse 
landroof te plaatsen. Enerzijds is er een beweging tegen onteigening, en 
anderzijds een beweging tegen arbeidsuitbuiting en voor betere deelname-
voorwaarden. In een situatie van relatieve overvloed aan land, waarin land-
roof de bestaande zelfvoorzieningscultuur niet volledig verstoort, zijn de 
politieke reacties van de getroffen grondbezitters over het algemeen ver-
borgen, ingehouden en reactief. De landarbeiders reageren met verzuim 
en houden zich niet aan de afspraken. Door hun eigen voedsel te blijven 
produceren, behouden ze hun basale voedselsoevereiniteit/-zekerheid. 
Tegelijkertijd domineert een bedrijfsmatig 'investeringsdiscours' een nar-
ratief van landroof, gelet op de kwetsbare levensomstandigheden van deze 
afgelegen gemeenschappen. De eisen zijn meer gericht op pacht en arbeid 
dan op het terugvorderen van land, en door individuele verschillen in de 
alledaagse politiek van landarbeiders verandert er niet noodzakelijkerwijs 
iets aan de structuur van de sociale verhoudingen die gepaard gaan met 
kapitalistische landbouw. De belangrijkste verbindende schakel in het 
dwarsverband tussen land en arbeid en landroof is het voedselvraagstuk. 
Dit is nauw verbonden met het wereldwijde narratief van voedselsoeve-
reiniteit. In Ghana betekent dit een soort lokale zelfvoorziening van voed-
sel. Daarbij geven bijna alle getroffen groepen de voorkeur aan voedselze-
kerheid die vooral berust op hun eigen productie en voldoende 
beschikbaarheid van hun producten in plaats van op voedselaankopen. Dit 
bevestigt opnieuw het belang van toegang tot land voor boeren en 
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landarbeiders, zelfs als landtransacties werkgelegenheid scheppen en in-
komsten genereren. Niettemin is er op verschillende punten sprake van 
uiteenlopende en tegenstrijdige belangen op grond van sociale klasse, 
identiteit en generatieverschillen. 
Tot slot blijkt uit het onderzoek dat de problemen van boerenbedrijven 
en agrarische loonarbeid op het platteland niet losstaan van elkaar. Land-
arbeiders stellen nog steeds specifieke kwesties aan de orde die helaas noch 
in reguliere regelingen ter bevordering van 'verantwoorde' investeringen 
in landbouwgrond worden aangepakt, noch door radicale anti-landroof 
activisten. Onder deze laatste groep valt de beweging voor voedselsoeve-
reiniteit die campagne voert tegen de dreiging van onteigening van land. 
Enerzijds zijn er vanuit beleidsperspectief veel hiaten in de wetgeving op 
het gebied van governance van loonarbeid in de landbouw. In Ghana zijn 
er geen goede arbeidsinstanties ter bescherming van landarbeiders, en de 
weinige bestaande instanties handhaven de status quo of treden zelfs re-
pressief op. Investeerders blijven daarom opereren in een laissez-faire on-
dernemingsklimaat. Ze geven daarbij prioriteit aan hun economische le-
vensvatbaarheid, wat vaak ten koste gaat van gemarginaliseerde groepen. 
Het is van essentieel belang dat er landbouwspecifieke wetgeving komt 
voor arbeidskwesties op zowel grote als kleine landbouwbedrijven. Voor 
een effectieve regelgeving moeten de rechten van werknemers in de land-
bouw worden gewaarborgd. Tegelijkertijd moeten de wettelijke bepa-
lingen voor vakbondsvorming worden ondersteund door beleid en pro-
gramma's die de competenties van deze moeilijk te organiseren tijdelijke 
arbeidskrachten vergroten.  
 Om grootschalige investeringen te kunnen rechtvaardigen, moet de 
'waarom'-vraag vanuit het perspectief van landeigenaren en landarbeiders 
worden gesteld. Boeren hebben te maken met seizoensgebonden ar-
moede, en uit wanhoop hebben ze weinig keus met betrekking tot de over-
dracht van land. Ook kunnen ze onvoldoende tegenstand bieden aan ka-
pitalistische grootschalige boerenbedrijven. Er moet iets worden gedaan 
aan het discriminerende beleid in de landbouwsector, waardoor sommige 
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kleinschalige boeren weinig te kiezen hebben. Een effectieve investerings- 
en arbeidsregelgeving moet ook een weerspiegeling vormen van de con-
text waarbinnen deze investeringen naar verwachting plaatsvinden. Deze 
context wordt gekenmerkt door werkloosheid, te weinig werkgelegenheid, 
ongelijkheid tussen stad en platteland, de uitdagingen van kleinschalige 
landbouw, kwetsbare bestaansmogelijkheden en machtsverhoudingen. 
Om het potentieel van voedselsoevereiniteit als tegenhanger van het neo-
liberalisme en als een mogelijk democratisch alternatief voor werkende 
mensen met gedifferentieerde en soms tegenstrijdige sociaaleconomische 
belangen te kunnen realiseren, is het aan de andere kant noodzakelijk om 
de verschillende problemen van de mensen die op het platteland in de 
landbouw werken op de agenda te zetten en beter aan te pakken dan nu 


































The first wave of research on land grabs focused on its process, and ad-
vanced towards the consensus on the multiplicity and a convergence of 
issues — the global increasing demand for food, energy and commodities, 
globalized transport and communication technologies, speculation, inter-
nal crises within capitalism — all of which are crucial for the current ne-
oliberal paradigm (Borras, et al, 2011; Hall, 2010; McMichael, 2012; Visser, 
2015). As a point of departure, this study adopts Borras & Franco's, (2012, 
p. 1725) definition of ‘land grabs’, used interchangeably with land deals, 
and large-scale land investments as ‘the capturing of control of relatively 
vast tracts of land and other natural resources through a variety of mech-
anisms and forms, carried out through extra-economic coercion that in-
volves large-scale capital, which often shifts resource use orientation into 
extraction, for international and domestic purposes’, and that which trans-
forms the social relations of reproduction for different groups of people.  
Following the general descriptions that country contexts, marked by 
relative land abundance and weak governance become fertile grounds for 
land deals, it is not surprising that Africa remains the most targeted region 
for large-scale land acquisitions. By some estimates, about seventy per cent 
of the land transacted in recent land deals occurred in Africa. It has been 
widely acknowledged that land deals in Africa are rooted in the long his-
tory of colonial legacy, postcolonial modernization policies, and in con-
temporary times, the emergence of a neoliberal hegemony upon which 
agricultural development has been premised on free trade and capital mo-
bility (Amanor, 1999). In Ghana, for instance, contemporary land deals 
are characterized by both new land acquisitions and relatively old state-led 
large-scale farms that have, over the years, come under the control of the 
private sector. The rise in investor rush for rural agricultural lands has 
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spurred debates about their impacts on rural livelihoods. Some argue that 
land deals, when well governed can have productive uses through in-
creased food production and employment avenues in farm and off-farm 
sectors (Deininger, et al., 2011). However, on the other side of the debate, 
Li, (2011) has argued that such prospects are unlikely because productive 
land uses associated with large-scale land acquisitions do not occur with-
out exclusionary processes even when land is transferred to the most ‘pro-
ductive’ users.  
The central question remains who wins and who loses such inequitable 
processes and what are the mechanisms? Many studies that have re-
searched the implications of land grabs on land and property relations 
have shown that the impacts are differentiated and context-specific. When 
land deals transform land ownership and access, they do not only create 
gaps between legality and legitimacy of existing, modified and new land 
governance institutions (a common source of land conflicts and contesta-
tions), but also expose different local groups and working classes to risks 
of dispossession from land and its resources such as water, soil nutrients, 
seeds etc. (Bruna, 2019; Levien, 2017; Moyo, 2011b). Land grab literature 
provides numerous empirical accounts of forced evictions in Mali, Sudan, 
Ghana, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Argentina and Colombia (Borras, et al, 2012; 
Nyantakyi-frimpong & Kerr, 2016; Peelay, 2014); in the case of Bangla-
desh, where there has been a ‘slow-motion loss of entitlements, social ex-
clusion and alienation from the rights and identities’ which had been 
fought for through tensed state-society relations (Feldman & Geisler, 
2012, p. 974); and in Ghana where patron-client relations between tradi-
tional authorities and certain social groups influence how impacts are dif-
ferentiated (Boamah, 2014a).  
In this burgeoning land grab literature, the labour question appears to 
have been peripheral to property relations. Some exceptions include the 
studies by Hall, et al (2017); Li, (2011) and Oya, (2013). Evidence of the 
implications of land deals for wage labour on plantations as well as the 
labour on small-scale farms necessary for social reproduction are often 
presented in transient and ‘snapshot’ studies. In general, the literature is 
rather scanty but necessary to get a far-reaching understanding of the com-
plexities of land deals deal and their governance. The labour question in 
relation to land, raises particular questions about displacement, disposses-
sion, terms of incorporation, and rural politics. In contexts of strong civil 
society organizations, especially social movements and development 
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NGOs, campaigns to regulate in order to mitigate adverse impacts and 
maximize opportunities, or to stop and rollback land deals have not only 
gained wide popularity but also impacted the outcomes of various land 
deals (Margulis, et al, 2013). Nonetheless, recent studies have shown that 
it is not always the case that peasants oppose land grabs. As the impacts 
are differentiated for social groups and classes, so are the political reac-
tions from below (Hall et al., 2015). There have been accounts of adapta-
tion and co-existence in post-soviet Russia (Mamonova, 2015), resistance 
and struggles for incorporation in Africa (Larder, 2015; Sulle, 2016), and 
the overt resistance from workers, dispossessed farmers and indigenous 
communities in many parts of Southern America (Massicotte, 2010; Welch 
& Sauer, 2015). Certainly, the historical, political, economic and social 
contexts within which land grabs take place are vital to shaping the politi-
cal reactions from below.  
This study, on the rural impacts of land grabs is grounded on four main 
building blocks: i) the class-generational dynamics of land dispossession; 
ii) labour relations for production and social reproduction, iii) local politi-
cal reactions around dispossession and exploitation; and iv) a critique of 
land grab-labour governance within both mainstream regulatory ap-
proaches and agrarian movements’ food sovereignty discourses. The study 
site is situated in the Volta (Oti) region of Ghana where over 3000ha of 
family lands have been acquired by foreign investors for an oil palm plan-
tation. It is grounded in critical agrarian political economy perspectives, 
informed by analytical concepts including social class differentiation, gen-
der and social reproduction, sustainable livelihoods and ‘everyday politics’. 
The research is premised on a qualitative predominant mixed method that 
builds on a historical, relational and interactive approach (Schiavoni, 
2016). The study contributes to bridging key empirical gaps within and 
between knowledge and praxis relating to the impacts of the global land 
rush, and rural wage labour relations in Africa.  
1.2 Large-Scale Agriculture as the Development Pathway 
for Africa?  
Large-scale land acquisitions have historical antecedents in the colonial 
period where the promotion of export agriculture, and the institution of 
indirect rule and tax systems, transformed property rights, labour relations 
and the global food system (Amanor, 1999; Tsikata & Yaro, 2013). For 
instance, during the 1930s, many colonial administrations experimented 
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with the modern food system i.e. capital controlled farming and agricul-
tural production methods. Following the expansion of industry into agri-
culture, the pace of modernization and technology has been maintained, 
intensified and carried out across different geopolitical contexts via inter-
national political-economic processes: the post-second World War Mar-
shall Plan for Europe, export-oriented colonial policies, and development 
aid conditions that have since influenced post-colonial policies (Amanor, 
1999; Mcmichael, 1997). This was evident in the agricultural research par-
adigms of the World Bank in the 1960s, and the unification of interna-
tional agricultural centres; purported to promote agricultural productivity 
through experiments with modern seeds, technology diffusion and large-
scale industrial approaches.  
Although several newly independent African governments in the 1960s 
were influenced by socialist ideological standpoint and functioned in ‘a 
compromise between technocratic ‘developmentalism’ and rural Socialism 
in their socio-spatial equity and poverty alleviation strategies’ (Oya, 2006a, 
p. 203), their policies also reflected the modernization ideologies of the 
international development paradigm (Huddleston & Tonts, 2007). A key 
policy direction during this period was the promotion of import substitu-
tion industries purported to be dependent on raw materials from the na-
tional agricultural supplies. In Ghana and Tanzania, for example, it led to 
the establishment of state-controlled and parastatal plantations, and agro-
processing industries, which operated alongside tenant farmer arrange-
ments and out-grower schemes to underpin agricultural development. 
There were, however, some exceptions like Cote d’Ivoire, where upon in-
dependence, governments maintained strong commitments to private en-
terprises and relied on the French government for technical assistance 
(Due, 1969).  
Nonetheless, towards the end of the 1960’s and in the early 1970s when 
the global economic crises and increased debts affected many economies, 
the independent African governments also experienced social and political 
unrests associated with the not-so-successful interventionist policies. For 
example, between 1966 and 1981, Ghana was politically unstable and had 
witnessed several coups d’état. Several policies were introduced by differ-
ent governments to revamp the agricultural sector, yet many tended to be 
reactive and failed to address systemic issues in the sector. In effect, from 
the 1970s, many states began to shift focus to the private sector and mar-
ket-oriented programmes with agriculture being greatly impacted. State 
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policies during that period mostly promoted various forms of preferential 
support for large-scale schemes thereby stifling the growth of many small-
scale farms (Smalley, 2013). From the early 1980’s, at the height of liber-
alization ideologies and low success rate of state interventions, various 
forms of business partnerships were formed with the (international) pri-
vate sector for the management of large-scale schemes that survived na-
tionalization. This transformation advanced at a time when international 
debates, foreign policies and development assistance focused on, and at-
tempted to tackle the pertaining issues of poverty and economic stagna-
tion across Africa and in other developing regions such as Southern Amer-
ica (Heidhues & Obare, 2011).  
The ‘accelerated development’ Berg report (World Bank, 1981)  served 
as the most comprehensive World Bank thinking on the causes of poverty 
in Sub Saharan Africa, and the alternative development strategies that the 
Bank would be willing to support (Daniel, 1983). The report, highlighted 
the incessant balance of payment deficits, attributing it to the underdevel-
opment of the agricultural export sector and the over-extension of the 
public sector, mainly regarding administrative controls (Amanor, 1999). 
Whilst the report acknowledged the role of external factors, it focused ex-
cessively on state-created distortions and domestic policies, thus policy 
recommendations were oriented towards devaluation, improved price in-
centives for agricultural exports, low protection for industry, and a de-
crease in the use of direct controls (John Sender & Smith, 1985). This line 
of analysis generated debates on the role of state, and prospects of agri-
cultural development in Africa. The underlying assumption was that liber-
alized agriculture could better enhance access to export markets, capital, 
modern technology, research and innovation, and improve land produc-
tivity than when under state control (Toulmin, & Gueye, 2003).  
 However, a key element that ran through most critiques was a defence 
of the potential of state policies to address redistributive development bet-
ter than the alternatives suggested by the World Bank. Others also high-
lighted the negative implications of food imports for food self-sufficiency 
(see Daniel, 1983; Colclough, 1983:28). Sender & Smith, (1986) while 
pointing out the flaws of these major critiques also argued that getting the 
prices right does not guarantee increased agricultural outputs. Through 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and development conditional-
ity in the 1980s, many states promoted the divestiture of public and para-
statal agricultural programmes, joint ventures, and contract farming 
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schemes. This process often resulted in the transformation of traditional 
agrarian systems to favour large and medium-scale transnational corpora-
tions (Amanor, 1999; Huddleston & Tonts, 2007). Other examples include 
Cameroonaise de la Banane (OCB) plantation sold to French-owned Plan-
tations de Haut Penja (PHP) in the late 1980s (Fonjong et al, 2016). By 
the 1990s, when many of the initiatives that came out of the SAPs had 
been generally unsuccessful, the policy environment shifted from rolling 
back the state to bringing the state back in, but this time to facilitate mar-
kets and the private sector. As noted by Oya, (2011) this policy phase ex-
panded the space for privatization and deregulation. The quasi-privatiza-
tion of the Ghana Oil Palm Development Corporation (GOPDC) in 1995 
is another case in point.   
From the 1970s to date, (neo) liberal policies have underpinned much 
of the agricultural development in Africa though manifested in different 
ways and sometimes even masked under neo-populism in some small-
holder policies (see World Bank, 2008). The evolution of policy changes 
in agricultural development are often seen as relatively distinct policy 
phases with some continuities (Oya, 2006), yet they all fall into one histor-
ical pattern which is concerned with the extension of the modern agricul-
tural food system and agribusiness (Amanor, 1999, p. 32). In the aftermath 
of the 2008 world food crises, transnational corporations, and agribusi-
nesses have re-entered development policy, and ‘practice’ through the pro-
motion of capital investment in agriculture under the rhetoric of effi-
ciency, productivity and employment. Many of these developments have 
also been targeted at modernization of the traditionally predominant small 
holding systems via their integration into the markets of large-scale 
schemes and/or the establishment of plantations, and the enabling of an 
environment for private investments into industrial scale agriculture pro-
duction (Amanor, 2010).  
Today, the food system is challenged with environmental, political and 
socioeconomic stressors (Pereira & Ruysenaar, 2012). Africa has always 
been the hardest hit by food crises, food insecurity and poverty. About 
eighty percent of food grown in Africa is by small-scale family farmers, yet 
seventy per cent of rural farming households in Africa live below poverty 
lines. This makes sustainable access to land resources crucial for the de-
velopment of the continent’s one billion plus population (GRAIN, 2014). 
Whilst agriculture-led growth has had a transformative impact on poverty 
reduction in Asian countries, neoliberal market-oriented strategies have 
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not yet worked effectively in Africa (Diao, et al 2010). Prospects for, and 
impediments to capitalist development in the countryside continues to be 
an issue that requires critical research and policy attention.  
1.3 The Land and Labour Questions in the Land Grab Debate 
The steady increase in transnational investor interest in agricultural land in 
developing countries has prompted large-scale commercial land deals in 
Africa. Yet, not only has the notion of abundance been challenged, the 
developmental impacts of land deals continue to be a subject of ongoing 
debates. The debates are often divided between two broad ideological per-
spectives. Researchers from the tradition of Neoclassical/New Institu-
tional Economic (NIE) perspectives including International Financial In-
stitutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, incline toward the developmental 
potentials of land deals. Underpinning this viewpoint is that if there are 
properly functioning institutions, markets can be well governed to facili-
tate development (Harriss, et al, 2003; North, 1993). Rural development 
thus occurs when institutions such as market-led land reforms, private 
property rights, and labour regulations enable (self-interest seeking/ profit 
maximising) individuals/farmers to become efficient given their available 
resources (Gyasi, 1994; Lipton, 2006; North, 1993; Popkin, 1979). Adher-
ents recognize that investors are attracted to countries with a relative land 
and labour abundance and weak governance. This is the reason they push 
for consultative and transparent land institutions that can help minimize 
the evictions and dispossession, and could lead to win-win outcomes. 
Deininger, et al (2011 p. xv) have argued that ‘when done right, larger-
scale farming systems can also have a place as one of many tools to pro-
mote sustainable agricultural and rural development, and can directly sup-
port agricultural productivity. One of the often-highlighted ways through 
which land grabs can be of development potential is through employment 
opportunities for rural economic development. As argued by Popkin, 
(1979), peasants attraction to large-scale investments is a key element of 
their adaptive efficiency or evidence of how they are able to respond to 
new opportunities. Here, NIE perspectives pay much attention to regula-
tory frameworks that promote or inhibit the participation of those affected 
by land grabs. Emphasis is therefore placed on the effectiveness of these 
institutions, and peasants’ access to information about their rights. 
 Institutions are however premised on unequal power relations and 
therefore perceive this new wave of investments from its adverse and 
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differentiated effects on livelihoods and natural environment of the rural 
working poor. Through capital accumulation, land deals produce and 
deepen the processes of social differentiation in agrarian societies-whereby 
the social relations of (re)production benefit some while others lose out 
(Akram-Lodhi, 2007; McMichael, 2014). Harvey’s (2003) theory of accu-
mulation by dispossession, which builds on Marx’s primitive accumulation 
theory, explains how the advancement of neoliberal capitalist strategies 
since the 1970’s1 has become a means by which power and wealth is con-
centrated in the hands of a few (capitalists/entrepreneurs) through pro-
cesses whereby the public is repeatedly deprived of their assets in spaces 
where capitalist circuits are reproduced. This process of accumulation by 
dispossession is embedded mainly in neoliberal capitalist strategies of pri-
vatization and financialization but is also significantly facilitated by state 
redistribution projects and policies. From this perspective, land deals ex-
pose the rural working poor and peasants, in general, to being vulnerable 
to marginalization and dispossession which eventually leads to deprivation 
and poverty. As argued by McMichael, (2008 p 213), land deals and cor-
porate food systems are not just about capital accumulation and dispos-
session of peasants. Equally crucial is the fact that it has a tendency of 
ruling out the place for peasants, closing doors to alternatives and remov-
ing peasants and their systems of production from history.  
Compared to studies conducted on the direct land implications of land 
deals, empirical evidence pertaining to what happens on the ground when 
investors need land but not labour, or need both land and labour, has been 
rather limited (Li, 2011). In the past two to three years, some studies have 
begun to track employment implications of land deals with an emphasis 
on job generation, conditions of work, and income. Some of the studies 
pertaining to the African context have shown that the absorption of rural 
labour is not always assured, especially when there are no matching skills, 
and poor labour conditions and farming models are highly mechanized 
(Dubb, 2016; Nyantakyi-Frimpong & Bezner Kerr, 2017). In cases 
where labour-intensive production models are implemented, especially in 
the horticulture sector, it is often accompanied by a process of ‘feminiza-
tion’ of labour — where women’s employment is tied to specific tasks as 
they are considered as having ‘nimble fingers’, being less conflictual and 
more willing than men to accept lower wages (Kay, 2015). In the recent 
study conducted in Ghana, Kenya and Zambia by Hall, et al, (2017), they 
showed that there are instances when land deals have created more jobs 
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but with highly uneven distribution of wages. Permanent and highly skilled 
outsiders usually get higher wages than their counterparts who are doing 
manual jobs. Some findings also suggest that in some instances, wages and 
working conditions for farm work have been low and have not improved, 
yet farmworkers persisted. Assurance of regular wage income appear at-
tractive to peasants with unstable cash returns from farming (German, et 
al 2013).  
When land deals transform land ownership and use, the agrarian ques-
tion of labour becomes inevitable. Land deals modify labour regimes in 
the rural agrarian communities when they displace populations or pre-ex-
isting landless people seek livelihood opportunities, and on the other hand, 
investors require hired labour. With a convergence of job seekers and of-
fers available, wage labour becomes the new source of income. Here, the 
questions of ‘who does what’ and ‘what do they do with each other’ pro-
vides a ‘relational’ dimension to unpacking the complexities of land deals. 
Yet we do not know much about how the dynamics play out in different 
contexts. As such, even in the light of recent studies, what, and how much 
we know about the land deal-labour-livelihoods is still partial. The scale 
and scope of current studies are limited to a few case studies and countries. 
The study conducted by Hall et al (2017), which stands out as a major 
source of insight into the emerging patterns and trends of the labour im-
plications of different models of land deals, raises new and important 
questions relating to gender and class dynamics of impacts, and the ways 
in which affected people navigate the opportunities and risks associated 
with it.  
What opportunities do land deals offer to farmworkers whose land ac-
cess and control are not guaranteed by tradition? For many, their access 
to farm work opportunities could be a coping mechanism and survival 
strategy against unfavourable policies and traditions (see Byres 2003; Oya, 
2010). Regarding women who do not have guaranteed cash returns from 
their family farms, how do their incorporation as farmworkers address 
their needs for household reproduction? Similarly, what are the implica-
tions of seasonal and casual employment for the near landless, migrants 
and the youth? When land deals employ a significant amount of unskilled 
and semi-unskilled labour — although often not the case, it could have 
the potential of addressing their cash needs, at least in the short to medium 
term. Nonetheless, land deals could also have negative trade-offs for long-
term sustenance of livelihoods of farmworkers- in terms health, social 
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relations and the deepening of structural inequality. These impacts would 
be socially differentiated across the different classes and groups of the 
farmworkers: landless, migrants2, divorced/separated/single women with 
or without dependents; ethnic minorities, permanent and casual workers, 
skilled, semi-skilled, less land, landless, proletariats, those engaged in other 
non-farm economic ventures etc. The measure of impacts may also de-
pend on their perceptions of the work they do, aspects viewed as oppor-
tunities and at the same time as threats (Behrman, Meinzen-Dick, & 
Quisumbing, 2012) which could be shaped not only by working conditions 
but also by their class struggles and the effects (how it alienates or em-
powers them), social backgrounds, past experiences, present situation, al-
ternatives available and their own expectations.  
The above require empirical investigations into the land-labour impli-
cations of land deals. However, three major reasons account for the gaps 
in research. First, because the land grab phenomenon is primarily associ-
ated with enclosure, related studies have often approached it from theo-
retical and analytical handles that speak particularly to the questions of 
land and capital accumulation, dispossession and displacement (see Hall, 
2013; Levien, 2011; McMichael, 2012). Inherently, these theories do well 
to address how land deals shape access to and control over land resources 
but do not primarily capture the labour question. Second, and closely 
linked to the above, the term ‘land grab’ has always had strong political 
connotations. As Larder (2015 pg.840) has rightly noted, land grabbing 
has emerged as an effective framing opportunity for social movements, 
human rights groups and other civil society organizations to raise ‘aware-
ness around the potential negative impacts of increased flows of finance 
capital into land’ — that land grabs dispossess family farmers or peasants 
from land, their primary means of livelihood. By so doing, the research 
agenda both theoretical and empirical, has been centred around the land 
question, often leaving the labour question to its margins. Third, limited 
access to information, methodological and other practical challenges have 
also influenced the scope of studies on labour. The time distribution of 
employment costs and benefits is often uneven, different types of impacts 
are experienced at different times of project lifespans, transformation in 
land access and use is the most visible in the short term, labour-related 
impacts may only materialize at later stages, unreliability and elusiveness 
of data on income, and the full implementation of most of the widely pub-
licised land deals occurred at later periods making it methodologically 
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problematic to assess impacts (Cotula et al., 2014; Carlos Oya, 2013b). 
Besides, many companies do grant researchers full access to plantation 
data or to observe wage labour conditions. 
Under-exploration of how and why the labour question relates to land 
has implications for how we interpret, suggest alternatives to, and politi-
cally intervene in the current era of a global land rush. Not fully under-
standing the impacts on labour means that the debates around land grabs 
may continue to be set between the two broad narratives that are inher-
ently premised on particular ideological groundings. While such debates 
could be theoretically stimulating, they may not be able to provide the 
needed inputs for political interventions if not empirically grounded. In-
deed, there is growing evidence that suggests land deals are not transform-
ative development projects. Yet, there are dynamics in the short, medium 
and long-term livelihood implications for the different rural groups in 
structurally unequal agrarian societies. With such heterogeneity and differ-
entiation, neither can we claim a simplistic ‘win-win’ scenario between in-
vestors and farm workers as the World Bank3 puts it (World Bank, 2011), 
nor interpret deals as totally labour-displacing projects without thorough 
and stylized empirical studies. 
Peasants’ politics within this land-labour nexus can be affected by the 
degree of their insertion into global discourses but even more significantly 
at domestic level, are the historical, economic and social specificities that 
shape political reactions from below. In Ghana, through the actions (e.g. 
market-led land policies) and inactions (e.g. poor implementation of la-
bour regulations) of the state, an enabling environment is created for for-
eign and private investments in agribusinesses in the name of efficiency, 
productivity and employment (Yaro, 2012). These ideas also often reso-
nate with the legitimating imperatives of traditional land institutions. In 
addition, cash-strapped rural folks who maintain both an economic and 
cultural attachment to land are often caught in a complex web of trade-
offs. Under these contexts, in addition to the fact that there is not a strong 
base of rural social movements, land grabs are often received as a contin-
uum between acquiescence and outright resistance.  
1.4 Research Questions and Significance 
Following a case study of a 3750ha land transaction between the Sithe 
Global Sustainable Oils Ghana (SGSOG) and families of the Ntrubo Clan 
in Ghana, the central research question of the research is to examine   




How and why corporate large-scale farmland deals impact land access and control, and 
labour relations of production and social reproduction; what are the implications of this 
for rural politics and governance?  
 
Specific research questions guiding the study are: 
 
a. What is the character of dispossession, and how has the land 
grab reconfigured access, entitlements and control over land 
resources for different social groups, landed and labouring 
classes?  
 
b. What is the extent of incorporation into land grabs and the 
livelihood implications of the dynamics in the social relations 
of production? 
 
c. How have the affected communities and social groups per-
ceived and reacted towards the land acquisitions, and partic-
ularly how do the claims and demands against land dispos-
session relate to that of labour exploitation? 
 
d. How and why should land grab governance effectively ad-
dress the everyday struggles of the differentiated social 
groups and working classes, including farmworkers? What is 
the role of the state and civil society?  
 
The research offers a significant contribution to knowledge and policy on 
land and rural labour in Africa. It contributes to the land grab literature in 
a very relevant way, mainly by filling relevant empirical gaps. The findings 
from the study would be useful for policy-making and practice especially 
in Ghana even as it considers different and competing interests within the 
recent trend of large land acquisitions. The land-labour nexus remains an 
important issue for today’s developing countries where countries are char-
acterized by increasing pressures on land, high rates of rising joblessness 
and underemployment.  
Arguably, although ‘employment benefit’ narrative remains the most 
compelling justification for large-scale land investments, many of these 
claims have not been sufficiently supported with data on rural labour 
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dynamics. Data on rural agrarian systems in West Africa in relation to la-
bour and class formation is relatively scanty and ‘outdated’. In a literature 
search on rural labour in West Africa/Ghana, I found out that many of 
the relevant and thorough studies were published between 1970 and 1990. 
Indeed, they provide evidence of substantive and complex labour relations 
in the countryside, but the findings also provoke the need for fresh views 
on the ongoing changes in rural agrarian societies that inserted into capi-
talist markets. Knowing the dynamics of rural labour experiences will con-
tribute to knowledge production on rural labour markets and agrarian 
change in Ghana.  
The study sheds lighter and contributes to ongoing research that en-
gages with the complexities surrounding the persistence of the global land 
rush and its impacts. The emphasis on rural labour experiences in relation 
to access to land, the character of accumulation and of dispossession and 
rural politics contribute to knowledge and poverty targeted policy-making 
around recent global trends of large-scale transnational agricultural invest-
ments in developing countries and also in the light of the Sustainable De-
velopment Goals (SDGs) which call for reduced inequalities, and project 
the role of decent work in economic growth. Proponents of large-scale 
land investments claim that the global powers behind pro-poor policies 
and the SDGs show optimism in the developmental potentials of land 
deals for rural people. This research provides rich inputs from empirical 
evidence to critically test such claims. 
1.5 Analytical Framework: An Agrarian Political Economy 
Approach 
The global land rush phenomenon is embedded in long-standing debates 
and fundamental questions in the agrarian political economy regarding the 
politics of resource distribution. To unpack the prospects for and imped-
iments to capitalist agriculture in the countryside, Bernstein, (2010) sug-
gests asking questions about who owns what, who does what, who gets 
what and what do they do with what? In the analysis of the land-labour 
implications of land deals, the dissertation takes a rather eclectic approach 
that is broadly along agrarian political economy lines, and anchored on 
both Marxist tradition and the non-Marxist radical agrarian populist tradi-
tion around ‘moral economy’ in the sense framed by James Scott. I also 
engage in feminist debates on social reproduction and interweave sustain-
able rural livelihoods perspectives in this research. The study engages with 
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key concepts including the ‘agrarian question’, accumulation and class dif-
ferentiation as employed in the Marxist agrarian political economy frame-
work to understand the social relations of production associated with land 
deals and to explain the dynamics of farmworkers’ interests (politics and 
struggles) that arise out of unequal power relations between capital and 
labour and within the different classes of labour — especially women, mi-
grants and ethnic minorities. This is particularly useful for unpacking the 
historical and structural implications of land deals and more broadly, 
agrarian change in Ghana. Given that there are diverse determinations be-
yond class that also shape capital-labour relations, this is where sustainable 
livelihood perspectives can offer a relevant conceptual handle. Whilst rec-
ognizing the utility of the expanded dimensions of a sustainable liveli-
hoods approach, that which Scoones (2015), terms ‘the political economy 
of livelihoods’, it will be employed mainly in the analysis of short to me-
dium-term implications of land deals on social groups especially women, 
ethnic minorities, migrants etc. and how the diversity of livelihoods strat-
egies are shaped by access to and control over resources and institutions. 
Finally, as the study seeks to examine the political reactions around land 
deals from those affected, conception of ‘everyday day politics’ emerging 
from moral economy perspectives (Kerkvliet, 2009; Scott, 1986) will be 
adapted to analyse the agency of rural people in dealing with impacts. Cer-
tainly, this also intersects with livelihoods, class relations and politics. I am 
conscious that all three approaches will have their distinct take on each of 
the clusters of issues around capital accumulation, social differentiation, 
political reactions from below, and so on. Cognisant of the potential ten-
sions between these approaches, I consciously navigated them here.  
 
 
1.5.1 Rural Social Class Differentiation  
In order to comprehend the dynamics of change and impacts of land deals, 
an agrarian political economy framework serves a useful analytical utility. 
It focuses on the social relations of, and the power dynamics of re (pro-
duction), where land, capital and labour are central to rural development 
(Akram-Lodhi & Kay, 2010). In many rural areas in Ghana, farming plays 
a key role in the livelihoods thus making land and labour relations crucial 
for development. Historically, the African agricultural system has been 
characterized by family farms, small scale or the peasant mode of produc-
tion. Farming has been built on a resource base — land, seeds, livestock, 
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fisheries, water, family labour, social networks and local knowledge and 
skills (Otsuki, 2014) that were fundamentally uncommodified, and ori-
ented towards survival and subsistence (Toulmin, & Gueye, 2003). How-
ever, over the years, this mode of production has been affected by the 
wider political economy which is reflected in the ways in rural people’s 
access to land have been shaped by their integration into unfavourable 
state-society and market relations. Rural people’s land access, use and ben-
efits have been restructured, generally. Peasants produce cheap food and 
those whose land access has been constrained also sell their labour cheaply 
in order to survive. In as much as the ‘peasantry’ persists, it has also been 
evolving as a group that is differentiated in their relations to land, capital 
and labour. The forms of social differentiation, how and why they occur 
are necessary to understanding rural development dynamics in agrarian 
societies. Within an agrarian political economy framework, social differ-
entiation is central in the analysis of rural development. Marxists and Cha-
yanovian strands of agrarian political economy provide different entry 
points into the analysis of peasant differentiation as reflected in the Lenin-
Chayanov debate. 
For Marxists, the main driving force for differentiation has been the 
penetration of capital into peasant societies. Marx (1876) theorized on the 
trajectory of capitalist agriculture starting from ‘primitive accumulation’ 
which is the historical process of forceful separation of peasants from the 
means of production that leads to the emergence, appropriation and dis-
possession which creates and differentiates between the two classes: a 
class that controls land and labour, and a class of proletariats who are sep-
arated from their means of production and work for capital as wage labour 
to obtain its means of subsistence. Byres interpreted the agrarian question 
as that of a continued existence of obstacles to unleashing accumulation 
in the countryside and capitalist industrialization. Following Byres, and af-
ter years of researching this puzzle, Bernstein posits that the classic agrar-
ian question was an ‘agrarian question of capital’ centred around three 
problematics: accumulation, production and politics. Capitalism thus 
blocks the possibility of achieving an egalitarian distribution of the mate-
rial conditions of life, thereby placing rural agrarian societies into differ-
entiated class relations. The development of agriculture in capitalist socie-
ties raises an ‘agrarian question’ that ought to be resolved (Kautsky, 1899). 
That is a question of ‘whether, and how, capital is seizing hold of 
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agriculture, revolutionising it, making old forms of production and prop-
erty untenable and creating the necessity for new ones’.  
Lenin’s engagement with the agrarian question was shown in his em-
pirical study of the development of capitalism in the village economy in 
the context of Tsarist Russia at the turn of the 19th century (Lenin, 1964). 
Following the dynamics of commodity relations — property, income and 
labour relations, he postulated that the peasantry becomes differentiated 
into rich, poor and middle peasants. Rich peasants or rural capitalists were 
the small minority of owners of commercial-scale farms that were usually 
linked to industry. The necessary condition for this was large sizes of land 
and wage labour. Poor peasants on the other hand, were rural proletariats, 
a class of landless or near landless peasants who were compelled to depend 
on wage work other than land as their primary means of subsistence. They 
struggle to reproduce themselves as capital or from labour on their own 
farms thus placing them in a ‘simple reproduction squeeze’ (Bernstein 
2010). The middle peasants had just enough land for their subsistence, and 
within its social relations, it fluctuated between the rich and poor peasant 
classes. They could ‘reproduce themselves as capital on the same scale of 
production and from labour on the same scale of consumption’ 
(Bernstein, 2010, p. 104) but they did so precariously with rich farmer as-
pirations but also the fear of plunging into the poor farmer class. This 
often times reinforced the extremes; many incline towards the top but just 
a few succeed (Lenin, 1964, p. 134). For Lenin, this represented a struc-
tural and an economic problem, which, eventually leads to the permanent 
dissolution of the middle peasantry, and the creation of a polarised rural 
economy — one consisting of capitalist farmers and another, the wage 
labourers/proletariats. However, because this process is a necessary stage 
for the transition to capitalism, for those who become differentiated out, 
i.e. rural labourers who are ‘double free’ i.e. free of property, and free to 
sell their labour power, could also migrate to fuel industrialization through 
their labour supply. As such, although migration was perceived to be a 
major cause of the breakdown of the peasantry, the bonding nature (to 
land) of feudal relations at the time, was conceived to be an impediment 
to the development of capitalism.  
The analysis of Marxist variants of the agrarian political economy con-
tinue to be centred on the nature of social differentiation, its accompany-
ing labour relations, and future of the peasantry. The expansion of com-
modity relations in rural agrarian systems, and the patterns of capitalists 
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control over land and labour resources as influenced by the institution of 
private property right regimes, and land markets, and the implications of 
the restructuring of labour processes etc. take precedence in their analysis 
of rural development. Marxist traditions assess rural development by em-
ploying a materialist interpretation of historical development and a dialec-
tical view of social transformation. Thus, the social structures of class re-
lations where people find themselves are the key determinant for their 
development. These social structures usually work against the interests of 
the marginalized classes thereby making them victims. In rural develop-
ment, dominant classes cause the impoverishment and exploitation of 
marginalized classes who become separated from means of their (re)pro-
duction. It is the transition from a class in itself to class for itself — when 
they become conscious of their marginalized positions and have the au-
tonomy and capacity to understand it, that strengthens their agency to po-
litically mobilize to change their situation. 
In contrast with Marxist interpretations, for agrarian political econo-
mists influenced by Chayanov, social differentiation is largely cyclical and 
demographic. Historically, this has been premised on Chayanov’s empiri-
cal studies of the Russian peasant economy in the 1920s. He postulated 
that farmers in the countryside were embedded in family economies where 
wage labour is absent and they engaged in simple reproduction making use 
of available household labour (Thorner, 1966). In contrast with Lenin, 
Chayanov argued that differentiation within the peasantry was not driven 
primarily by social-historical processes of class formation (of capitalist and 
proletariats), but rather traced it to natural historical processes of demo-
graphic change that occurred with family growth, household characteris-
tics, kinship ties, and cyclical mobility within and across generations 
(Shanin, 1974; Thorner, 1966; Wolf, 2001) 4. Although towards the end of 
Chayanov’s writing, he engaged with class differentiation of the peasants, 
noting that Russians peasants at the time generally fell within the ‘middle 
farmers’ rank, he maintained that hired labour and capitalist penetration 
was very minimal due to the farmers ability to survive capitalism by means 
of drudgery and self-exploitation’ (Thorner, 1966). Emerging from the 
Chayanovian perspectives, most moral economists continue to argue for 
the persistence of the peasantry and family labour, but as shown in the 
previous section, not as that of a fixed characterization, but as production 
units that are constantly evolving through dynamic processes of change 
(Edelman, 2005; Shanin, 1973; van der Ploeg, 2010). Most scholars with 
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some inclinations towards a Chayanovian interpretation of agrarian 
change and moral economy of the peasantry (Scott 1976) recognize class 
differentiation of the peasantry. However, their take on class is seen 
through a populist perspective, a binary lens of ‘them versus us’. This im-
plies that the peasantry in itself should be considered as a class that has 
social structures of relations (usually one that is subordinated) with non-
peasant elites/ruling classes; landlords; capitalists; and the state. Ascrip-
tions of the peasantry as a single class is usually linked to their descriptions 
related to their near subsistent mode units of production, utilization of 
family labour, dependence on nature/agroecology, their persistence as 
well as the general ‘peasant condition’ of socio-economic vulnerability 
which can be linked to natural causes, household demographic changes, 
capitalist subordination and the policies of ruling classes and states 
(Desmarais, 2008; McMichael, 2015; Shanin, 1974; van der Ploeg, 2014). 
Moral economy perspectives, like Marxists interpretations of rural devel-
opment, also follow the logic of differentiation and exploitation, but they 
tend to perceive this from a binary interpretation of class, whereby the 
policies and activities emanating from ruling elite classes threatens the sub-
sistence of peasants (a single marginalized class) or that which unsustain-
ably transforms their mode of (re)production (Shanin, 1974). 
Within and between these broad theoretical strands, the conceptualiza-
tion of social class differentiation is still contested. Indeed, there are also 
several conjunctures and nuances that may not fall within a particular tra-
dition as they may associate with processes that relate to both Marxist and 
Chayanovian perspectives or even transcend them. For instance, Becker, 
(1989) argued that although structural antagonism between capital and la-
bour is real, it is an abstraction due to the fact that its manifestation in 
struggle is premised on many other factors including age, sex, etc. thereby 
making capitalist class structure so complex that not all individual wage 
workers are uniformly threatened by the logic of capital and to the same 
extent. Similarly, Berry, (1984) critiqued the appropriateness of Marxist 
approaches to the African peasantry from its historical generality and ina-
bility to fully analyse the shifting realities of agrarian change in Africa. O’ 
Laughlin (2016) in her tribute to Bernstein’s work on the agrarian question 
in Africa, has noted that in spite of the inherent challenges within Marxist 
approaches, it has offered an important alternative to the almost hege-
monic neo-liberal explanations that limited the analysis of rural poverty 
and development to market relations. Besides, it has also expanded an 
 Introduction 19 
open and creative research on class dynamics in Africa as evidenced in the 
various studies on land reforms in Southern Africa (Moyo, 2011a); class 
and gender dimensions of hunger in Africa (Tsikata, 2003; A Whitehead, 
1990); commodification and changes peasant modes of production in 
West Africa (Amanor, 1999; 2012); and colonial questions surrounding 
land re-distribution and the forced eviction of white settler farmers in 
Zimbabwe (Bernstein, 2002; Moyo 2003) among many others. Beyond the 
African question, it is worth noting that both Marxists and Chayanovian 
perspectives of rural class differentiation have influenced debates of rural 
development in critical agrarian scholarship and policy, e.g. small versus 
large-scale agriculture, of industrial versus non-industrial agriculture, 
whether or not the peasantry has/will disappear etc. (Bernstein, 2010; 
Lenin, 1982; Lipton, 2006; Shanin, 1973; Thorner, 1966). While these de-
bates have waxed and waned in the past, they have been revived partly as 
a result of the global resource rush, as well as the contentious politics 
waged by agrarian movements, notably La Via Campesina and the food 
sovereignty movement.  
Following colonial penetration in the late nineteenth century and com-
mercial expansion in Ghana and Africa in general, capitalist development 
advanced steadily through the introduction of a trade economy, labour 
reserves and concessionary companies. These have transformed agricul-
tural land use and production methods from colonial times through inde-
pendence and to the contemporary period where there has been a renewed 
interest in land and commercial agriculture (Amin, 1972; Moyo, 2003). 
From these historical processes, the current wave of land rush and its as-
sociated land concentration and large-scale production systems continue 
to shape and change the social relations of production in rural agrarian 
societies. Borras and Franco (2010) provide a typology of four (4) possible 
directions in land use changes associated with land deals: food to food; 
food to biofuels; food to non-food; and non-food to biofuels. Whilst the 
first two represent a displacement of food production by commodified 
food/biofuel production, the latter two present an intensification of land 
use from the forest, marginal or so-called idle lands for food and biofuel 
production (Hall, 2010). Yet, in all instances, they could be for both the 
domestic market and/or exports. This relates to the case of enquiry that 
is characteristic of the food-food trajectory, and the state and customary 
institutions are highly implicated. Here, Bernstein’s question ‘who owns 
what’ becomes very relevant. In one of the old state-led oil palm land grabs 
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in Ghana, some chiefs lost custody over their lands while others were ben-
efiting from some ground rents. Many migrants and sharecroppers also 
lost their investments and became displaced, while others have been com-
pelled to migrate or have been integrated into out-grower schemes 
(Amanor, 1999). Because of the nature and complexity of changes in land 
relations, Ribot & Peluso (2003) call for analyses that transcend land rights 
and entitlements to that which looks into the power relations of access i.e. 
the ability of different groups and classes to derive benefits from land re-
sources. The impacts on access affects different classes and generational 
groups differently: landless and near landless proletariats, smallholders 
who may not adequate land for production and those who are forced into 
petty commodity activities, women, the aged, and the youth whose land 
access is often constrained among others (Bernstein, 2010; Borras, et al, 
2015; White, 2012).   
To unpack the land-labour nexus, an agrarian political economy ap-
proach, serves as a useful analytical framework. The labour question can 
be analysed within two major trajectories. One is when capital needs land 
but not labour ( Li, 2011). This pathway occurs when labour becomes sur-
plus to the requirements of a more efficient agriculture as often dominant 
in the ‘modernization’ and ‘transformation’ rhetoric of both domestic and 
foreign policies on agriculture (World Bank 2008). A few find jobs in other 
sectors of the economy: off-farm jobs, wage work and in urban areas. 
However, the most likely outcome is the continuous expulsion of rural 
people from the land through primitive accumulation and expanded re-
production (Harvey, 2003). Hence, land deals are implicated in the crea-
tion of what Marx calls a ‘relative surplus population', referring to the ‘rel-
ative redundant population of labourers who are of greater extent than 
suffices for the average needs of the self-expansion of capital’ (Marx, 1977, 
p. 437). Marx postulated that for a ‘successful’ transition to capitalism, this 
reserve army of labour is to be absorbed in industry. This also alludes to 
classical economic literature as theorized in the Lewis (1954) model where 
he theorized that movement from the rural agricultural to the urban in-
dustrial sector characterized structural transformation. The idea was that 
transfer of labour may proceed without decline in agricultural output, and 
at a constant real wage; and that food might be transferred with labour. 
Arsel & Dasgupta, (2012) argue that structural transformation literature 
does not adequately account for the role of land supply in the movement 
between productive sectors, thus question the agricultural, socioeconomic 
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and environmental implications of structural change. Still, following the 
truncated trajectory of agrarian transition in Africa, whereby there has not 
been a reliable pathway from agriculture to industry, or from country to 
city, the question thus remains, ‘what happens to the livelihood trajectories 
of rural people displaced by land deals? 
Second is the question of what happens when both land and labour are 
needed. Here, rural people may not be expelled but rather they are likely 
to be subsumed into large-scale enterprises as wage workers or contract 
workers. A class lens, as guided by the question ‘who does what’ and ‘who 
gets what’ is relevant for understanding the differentiated interests and 
impacts on those incorporated; e.g. a landless wage worker’s interests dif-
fer from those who own land, in the same way that casual and permanent 
workers’ interests may not only differ but sometimes even conflict. The 
class positions of workers could determine the power of their agency — 
to negotiate conditions and have choices and options. For example, a land-
less and bonded wage worker who does not have adequate alternative 
sources of income may have limited choices on negotiations as compared 
to a casual landed wage worker. It also helps to analyse the long-term cy-
cles of inequality associated with land grabs. As has been already noted, 
because contemporary wage farmworkers do conform strictly to the clas-
sic single class of proletariats, the term ‘classes of labour’ as used by 
Bernstein, (2007, p. 1) is employed to connote ‘the growing numbers who 
now depend directly and indirectly on the sale of their labour power for 
their own daily reproduction'. That is both wage workers who possess 
some means production (land) as well those who alternate between small 
wage work and small-scale petty commodity (Lerche, 2010). These land-
based class differentiations intersect with generational and demographic 
differentiations within households in terms of population size, gender, 
marriage, age, sex, characteristics. A class analysis provides a nuanced un-
derstanding of the different layers of political reactions from below, which 
goes far beyond outright resistance to include varying forms of acquies-
cence and incorporation (Hall et al., 2015). This second trajectory also 
opens up debates about semi-proletarianization and social reproduction 
(Cousins, et al 2018). 
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1.5.2 Social Reproduction  
Following Marx, private property, free labour, accumulation and markets 
are defining features that sustain capitalist production. These factors, as 
discussed in the preceding section, shape the nature of economic relations 
and class-based differentiation, but are also, in themselves, dependent on 
capital’s commodification of land and labour through both overt and cov-
ert expropriation and exploitative processes that enable its expansion and 
the accumulation of surplus. As such, capitalist relations produce and re-
produces capital on the one end, and labour on the other. In the case of 
the latter, Marx equated the cost of labour to the wages necessary for the 
purchase of commodities that sustains workers’ social reproduction 
(Marx, 1976). Central to Marx’s discussions was thus, the dynamics of cap-
italist relations, particularly how lowering the cost of necessary commodi-
ties profits capital through relative surplus appropriation; leaving im-
portant gaps in external process outside of wage relations (Cousins, et al, 
2018).  
Beyond the conditions that shape economic relations on the site of 
production, many feminist political economists have drawn attention to 
the social relations of care that facilitate the reproduction of the work-
force, both biologically and as compliant wage workers (Bhattacharya, 
2017; Fraser, 2017; Razavi, 2009b). In other words, social reproduction 
which Fraser, (2014, p. 61) defines as the ‘forms of provisioning, caregiv-
ing and interaction that produce and maintain social bonds’ serve as an 
indispensable background condition for the possibility of capitalist pro-
duction. Social reproduction is thus constituted in four aspects: (a) biolog-
ical reproduction of the species, and the conditions and social construc-
tions of motherhood; (b) reproduction through migration and its enabling 
conditions (Shah & Lerche, 2020); (c) the reproduction of the labour force 
which involves subsistence, education and training; and (d) the reproduc-
tion and provisioning of caring needs through either privatized kinship 
networks or through state institutions (Bakker, 2007, p. 541). Through the 
concept of social reproduction, we understand that within capitalist econ-
omies, labour in particular, is not only needed for the production of goods 
and services, but also has to be reproduced for the continuance of this 
system; the process of labour reproduction is therefore not only material 
but also social and embedded in historically established norms and insti-
tutions (Picchio, 1992).  
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Earlier debates on social reproduction centred on how and why women’s 
unpaid domestic labour subsidized capitalist reproduction under Fordism, 
to promote working-class consumerism in cities while inhibiting the de-
velopment of commodity consumption in the periphery (Fraser, 2014). 
Recent interests in the concept reflects more broadly, how the everyday 
activities of maintaining life and reproducing the next generation are grad-
ually being realized through the increasingly privatized forms of social pro-
visioning; the role of both paid and unpaid domestic activities, and there-
fore the infiltration of capitalist market relations in historically non-
marketized aspects of the economy (Bhattacharya, 2017; Fraser, 2014). As 
such, production and social reproduction in rural agrarian societies are be-
ing co-shaped, and encompass contradictions and tensions that often re-
main at the centre of class, identity and generational struggles and rural 
politics. While neoliberalism is marked by a crisis of social provisioning, it 
is not simply a crisis of care, but also tends to destabilize the process of 
social reproduction upon which capitalist production depends5.  
In this study, the concept of social reproduction provides analytical in-
sight in examining the dynamics of dispossession, wage labour relations 
on the plantation and labour on family farms. It guides understanding into 
how dispossession affects women farmers and their sources of subsistence 
and the interrelated process that contribute to the reconfiguration, and 
transformation of existing social contracts and relations of production. It 
informs analysis on the role of households and kinship relations, particu-
larly women, the youth and children in enabling production on the plan-
tation; the relations and the nature of inter-dependence between the 
small/family farming the plantation, given the large extent of semi-prole-
tarianism in the affected communities; and how state institutions as well 
as local norms and traditions influence the social relations of production.  
 
1.5.3 A Gendered Political Economy 
As it has been highlighted above, land-based social differentiation inter-
sects with other social and identity-based differences, co-shaping each 
other. In his study on the shortcomings of classic agrarian political econ-
omy theories of rural differentiation, mainly Marxists interpretations, 
White, (1989) highlighted the need for dynamic and adaptable frameworks 
that approach social differentiation from a contextualised and relational 
viewpoint. Similarly, Oya, (2004) even notes that the application of class 
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in the rural African context may even defy objectivity. In some rural places 
in Ghana for instance, a prominent basis of differentiation is ‘stranger-
hood’ rather than class, whilst elsewhere in Ethiopia, state policies of land 
distribution has made class a less significant, if not a non-existent means 
of differentiation (Moreda, 2016). To better understand rural agrarian 
structures and visible transformations in the era of the global land rush, 
other demographic and identity-related forms of differentiation (gender, 
age, ethnicity, religion, social status etc.) usually raised in moral economy 
perspectives, cannot be overemphasized. To explore other identity issues 
that are evident in the land grab-land-labour nexus in West Africa (partic-
ularly, Ghana), I employ ‘gender’ as a feminist analytical tool that considers 
the issues of ‘feminized identities — not only women but also migrants, 
ethnic and religious minorities whose agency, skill, reason, capability and 
power remains threatened, structurally and systemically. 
A great number of gender studies have been influenced by, and are now 
central to the large body of literature of on Gender and Development 
(GAD) and Women in Development (WID). Boserup's, (1970) study on 
women's role in economic development has most often been referred to 
as the starting point for understanding women’s position in development. 
Her study, together with the growth of feminist research at the time, pro-
vided a critique of modernization theory and provoked projects aimed at 
addressing the economic exclusion of women in development (Okali, 
2011; Waylen, 1997). Most significantly, these debates drew attention to 
the omission of women and adding them to dominant narratives of devel-
opment. Gender advocates, economists, and international institutions 
such as the World Bank and the International Food Policy Research Insti-
tute (IFPRI) inclined to new institutional economics have usually ap-
proached agrarian studies from this angle, most often pointing out alloca-
tive inefficiencies driven by the structure of male and female incentives in 
farm households (see World Bank 2001). Such ‘gender-aware’ or ‘gen-
dered disaggregated’ perspectives (Elson, 1998) make women empirically 
visible, and it is usually a useful point of departure to explaining how 
women and men are differently related and affected by development 
(Elson, 1998). Nonetheless, several critiques have been levelled against 
this approach to studying gender in development for being too narrow, 
depoliticising women’s subordination and not addressing fully the struc-
tural privileging of men and masculinity (Lockwood, 1992; Peterson, 
2005). Peterson, (2005, p. 500), therefore calls for ‘productive and 
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transformative gendered political economy that not only adds a women’s 
dimension but expands into investigating relationships among women’s 
and men’s identities, activities and inequalities of power’.  
Agrarian political economy perspectives, arguably, offer convincing 
grounds for a social relations analysis of gender (da Corta, 2009). In doing 
so, the study sets out to explore two broad interrelated aspects of gender 
relations in communities affected by land grabs: i) How power is consti-
tuted in domestic and capitalist relations of (re)production and ii) the in-
stitutions, ideologies and norms that structure or reinforce power relations 
in access to and control over land, conditions of work, income and repro-
duction (Razavi, 2002, 2009a; Venkateshwarlu & da Corta, 2001). It widely 
acknowledged that in West Africa, with or without land grabs, women and 
other minority groups’ access to and control over land resources (includ-
ing complementary inputs for production) remains restricted and insecure 
(Doss, et al 2014; Kevane & Gray, 1999; Tsikata, 2003). As such, whilst 
land deals that provide new opportunities to women and other marginal-
ized groups could be transformative, those that take away their already 
limited access further worsens their welfare even if there are some income 
gains to men (Behrman et al., 2012). Questions of rights over land, the 
existing tenure institutions, patterns of inheritance and how benefits from 
land are determined to (dis)empower marginalized groups, are all im-
portant contextual issues for examining gendered relations (Agarwal, 
2003).  
One area in the land grab literature where gender issues are mostly dis-
cussed is the labour question, usually set in the context of agribusiness and 
the growing feminization of labour. However, the oil palm sector is a ra-
ther male dominated field, further complicating the direct and indirect im-
pacts on women of different social classes. A gendered analysis of the im-
plications of land deals on wage labour relations looks into the to the role 
of gendered domestic relations in structuring labour and product markets 
(Razavi, 2002). Here, we are reminded to look into how the bargaining 
positions of feminized wage labourers are shaped by domestic relations. 
In their study in India, Venkateshwarlu & da Corta, (2001) and da Corta, 
(2009) found out that women’s bargaining power for good conditions of 
work, sometimes fall when they become de facto family heads or when 
they have to contribute to paying off debts taken by a patriarch. Their 
disadvantaged situation is even compounded when widowed, divorced 
and separated in places where there are no reliable social systems of 
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support. Under such structural constraints, they may not overtly resist land 
grabs but are likely to remain in it under weakened employment relations. 
A gendered political economy looks not only into how power relations 
disempower marginalized groups, but also the extent to which land grabs 
provide opportunities or not, for building the capacities and skills of wage 
workers, how this is differentiated among women and men under different 
task allocations and contracts, and how this is influenced also by institu-
tions and norms (Behrman et al., 2012; Harriss-White, 2003). In their re-
search in Ghana, Torvikey, et al (2016)  found out that even when land 
deals have generated many jobs for men and women, they have favoured 
men who occupy more secure forms of inclusion in administrative posi-
tions and as out growers, while women have been largely integrated as 
disposable casual workers on farm and factories.  
These gender/identity-related issues intersect with class to produce 
even more complex outcomes. Under the prevalent contexts where their 
gender and migrant statuses deny them land ownership, and when the loss 
of the ‘wifey’ status can also strip them of their entitlements, they also 
become dispossessed, thereby transiting them into landless/near landless 
classes in urgent need for alternative sources of income and reproduction. 
Such double vulnerability makes wage work both attractive and exploita-
tive (Julia & White, 2012). This may consist of inclusion (attractiveness to 
specific production tasks), disadvantaged inclusion (wage disparities, and 
gender-blind/biased/neutral working conditions), and forced inclusion 
that also doubles as exclusion (when they are forced into wage work be-
cause of unsupportive institutions, e.g. their inability to own land, men’s 
control over family farms, and limited diversification options). Also, when 
women are forced into wage labour as a result of dispossession, or even 
in the case of landless migrants, their class positions also affect how much 
land deals affect them. Under varying social conditions, both class and 
identity relations revert backwards and forwards, suggesting the need to 
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1.5.4 The Political Economy of Livelihoods (Livelihood 
Perspectives) 
In the context of rural Ghana, a livelihood approach is analytically and 
practically useful as a complementary approach to agrarian political econ-
omy for assessing how land grabs affect land and labour relations among 
the rural working poor in Ghana whose choices are shaped by the every-
day struggles of unemployment, cash and basic needs etc., in order to 
make a living. This does not represent a shift from class-based approaches 
as O’Laughlin, (2002) has cautioned, but one that places class differentia-
tion within the context of everyday struggles and livelihood strategies. To 
examine the implications of land grabs on the day-to-day lives of rural 
working people, a livelihoods approach is very relevant. Usually centred at 
the household level, livelihoods perspectives start with what people have 
and how people live differently.  
Most livelihood studies draw on Chambers and Conway’s (1992, p. 7) 
definition of livelihoods as ‘the capabilities, assets and activities required 
for a means of living'. Livelihoods are thus sustainable when they can cope 
with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance their capa-
bilities and assets, and support future generations. Assets comprise the 
human, natural, physical, social and economic that interact across space 
and time and also vary across social, gender and ethnic groups 
(Bebbington, 1999). They serve as ‘stocks of capital’ existing either as a 
stock (e.g., land) or from surplus value necessary for a household’s capa-
bilities, means of survival and reproduction (Bebbington, 1999; Ellis, 
1999). They are therefore dynamic, context-specific, and households may 
reduce or increase some at the expense of others (Morse & McNamara, 
2013). Second, the mediating processes within which assets can be ac-
cessed and utilised has been categorised as the contexts, conditions and 
trends focusing on political, socio-economic, cultural demographic and 
natural environments, social differentiation, institutions and organizations 
(Scoones, 1998, 2009) or the vulnerability contexts and transforming pro-
cesses. Third, the particular livelihood strategies of rural people are shaped 
by how assets, mediating processes of the households of the rural working 
poor can be combined, substituted and switched to generate sustainable 
outcomes (Scoones, 2009). Livelihood perspectives thus analyse the com-
plexities and trade-offs in livelihood strategies to guide development in-
tervention. In rural development, emphasis is usually placed on how live-
lihoods are shaped around interventions such as agricultural 
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intensification, income diversification (non-farm employment) and migra-
tion (through remittances) etc. in ways that are sustainable —that they re-
duce poverty, enhance well-being, capabilities and resilience and protect 
natural resources (Scoones, 2009).  
Critical viewpoints on the livelihoods approach have mainly centred in 
its analytical limitations in capturing power relations and structural issues 
that affect the peasantry (de Haan, 2006; O’Laughlin, 2002). It discusses 
structures as ‘context’ and not understood as cross-cutting relations to be 
analytically probed. Small (2007) attributes the negligence of power rela-
tions to the fact that the framework did not emanate from a theory of 
social or economic change, grand or otherwise, rather relies on an array of 
current international development paradigms that narrowly focus on par-
ticipation, empowerment and poverty reduction. Wiggins (2002) however 
does not fully agree with such claims, but attributes it to an ‘economic 
capture’ — a microeconomic equation of input resource plus structure 
equals outcome, which sometimes leaves discussions of power relations 
to its margins. This also resonates with an earlier argument by Bryceson, 
(1999) that livelihood perspective mostly captures short-term impacts of 
capitalist development because even when income diversification through 
wage work is provided, it produces long-term inequalities and speeds up 
de-peasantisation processes in rural communities — a blind spot of the 
framework.   
In response to some of these critical standpoints, Scoones (2009) 
acknowledged that within the livelihood perspectives, class and other 
identity relations and structural questions of agrarian change have not 
been central yet not absent. He, for instance, argued that sustainability is 
negotiated in a maze of politically defined opportunities and constraints 
thus suggesting the importance of not narrowing it down to simple coping 
strategies (Scoones, 2015). ‘Stresses and shocks must be coped with and 
recovered from; assets and capabilities must be maintained and enhanced; 
and natural resource base on which many livelihoods depend must not be 
undermined’ (ibid p.73). In response to the critiques, Scoones, (2015) in 
his small book on sustainable livelihoods and rural development, provides 
an expansive account on the framework, highlighting the role of power 
and politics on livelihoods as they unfold in specific contexts. For instance, 
empirical accounts of agrarian transitions revealed that there have always 
been many determinants and relations, and in most cases, the ideal types 
vary widely. He has reinstated the livelihood approach within the context 
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of long-term, historical patterns of structurally defined relations of state 
control, and of differential patterns of production, accumulation, invest-
ment and reproduction. This he terms as the political economy of liveli-
hoods (Scoones, 2015, p. 74). It is therefore important to look into multi-
ple livelihoods strategies, how they coexist and produce agrarian dynamics 
to shape social relations.   
 Livelihood perspectives provide understanding of the structures and 
processes involved in the ways in which land grabs impact access to, and 
control over land — looking at both dispossession (e.g. loss of land, crops, 
and food etc.) and the (un)sustainability of the alternative livelihoods as-
sociated with it (e.g. through (in)access to alternative lands, compensa-
tions, employment opportunities etc.) As Scoones (2009) has rightly ar-
gued, the complexity, diversity and uncertainty of rural futures make 
livelihoods perspectives very essential. Land grabs can provide differential 
outcomes for peasants, but peasants may adopt varying livelihood strate-
gies, given their available assets, contexts and institutions. The land-labour 
nexus that is the focus of this research would be assessed through some 
elements of the livelihood framework. It allows for the recognition of 
value differentiation. Peasants have differentiated raisons d’être, differ-
ences in their attachment to land, and place different values on different 
forms of assets when we consider assets as not as only inputs but also as 
outputs that explain people’s sense of ‘well-being’ (Bebbington, 1999). For 
instance, the attractiveness of wage work to women and migrants, reasons 
people sell their land to engage in wage labour etc. The approach is both 
conceptually and operationally supportive to African rural dwellers' drive 
for income diversification given the constraints of small farming (Ellis, 
1999). For example, for the landed farmer who becomes seasonally food 
insecure, livelihood perspectives can provide insights into their preference 
for certain employment contracts, e.g. the extent to which casual contracts 
on land deal sites becomes a viable livelihood strategy for them. The sus-
tainability elements of livelihood perspectives can also provide a useful 
framework for explaining how the land grab related impacts on land and 
labour also affect access to income and means of social reproduction. For 
example, even if those dispossessed from their land get incorporated into 
land deals as wage workers or out growers, to what extent will these strat-
egies enhance their well-being? It also means assessing the vulnerabilities 
and contexts of rural groups and classes (women, migrant workers, land-
less workers) and how they are able to adapt to various working terms and 
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conditions in order to determine the sustainability of their strategies to 
sustain the livelihoods of their households.  
 
In effect, everyday life experiences and livelihood contexts shape how 
people benefit or not from land deals, as well as their political/economic 
reactions especially in the short to medium term. In a country where there 
are high rates of unemployment/underemployment6, inadequate socio-
economic infrastructure, many people tend to embrace promises of job 
creation as promoted by the state, traditional institutions and investors. 
Some youth are also turning away from family farms because systemically, 
small-scale agriculture is becoming unattractive, and many are persuaded 
by promises of modern forms of production, good jobs, and incomes 
(White, 2012). Socially deprived rural communities are also squeezed be-
tween declining agricultural returns and poor access (economic and phys-
ical) to basic needs thus for most people, their land, and labour related 
interests are premised on expectations on improvements in their social 
conditions (Bryceson & Howe, 1997). It is not surprising that often times, 
communities tend to rate the promises of schools, health posts and pipe-
borne water over other structural needs (see Amanor, 1999 on the 
GOPDC case). Under such livelihood contexts, different social groups 
and societies are affected differently and perceive land deals differently. In 
the light of the above findings from literature, it could be argued that, on 
the one hand, the existing social structures of reproduction that are inher-
ently unequal, make land deals potential short-to medium-term livelihood 
diversification strategies for people, especially women and other margin-
alized groups. On the other hand, it also shapes power relations — the 
ability of people to benefit from or lose out on land deal.  
 
1.5.5 Organized and Everyday Politics 
Locating peasants’ political reactions within the context of contemporary 
global land grabs presents peasants’ politics on two broad fronts. One is 
the struggles against eviction and dispossession in the defence of the com-
mons. Indeed, this has been the most common assumption and underlying 
principles underlying anti-land grab advocacies and movements. In the 
Ghanaian rural context, civil society and organized action remain limited. 
Radical political mobilizations against land deals rarely occur. Among the 
few existing and influential agrarian justice organizations and movements, 
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they adopt advocacy politics and form alliances with domestic and trans-
national networks with shared interests. They usually advocate policy 
changes, and organize on principled ideas and values and plead the cause 
of others (Keck & Sikkink, 1999). This case examines the role of advocacy 
politics in mediating the issues around dispossession.   
Neoclassical conceptions on labour politics are premised on the meth-
odological assumption that peasants are rational and often make decisions 
upon calculating the benefits and risks of engaging in collective action 
(Deininger, 1999; Lipton, 2010). According to Popkin (1979), this explains 
why landless labourers may not necessarily initiate resistance. Although he 
describes them as the most politically conscious groups, he argued that, 
even when they resist capitalist interventions, it is usually based on incen-
tives, and/or directed towards new opportunities which aim at taming 
markets and bureaucrats rather than restoring traditional systems.  
Both Marxist and moral economy notions provide useful insights into 
how to understand the nature of land grab politics from below. Marxist 
perspectives are premised on the assumption that common oppression 
brings about class action, yet are generally not very optimistic about the 
peasants’ ability to organize resistance due to the exploitative and control-
ling nature of dominant classes and state institutions. Proletariats or the 
working class in particular are thought to be the most potentially radical 
class because they do not have property, and because of the nature of so-
cialized work place. One puzzle that preoccupies Marxists is why workers 
do not always think and act in the best interest of their class. Thus, the 
notions of ‘class-in-itself’ and ‘class-for-itself’; the former being the soci-
oeconomic being, and the latter the political translation. The often per-
ceived ‘false or lack of class consciousness’ is understood as part of the 
continuum between class-in-itself and class-for-itself (Duggett, 1975; 
Marx, 1977). Even when peasants exhibit consciousness, they often focus 
on economic bargaining rather than demanding radical political changes 
(Paige, 1975). With this in mind, one is able to unpack the attempts in 
pursuing collective action in relation to farmworkers and the dispossessed. 
It critically assesses the claims, demands and impacts of collective efforts, 
but even more importantly, the constraints of organizing and how and 
where the issues concerning dispossession and exploitation converge and 
diverge. 
Moral economy perspectives, on the other hand, which, like Marxists’ 
interpretations, also follows the logic of differentiation and exploitation, 
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perceive this, however, from a binary interpretation of class, whereby the 
policies and activities emanating from ruling elite classes threaten the sub-
sistence of peasants or that which unfavourably transforms their mode of 
(re)production (Shanin, 1974; Thorner, 1966). Although peasants may be 
constrained to organize, their everyday ways of life can express agency 
against the actions of ruling elites who threaten their means of subsistence. 
Their daily reactions of resistance, the everyday politics involves little or 
no organization to embrace, comply with, adjust, and contest norms and 
rules regarding authority over, production of, or allocation of resources 
(Scott, 1985). In his study on peasant resistance in Southeast Asia, Scott 
described everyday politics as often unplanned, uncoordinated, and those 
involved ‘typically avoid any direct symbolic confrontation with authority 
or with elite norms’. It is usually low profile and private behaviour of the 
people and often entwined with individuals and small groups’ activities in 
their struggles to sustain their daily livelihoods while interacting with oth-
ers like themselves, with superiors and with subordinates.  
The study also considers everyday action is a useful analytical tool for 
examining labour politics on the plantation. In a study by Amanor, (1999) 
on a post-independence state-led oil palm land grab in Ghana, he revealed 
how some unemployed youth engaged in illicit night time harvesting of 
palm bunches even under tight security confrontations. Through other 
forms of everyday ‘action and production', such as land occupation, squat-
ting, divestment by contract farmers, marginalized groups express their 
dissatisfaction with unfavourable systems. The extent to which everyday 
politics serve as effective ‘weapons of the weak’ is however contested. It 
has to be assessed within the social, economic and political contexts of the 
affected people. 
1.5.6 State-Society Relations under Pluralistic Institutions   
Now, on the broader questions of governance, the role of the state has 
been profound in land grab debates regarding states’ interests, and their 
authority and capacity to govern land grabs (Margulis & Porter, 2013; 
White, et al, 2012). The state remains a complex phenomenon and itself a 
site of struggle at diverse levels (Jessop, 2007; Watts, 1989). It is an ‘en-
semble of political, social, economic and coercive institutions that exercise 
‘public’ authority in a given territory (Fox, 1993, p. 11). A state-society 
approach centralizes the range of actors within the state, and the struggles 
to shape goals and strategies in relation to pressures from social actors 
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with common interests. Here, emphasis is thus placed on the relational 
autonomy and the capacity of the state to act as linked to social actors’ 
degree of autonomy, their identities and perceptions of common interests 
which are often formed by the identification of rights and claims (Fox, 
1993). One key aspect of state-society interactions is to look at how these 
relations in terms of power, interests, goals, and strategies shift over time, 
as well as the politics involved. In a country like Ghana with pluralistic 
land governance institutions, it is important to examine how political 
struggles around land grabs are mediated by the national policies and cus-
tomary institutions of land tenure including chieftaincy and family systems 
within which the land deals take place.  
For instance, given the massive publicity on land grabs, and especially 
regarding oil palm, investors continue to navigate away from negative 
press and accountability by seeking opportunities and operating in the 
loopholes within complex customary systems and norms. The past two 
decades have seen customary tenure being further reinvented by states 
through several policy reforms and in local spheres, they have become 
sites of changing institutions and norms. Customary tenure as discussed 
in this thesis is thus not completely detached from and opposed to formal 
systems but examined as both overlapping and competing institutional 
spheres that produce differentiated relations to land (Griffiths, 1986). This 
is particularly necessary for moving the discussion beyond the state, capital 
and society as actors, toward the politics within and between these actors 
as shaped by the existing institutions and structures (Steinmo & Thelen, 
2010; Thelen, 2002). Such an approach helps examine how and why land 
grabs emerge, how the interactions between and within institutions influ-
ence political reactions from below.  
 
1.5.7 Land Grabs and the Competing Governance Tendencies  
The theoretical discussions have suggested that capitalist relations in rural 
smallholder societies can have diverse implications for different social 
groups. How then should large-scale agricultural investments be governed 
to protect the marginalized groups? The view of three competing tenden-
cies: (a) regulate to facilitate land deals; (b) regulate to mitigate negative 
impacts and maximize opportunities; and (c) regulate to stop and rollback 
land grabbing put forward by Borras et al., (2013) is an appropriate starting 
point to understanding the institutional aspects of large-scale agricultural 
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investments in Africa. Reiterating the caution by Borras et al., (2013 
pg168), 'these tendencies are not sharply defined and fixed. Hence the use 
of the term ‘tendency', and each is in turn internally variegated' and also 
influenced by broader political and ideological contestations around the 
notions of economic growth and development. These three typical regu-
latory approaches help to analyse the policy directions of states concerning 
land deals, at the same time being aware of the political shifts over time.   
The tendency (A) of regulating to facilitate land deals is embedded in ad-
ministrative propositions to address the issues of effectiveness, efficiency 
and transparency in land transactions (Borras et al., 2013; Franco & 
Monsalve Suárez, 2018). Here, there is the recognition that large-scale ag-
ricultural investments are driven by the global demand for food, feed and 
fuel. However, they are also considered favourable because of longstand-
ing advantages, e.g. market adaptability and economies of scale of large 
operations (Deininger & Byerlee, 2012). This policy direction facilitates 
accumulation under transparent and participatory institutions that check 
on information asymmetries. Proponents promote land formalization pro-
grammes, public-private partnerships and property rights purported to se-
cure investments and reduce transaction costs for investors. These prep-
ositions are also presumed as preconditions necessary to prevent failed 
deals, unemployment, and irreversible environmental implications 
(UNCTAD et al., 2010).   
The tendency (B) of ‘regulating to mitigate negative impacts and maximise op-
portunities’ recognizes that large land investments have unfolded already, 
and cannot be un-done, but can be regulated. Similar to tendency A, policy 
priorities emphasize the need to ensure that investments are undertaken 
sustainably and have minimal adverse effects on people and the environ-
ment (von Braun & Meinzen-Dick, 2009). However, unlike the ‘strategic 
thinking' underpinning the first tendency that advances investments, this 
second current adopts a more tactical and practical approach, that is to 
address the urgent needs of poor people whose livelihoods could be 
threatened by land deals. In the past few years, human rights advocacy 
including the call for decent labour standards (e.g. elimination of child la-
bour, right to unionization, social security benefits, generation of new and 
higher-paying jobs), land use rights, transparency, and the incorporation 
of small-scale farmers in production and market chains of agribusinesses 
(e.g. out-grower schemes), have all become prominent ways to address 
land grabs (Beekmans et al., 2014; Bertram, 2012). 
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In stark contrast to the first two approaches, is the tendency (C) of 
‘regulating to stop and roll back’ land deals. It represents a radical stance against 
large-scale investments. From this perspective, land deals expose the rural 
people and peasants to dispossession and forced proletarianization, even-
tually culminating in deprivation and poverty (La Via Campesina, 2007; 
Moyo, Yeros, & Jha, 2012; Rosset, 2009). McMichael, (2008, p. 213) adds 
that beyond dispossession, is an equally crucial fact that such investments 
tend to rule out the place for peasants, closing doors to alternatives and 
re-moving peasants and their systems of production from history. Simi-
larly, others highlight their embeddedness in global power asymmetries 
whereby investors as compared to local populations, become better posi-
tioned to advance their agenda and benefit more under institutions of 
property rights (Margulis et al., 2013). Notably, radical agrarian justice or-
ganizations such as the food sovereignty movement has been influential 
in proposing alternatives through campaigns for agrarian reforms that sup-
port peasant agriculture instead of large-scale investments. Aa popular 
declaration of La via Campesina has been ‘‘Our Land is our identity, it is not 
for Sale.’ ( Borras & Franco, 2012; La Via Campesina, 2007). 
While all three tendencies recognize power asymmetries as a constraint 
to the developmental outcomes of land deals, they diverge on the per-
ceived sources of these power inequalities, and how to deal with them. 
Whereas policy strategies that navigate towards the first two tendencies 
show optimism that inclusive participation and transparency could lead to 
positive outcomes, that of the latter stresses more on the expropriating 
and coercive character of capitalist development which makes it unlikely 
to trust participatory processes. Again, from outside and within the third 
regulatory tendency, some have also drawn attention to class, identity and 
ideological tensions within which radical agrarian and environmental 
movements against all forms of large-scale investment operate (Edelman 
& Borras, 2016). The extent to which they represent the diverse interests 
of rural people or peasants in different contexts also remains highly de-
bated (Bernstein, 2013). A project may be denounced globally and nation-
ally but receive support from some groups at the local level (Larder, 2015).   
These regulatory responses, therefore, do not necessarily lead to par-
ticular outcomes but require evaluating what happens on the ground con-
cerning the specific political-economic context within which they are im-
plemented. Thus, it crucial to examine the political processes of certain 
regulations and why they emphasize certain goals rather than others. In 
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many instances, institutions operate within high power imbalances (see 
Visser & Spoor, 2011). For instance, in Ghana, the extent to which people 
can hold the state accountable on land deals depends on the land tenure 
guiding the acquisition. Ghana’s policy of ‘non-interference’ in customary 
and market-based land tenure (Amanor, 2008) promotes capital accumu-
lation while investors also operate under a laissez-faire business environ-
ment. Even though the state's non-direct interference in customary land 
transactions empowers traditional land institutions, it also relieves the state 
from excessive legitimation pressures thereby complicating the balance of 
power in land transactions and the ability to mitigate negative livelihood 
implications, e.g. labour impacts. The orientation of regulations/institu-
tions, the business models of investors, as well as the desires of affected 
communities are all socially and politically constructed, and therefore 
should be seen as broad patterns of class struggles around capitalist devel-
opment in the countryside (O’Laughlin, 2002; Steinmo & Thelen, 2010). 
In effect, the struggles over incorporation imply struggles over the char-
acter and orientation of labour institutions and models of production all 
of which affect the outcomes of and responses to land deals in both ex-
pected and unpredictable ways. This study, therefore, attempts to examine 
the two main competing regulatory approaches (AB, and C) to ascertain 
the extent to which they speak to the class and livelihood struggles of af-
fected communities and farmworkers in particular.  
 
1.6 Organization of Thesis  
The thesis is organized in eight chapters. This introductory chapter pre-
sents the problématique and the analytical framework that guides the 
study. Chapter two frames the case under study and the research methods 
employed. In chapter three, the social structures that shape land and la-
bour institutions are reviewed. It also illustrates the role of civil society in 
land politics in Ghana. The fourth chapter is centred on the land question 
regarding tenure, dispossession and rents, while the fifth chapter, unpacks 
the impacts of land deals on plantation wage labour and household farm 
labour supply and social reproduction. Chapter six examines the nature 
and forms of political reactions from below, exploring the overlapping, 
parallel and competing demands related to land and labour. Chapter seven 
takes a critical a look at the competing regulatory approaches to land grab 
governance to ascertain the implications for addressing the labour 
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question. In chapter eight, I present a summary of the research findings in 
relation to the research questions, engage with key theoretical debates, 







































1 Following the world economic crises and structural adjustment programmes. 
2 The status of migrants is not always a case of being marginalized. This is because 
in Ghana, the idea of local citizenship is very highly fluid and more often a case of 
social identity which is interpreted and legitimated by chiefs. Thus, migrants could 
be of varying classes in relation to their entitlement to land and resources.   
3 Yet, the World Bank also conceptualizes wage labour to be of little economic 
benefits (high supervision costs and low incentives) as compared to family for rea-
sons which therefore contradicts their land deal job creation narratives (World 
Bank, 2011). 
4 In the labour-consumer balance analysis he also considered the sum effects of 
other factors including soil quality, location, crops, market prices, availability of 
alternative work etc. 
5 While recognizing that there is not always a neat line between production and 
social production. Pensions for example, are not necessarily equivalent to labour 
time nor can they be considered the direct equivalent a worker’s labour power dur-
ing his or her active workdays but significant for generational social reproduction 
(Oran, 2017). 
6 Twelve percent unemployment rate out of which about ten percent are underem-





2 Research Scope and Methodology 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Researching global land deals requires a great deal of caution in order to 
provide a credible and convincing account of their processes and impacts 
(Edelman, 2013). This chapter provides an overview of the case under 
study i.e. is the demographic, and socio-economic scope of the study cov-
ered in this research. The chapter also provides a detailed account of the 
methods for the empirical fieldwork, a description of the secondary 
sources of data, the study limitations and the researcher’s positionality.  
2.2  An Overview of Study Design: Mixed Methods 
The pivot of this research is to understand the impacts of capitalist devel-
opment in the countryside, particularly how it affects the social relations 
around land and labour, and the political reactions from below. To provide 
answers to the research questions that are framed within a political econ-
omy perspective, a mixed methods approach to data collection and analy-
sis was adopted. Particularly, a qualitative predominant mixed-methods 
was employed to allow probing, narratives and discussions that give rele-
vant insights and explain the experiences of the study communities and 
affected people. As noted by Rossman and Rallis (2003) and Harwell, 
(2011), qualitative methods help to understand and analyse complex social 
phenomena and multiple “truths’ through contextual, emergent, and in-
terpretive ways. Quantitative data was gathered mainly for statistical evi-
dence e.g. on land sizes, demographic data among others, and in some 
instances for triangulation purposes.  
In addition, the research uses a case study approach to answer the re-
search questions. A case study refers to ‘an intensive study of a single unit 
or a small number of units (the cases), for the purpose of understanding a 
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larger class of similar units (Gerringer, 2007, p. 37). Case studies are con-
sidered an appropriate approach when units of inquiry are a social group, 
community, system, organization, institution, event, or even a person into 
which one wants to conduct a detailed and contextual study (Bryman, 
2012). The ‘case study approach’ is thus used by social scientists to mean 
many things — qualitative methods with small sample sizes, thick exami-
nation of a phenomenon using approaches such as ethnography and pro-
cess tracing. Bryman elaborates that ‘real-life contextual studies, investiga-
tions into the properties of a single observation a single phenomenon, and 
research that employs triangulation’ (ibid). This research, while engaging 
with a broader scope of agrarian issues, primarily investigates a specific oil 
palm plantation land deal, at the Nkwanta South Municipality on Ghana’s 
eastern corridor bordering Togo. It presents an in-depth study of the land-
labour implications of a large-scale land acquisition for an oil plantation.  
 
2.3  The Study Area: Nkwanta South Municipality Ghana 
The Volta region is at the easternmost part of the country and very unique 
because it is the longest in terms of land mass from the north to the south. 
Often described as a microcosm of the country, the region does not only 
house all the ethnic groups of Ghana but also stretches across all the coun-
try's ecological zones (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013).  It has a competi-
tive advantage for diverse agricultural activities — crop farming, animal 
rearing, fishing, hunting and forestry. Indeed, the northern Volta used to 
be one of Ghana's main hubs for cocoa production. Aside from the pro-
duction of cocoa and major food staples (maize, rice, cassava, yam etc.), 
non-traditional export crops such as ginger, cashew nuts, pineapple, paw-
paw and mangoes are also on the rise. Not so different from the general 
country context, the predominant farming systems is the small scale and 
family farming modes of production, often dependent on sharecroppers, 
family labour and wage labourers. However, over the years, some crop 
sectors such as pineapple, mango and rice have seen a rise in medium and 
large-scale production schemes from both foreign and national investors. 
The SGSOG-Herakles-Volta Red Farms is actually the largest oil palm 
plantation in the region. Aside from agriculture, there are other economic 
activities such retail and wholesale trade including agricultural middlemen, 
quarrying, construction, manufacturing, and transport services, among 
others.   
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Map 2.1 
 The Study Area 
 
 
Source, Author, 2018. 
 
The plantation is located in the Nkwanta South Municipality of the Volta 
region (now Oti Region1). The district, by virtue of its geographical prox-
imity to the northernmost half of Ghana, experiences the existing hori-
zontal inequality that compounds the ethnoreligious north-south divide in 
terms of infrastructure and basic social services and income. It is ethnically 
diverse and has a large population of settlers. The indigenes of Nkwanta 
south are the Ntrubos, the Adeles, the Atwodes and the Challas.  
42 Research Scope and Methodology 
 
Other settler and migrant ethnic groups are the Ewe, Guan, Kotokoli, Ga-
Dangme, Mole Dagbani, Basare, and Konkomba people among others. 
The traditional authority is led by chiefs and family heads. They practice a 
family land tenure system with patrilineal systems of land inheritance.    
2.4  The ‘SGSOG-Herakles-Volta Red Concession  
This research is an in-depth study of an oil palm land deal that has gone 
through the hands of different investors and management. In 2009, two 
concessions including a 3750ha of family lands in Brewaniase (in Nkwanta 
South), and a 630ha land in Dodo-Pepesu (in Kadjebi District) were ac-
quired by an American company, Sithe Global Sustainable Oils Ghana 
(SGSOG), affiliated to Wall Street’s Herakles Capital2 for 50 years (See 
Map 2.1). These two deals were to serve as a pilot for a bigger African oil 
palm investment project. Thus, a year later, when they acquired a 17 times 
bigger forest lands in Cameroon, it affected their commitment to the Gha-
naian investment. During that period also, at least to the public, the com-
pany was officially known as Herakles Farms. The Brewaniase concession 
belongs to families of the Ntrubo clan, while the Dodo-Pepesu lease 
which did not see the light of production, is under multiple land tenure 
systems that are individual, family and stool.3 In 2013, a British owned 
company took over the management of SGSOG and now operates as 
Volta Red Farms (further explained in chapter four). Primarily, the re-
search focuses on the Volta Red Farms (originally SGSOG/Herakles 
farms) of 3750ha.  
2.5 Data from Existing Literature 
The study involved document or textual analyses of relevant secondary 
data. Reports, policy documents, legal instruments media articles, aca-
demic journals, and books were consulted for this study. For instance, I 
gathered and reviewed national (Ghana) policy documents including the 
constitution, the Labour Act, 651 of 2003, other (inter)national soft laws 
and the voluntary guidelines on land deals, as well newsletters and other 
media articles from agrarian justice movements including Food Sover-
eignty Ghana, ROPPA and La via Campesina — that are central to the 
discussions in chapter seven. 
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2.6 Primary Data Gathering  
2.6.1 Planning the Data Collection  
The study adopts a mixed methods collection approach, but inclines more 
to qualitative methods. Data collection instruments including in-depth in-
terviews, observations, and life histories among others detailed below, are 
used to help understand and ‘make sense’ of the everyday experiences and 
livelihoods of those affected by land deals. The data collection was con-
ducted in four phases, between February 2018 and March 2020. This was 
planned purposefully. The Akan and English languages were the main 
means of communication. In very few instances, I sought the help of in-
terpreters for Ewe-speaking respondents.  
Phase one was a one-week preliminary field visit in February, 2018. 
This was an introductory trip to familiarize myself with the area, establish 
contacts and assess accessibility to the plantations and the communities. 
During this period, I made contacts at the local government and with man-
agement and some supervisors of Volta Red. I also had access to the plan-
tation and spoke to some of the workers and community elders about the 
intentions of my research. The second phase of the data collection was a 
three-month field visit in the months of May, June and July 2018. During 
this period. I conducted a survey of the farmworkers, carried out key in-
formant interviews with dispossessed families, chiefs and elders, farm-
workers, management, local, regional and local government state institu-
tions among other relevant stakeholders. This period doubles as the peak 
season for the oil palm harvest, and as such I had the opportunity to ob-
serve the activities and organization of labour in its busiest season.  
The third phase was scheduled between mid-January and mid-March 
2019. The period was chosen in order to understand the labour dynamics 
in the off-peak season — a period where many workers are laid off. In 
February, I spent less time on the plantation and more in the homes of 
farmworkers to engage with them on their occupations and experiences in 
the lean season. It also provided the opportunity to conduct follow-up 
interviews following gaps identified from the preliminary data collation 
and analysis. I also conducted some interviews with relevant agencies in-
cluding the Ghana Agricultural Workers’ Union (GAWU). The final data 
collection was carried out a year later between February-March 2020. Un-
fortunately, the timing coincided with the unprecedented global Covid-19 
pandemic that affected movement and access to respondents.  
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Data collection during this period was centred at national-level govern-
ment institutions based in the capital city to have a broader perspective of 
national policy strategies relating to investment promotion, agriculture, 
and rural development. I also had the opportunity to do further follow-up 
telephone interviews with the affected people.  
2.6.2 Survey 
A face-to-face survey was conducted with the farmworkers to establish 
the baseline evidence. This was done with 200 farmworkers with the help 
of four research assistants. The survey data covered six main areas includ-
ing: demography, land access, farming activities and food security, em-
ployment, labour conditions, other occupations, and other community de-
velopment issues. See appendix 1 for more details.  
2.6.3 In-depth Interviews 
Interviews constitute an essential tool for generating empirical knowledge 
by making provisions for people to talk about certain themes (Porta 2014 
p.228). In-depth interviews are also relevant for signalling potential 
sources of information. In this research, I conducted semi-structured in-
terviews often carried out face-to-face and in conversational ways. On sev-
eral occasions, telephone interviews were also conducted when needed. In 
many instances, I conducted the interview with the support of a field as-
sistant who helped with taking records. Through interviews, I gathered 
both basic background information (such as socio-biographical data) and 
other substantive data core to the research. Interviews with farmworkers 
were carried out in both their homes and on the plantation as and when 
appropriate. Interviews were conducted with farmworkers, farm manage-
ment, dispossessed families, chiefs, state institutions and agencies and la-
bour organizations (for a list of state and traditional institutions contacted, 
see appendix 2 ).  
 
2.6.4 Life Histories and Stories  
Life histories are in themselves forms of in-depth interviews where per-
sonal experiences and life encounters are collected in open and interactive 
ways for the specific purpose of the research. It was a major approach to 
studying marginalized groups, migrant workers, women and landless 
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workers incorporated into land grabs as workers. A key objective of this 
study was to have a thorough understanding of farmworkers’ livelihood 
trajectories not only their conditions of work, but also their past experi-
ences, what attracts them to wage work, their perceptions about both oil 
palm establishment as well as the relations of production. A life history 
approach gives room to other important variables aside from class and 
identity relations that emerge from the stories of the lived experiences of 
people. In the process of gathering life histories and stories, I was cogni-
sant of the fact that the outcome of knowledge production through a life 
history approach is produced by an interactional process between the two 
parties involved. Throughout the data collection, I constantly reflected on 
the extent of my own involvement in the process so as to minimise any 
tendencies of hijacking conversations. 
 
2.6.5 Observations  
I employed participant and non-participant observation during the field-
work. Participant observation occurs in three main ways: collecting first-
hand data, being interested in and focusing on the actions and interactions 
of the individuals or groups, and experiencing or being incorporated into 
the group (Balsiger and Lambelet, 2014). By so doing one gets a better 
understanding what people do, mean, or believe as well as the experiences 
of those being studied. Participant observation is also relevant for reveal-
ing livelihood strategies, differentiation, and the construction of subjectiv-
ities and meanings. During my initial visits, I was received with ambiva-
lence and witnessed hesitations from both the company and the affected 
people in providing me with information, however as my stay prolonged 
and in my subsequent visits, people became more open. During the survey 
with the help of three field assistants, I had the opportunity to spend am-
ple time on the plantation and with the farmworkers. I joined their weekly 
morning devotion/meetings where they voiced out their concerns to man-
agement and supervisors. I also had the opportunity to join them on the 
trucks to their working fields. Particularly, it was very useful for under-
standing the interactions between supervisors and workers, harvesters and 
their carriers (head porters of palm bunches), and the of role headmen 
among others. 
Non-participant observations took place in the work and home envi-
ronments of respondents. For instance, in the process of tracing the 
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household generational dynamics of the affected families, it became ap-
parent that women could provide more reliable information on their 
household population figures, e.g. the number of children and of others 
in their extended families than men could do. The men often had to start 
counting their children to be able to tell me their numbers, and sometimes 
themselves redirected me to the women. Again, during family group con-
versations, some men and family heads sometimes attempted to moderate 
the impacts of the land deal on their farming activities and livelihoods, yet 
the women, often the spouses, signalled through their latent mannerisms 
or quick interruptions to unpack the ‘whole truth’. Always, attentive of my 
environment, I gave these women the opportunity for a one-on-one con-
versation or to contribute to the discussion, depending on the setting.  
 
2.6.6 Focus Group Discussion (FGDs)  
FGD’s are usually conducted to build a holistic understanding of a situa-
tion based on participants’ comments and experiences (Bhattacherjee, 
2012). In undertaking FGDs, the internal validity is usually hard to estab-
lish and there are likelihoods of unequal participation, yet it is a good av-
enue for gathering informal information (Creswell, 2009). The FGDs 
complemented the other data collection instruments. Focus group discus-
sions were held around particular themes and for specific groups. Typi-
cally, they constituted 6 to 12 people in a group but there were other in-
stances such as the task-based groupings among the farmworkers where 
the groups were larger. FGDs were conducted with farm workers, affected 
families, former plantation workers, unit committee members (local gov-
ernment leaders) and some community members. In a few instances, 
FGDs with community members were conducted randomly, i.e. when 
groups gathered under trees gave me the green light to discuss my research 
with them. FGDs among the workers focused on the issues of working 
conditions, how they organize their complaints, and other general percep-
tions around the labour relations on the planation. In the FGDs among 
the dispossessed families, I focused on generational issues and impacts on 
farming, their general perceptions about the plantation and development.  
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Table 2.1  
 Overview of Primary Data Gathering Methods 
Data Collection  
Instrument 
Unit of Analysis N Fe-
males 
Males  Total 









Farmworkers 237* 28 42 70 
Carriers (informal workers) 25* 7 - 7 
Administrative staff and 
management of Volta Red 
14 - 9 13 
Representatives of the land 
owners’ association  
15 1 14 15 
Dispossessed family mem-
bers  
 11 43 54 
Chiefs NA - 6 6 
Staff of State Institutions 
and Agencies 
NA 3 7 10 
Focus Group Dis-
cussions 
Dispossessed Family  NA   5 
Former farmworkers and 
community members 
NA   7 
Farmworkers-Task-based  
• Harvesters (men) 
• Sprayers (men) 
• Loose pickers 
(women)  
• Fire control work-
ers 
   4 
Community Members NA   9 
Observations Work and Home Environ-
ments 
NA    
* approximate   
Source: Author’s interviews 2018, 2019. 
2.7 Sampling  
In the selection of respondents, a purposive sampling method was em-
ployed. The survey of farmworkers was conducted with approximately 
90% of the farmworkers. Focus group discussions, interviews and obser-
vations were done purposively to capture gender and other social class 
differences. Throughout the research, I employed the snow-balling 
method to identify and locate people recommended as contact persons 
and institutions relevant for the study.  
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The SGSOG-Herakles-Volta Red (hereafter Volta Red) oil palm conces-
sion was selected purposively for this research. Given the limited data and 
ambiguities surrounding the scale and scope of land deals in Ghana, Land 
Matrix4 remains the major source of data on land acquisitions, but some 
of the data on the status of the plantations do not reflect the present state 
of affairs. Nonetheless, it served more or less as a sampling frame from 
which prospective cases could be chosen. From the database, as at January 
2017, 41 transnational agricultural land deals initiated between the year 
2001 and 2014 are recorded as either ongoing, in the start-up phase or 
abandoned. Out of this number, about 12 land deals ranging between 40 
to 10,000 hectares had been under operation since 2008. This database 
served as a point of entry into purposively selecting the Volta Red, which 
had an established presence in the area since 2008.  
Since the investment is centred on oil palm, it helps to delve deep into 
a specific process of labour relations. Recently, there has been a rise in 
research on the spread of industrial scale oil palm cultivations that is con-
sidered a flex crop. That is, the material flexibility of oil palm — its multi-
ple uses for food, feed, fuel and industrial material — makes it attractive 
to investors because even as a single crop, it supports the diversification 
of investment markets (Borras, et al 2016). The Ghanaian context adds to 
the dynamics even as oil palm in itself has high material flexibility for cul-
tural and everyday domestic use5, and local small-scale businesses. Oil 
palm is already deeply embedded into the domestic, artisan and industrial 
sectors. This contrasts with Asian context where it does not have strong 
cultural significance in its raw/unrefined form thus suspicions about in-
vestor interests do not go unnoticed in such places (Fold & Whitfield, 
2012). The societal embeddedness of oil palm in Ghana makes it an inter-
esting case of enquiry — for exploring local people’s perceptions and the 
role of the state. Oil palm has also been at the centre of several state po-
lices in Ghana. As indicated in chapter one, the interests in oil palm can 
be traced to the post-independence compulsory land acquisitions, and to 
recent special initiatives to drive both export and local oil palm supply. 
The study provides evidence into the indirect and subtle ways in which the 
state is implicated in recent land deals. Further explained in chapters three 
and four, the birth and sustenance of SGSOG-Herakles-VR is strongly 
linked to agricultural and investment policies and projects, the promotion 
of market-led land tenure systems and the state’s failure to deliver basic 
social services in rural areas. Also, the Volta Red plantation is a relatively 
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young agribusiness, and the largest scale oil palm plantation in the Volta 
region, which requires research attention. Numerous studies have investi-
gated the older plantations: Amanor, (1999) situated in the global food and 
land restructuring; Gyasi (1994) explored the economic and 
environmental viability of the plantations; and Nolte & Väth, (2015) have 
discussed its governance processes. The land-labour nexus remains under 
explored.  
 
2.8 Data Processing and Analysis 
In this study, data was collected from households, individuals and groups 
while at the same time, engaging with several concepts: land grabs, wage 
labour, peasantry, and rural livelihoods. To be able to collate, process, and 
interpret the data, careful and well-thought-through analytical processes 
were followed. I used SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Science) soft-
ware to collate, organize and analyse the survey results. The study also 
benefitted from the process tracing method. Collier (2011 p. 823) defines 
process tracing as the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence se-
lected and analysed in light of research questions. This requires a search 
for diagnostic evidence that sets the platform for detailed narratives and 
thick descriptive and causal inferences. It was useful for explanatory pur-
poses, especially for bringing snapshots and pieces of evidence together 
(Gerringer, 2007). Aside from my field notes, I transcribed about 90 per 
cent of all the recorded interviews which also helped my analysis.  
2.9 Ethical Consideration  
A key area for ethical consideration is consent. Appropriate community 
entry strategies were employed. In many rural communities in Ghana, con-
sultation with the relevant traditional councils, local government authori-
ties, and sometimes even family heads are very important for a researcher 
to be accepted and for a supportive research experience. Appropriate entry 
consultations were made at the communities during the first and second 
phases of my fieldwork. The research purpose was disclosed to all partic-
ipants prior to seeking their consents to the research. It was usually done 
verbally except in instances such as during institutional interviews, when 
upon request, documented proofs were added. Permissions were also 
sought for the recording of interviews. Participants were also informed 
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about how the data was to be analysed and reported, and anonymity as-
sured. The study was approached from the angle of researching ‘with’ 
land-deal affected communities with the intention of producing socially 
meaningful results.  
2.10  Strategizing around Limitations  
Prior to the fieldwork, I anticipated that language barriers could affect data 
collection. However, upon visiting the research communities, I realized I 
could communicate in the Akan language with the vast majority of the 
people. In the few instances of communication barriers, I sought the as-
sistance of interpreters. Institutional interviews were mainly conducted in 
the English language.  
Also, every academic research is time bound thus dictating what data 
collection methods are adopted. Field visits were planned around available 
resources and the agricultural seasons. To optimize the resources available 
for this study, follow-up communication continued even after field visits. 
As indicated earlier, field visits were also planned in phases, taking consid-
eration of the different agricultural seasons that affect the availability of 
farmers and farmworkers, and the kind of data that can be collected. Gath-
ering data in the form of long survey questionnaires and one-to-one inter-
views with piece-rate farmworkers was also very challenging. The farm 
workers spend eight hours of their day on the plantation, doing very tedi-
ous work and often get home late to their businesses, do house chores, 
spend time with their families, rest, or go to their own farms. Thus, in 
principle, no period or place was appropriate to engage them in long hours 
of conversations that do not bring tangible and immediate results to them. 
I therefore had to ensure a good balance of my own moral judgment, and 
the time constraints of the research in deciding when and where to engage 
the farmworkers. The survey team and myself often engaged them during 
the breaktimes, a one-hour window at the end of their work when they 
waited to be transported. When permitted by them and their supervisors, 
we also talked to them casually or at their own pace during their work 
hours. Through phone calls, we also scheduled the survey and interview 
appointments at their homes in the evenings and on weekends, particularly 
Sundays. Again, It also took a very long process of explanations for some 
of the land owning families and the farmworkers to understand the direc-
tion of the research — especially having to regularly convince them I am 
not an undercover investigator for the company or the government. 
                                                                CHAPTER 2
   51 
Building good relations takes time but it facilitated the research when peo-
ple opened up and directed me to sources of data.  
Still, having access to adequate and reliable information remains one of 
the most challenging issues I envisaged for this work. From my back-
ground of conducting many socio-economic and baseline surveys and in-
terviews in rural Ghana over the past ten years, I came to realize there are 
many shortcomings in having access to good quality data. In Ghana, ac-
cess to institutional data that is recent and comprehensive can be some-
times difficult. Other issues ranging from people being exhausted from 
frequent ‘data extraction’ without accompanying interventions, to poor 
record keeping, to reporting biases, to the seasonality of livelihood condi-
tions, to the non-conformity of people’s everyday livelihood patterns with 
many pre-determined data collection standards and indicators, among oth-
ers, all affect the quality of data (Wuyt, 2011). Following the widespread 
media presence around the issues of land grabs, I anticipated reluctance 
from the company to provide ample and full information on their dealings. 
To my surprise, they provided considerable access to information alt-
hough initially there were attempts to dissuade me from focusing my at-
tention on the affected communities; the plantation is located the outskirts 
of the towns while the processing mill is another district, several kilome-
tres away from the communities. Nonetheless, the management of the 
company had their own reservations about the potential damaging effects 
of my research and the potential impacts on awareness creation and polit-
ical demands from the workers and families.  As expected, there were also 
discrepancies in narratives and accounts between the company and the 
affected groups. These are real limitations that are often difficult to over-
come, but as a way to minimise its potential impact on the outcome of the 
research, I did a lot of triangulation. For instance, due to my long presence 
in the community and on the plantation, I could identify many of the farm-
workers by name and this enabled me to probe and compare the survey 
data with more directed one-to-one interviews. Again, individual inter-
views with all the representatives of the land deal affected families, enabled 
me to identify and assess the inconsistencies between them and the com-
pany for further probing. I took the necessary steps to build trust, engage 
in community activities, and other social gatherings to have a better un-
derstanding of the contexts of the information provided.   
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2.11 Positionality and Methodological Reflections  
A vital aspect of any empirical studies and particularly on land grab re-
search is that researchers need to ‘reflect on the impacts of their own po-
sitionality and ideological biases on research questions, methods and the 
interpretation of the evidence (Oya, 2013a, p. 516). It is therefore im-
portant to make readers aware of one’s positionality, but even more, that 
we do not hold on to them rigidly in ways that inhibit us from being open 
to other ideas and dimensions. Having had a first-hand experience of a 
remote rural life, (my father migrated after active service in the military 
and health sector work in the city to engage in farming and the provision 
of health care in my village) I grew up observing and sympathizing with 
rural people on issues of poverty and inequality. Growing up, I spent con-
siderable time in my village in southern Ghana but I was relatively more 
privileged than many of my mates. My parents could afford private basic 
education in the city, and I had family support to live in the city. Many of 
my childhood colleagues resorted to early parenthood, others struggled to 
sail through school or look for jobs elsewhere but were not so successful, 
some have made it through small farming, petty commodity production 
and engagement in other services, while for many, everyday life is a con-
stant struggle of making ends meet through any means possible. These are 
daily struggles that play out in different but also similar ways in many rural 
communities in Ghana, where access to basic needs continue to be a chal-
lenge. These continue to influence my perceptions around land deals as 
being sites of survival and diverse livelihood strategies that addresses some 
essential needs at least in the short term. Yet, at the same time, I am of the 
view that the terms of incorporation and power relations are determined 
by these conditions as well as other social structures, especially the deeply 
rooted patriarchal relations that penetrate almost every aspect of the Gha-
naian society. These together, shape my thinking of land deals as sites of 
survival and exploitation.  
However, as indicated by Oya, (2013, p. 516), doing an independent 
research implies that the more we recognize our own ideological stand-
points, the more we should put in efforts to engage with evidence that 
could be contradictory or challenge our ideas. Following that my research 
and training is grounded in critical agrarian studies, there was also the ten-
dency to incline towards a pessimistic view of issues right from the onset, 
and this is something I tried to minimize as much as possible by starting 
off very open minded and establishing very good relations with the 
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management of Volta red, who even supported my research in diverse 
ways: through community entry, accommodation, access to the planation, 
and even organizing the farmworkers to introduce my work and for 
FGDs. Yet, sometimes good intentions can also lead to negative out-
comes. One example was that, the more I related closely to the company 
to access information, the more distant I was perceived by the people af-
fected by the land deal, leading to initial perceptions of my being affiliated 
to the company. This is coupled with the fact that in the initial phases, 
under the constraints of accommodation, commuting limited the planning 
of the data collection, especially in the evenings. Later on, I lived in the 
Brewaniase and it was a very humbling moment for me as many people 
appreciated and supported my research in diverse ways. This also had its 
own implications. To all the participants, I was still seen as a potential 
source of intervention to individual concerns and the competing interests. 
In fact, upon several requests, I did promise the family representatives, 
chiefs and some other key participants including the management, to pro-
vide copies of this dissertation — which also has its own implications on 
how I’m perceived — especially being a Ghanaian and a researcher who 
hopes to return to these communities in future for research and policy 
purposes. Having a good balance between sentiments and objectivity was 
necessary in both data collection and analysis. I was also aware of how 
both my ‘outsider’ and ‘insider’ statuses could influence this research. I am 
not an indigene, and it was this research that introduced me to those com-
munities so my knowledge of their culture is not exhaustive. However, 
being a resident Ghanaian, I also assume an insider status. This creates a 
tendency of conflating known stereotypes, assumptions and ground reali-
ties. My analysis therefore benefited immensely from feedback from my 
field assistants, peers, and supervisors.  
That said, the outcome of this dissertation is influenced by a constant 
process of reflexivity and my own positionality on the subject. I recall one 
of my days on field work during the off-peak season when I met a group 
of laid-off young men who were, in the interim, loading timber onto trucks 
for cash. Casually but meaningfully, they said it would be good for me to 
take over the management of the company so that the conditions of work 
would be improved. Early on, the daughter of one of the family heads, 
who, although she expressed some reservations about the land deal, said 
to me ‘let’s go and see what they have done to the land: it is nicely cleared 
and beautiful’. These two incidences caused me to think a lot about what 
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people want, what looks attractive, their reasons, their expectations of me 
and the need to be cautious about our own ideological biases and how we 
present the perspectives of the people we engage.   
Another important methodological issue that came to my attention 
during fieldwork is that of ‘consent’. There were several instances where 
participants stopped me in the middle of my interviews for clarification 
on my research, or their mannerism showed that they were uncomfortable 
with providing information even though they had consented to partici-
pate. There were three main factors that affected people’s willingness to 
engage with the research. Some people expressed the fear that I could be 
affiliated to a prominent undercover Ghanaian journalist6 who exposes 
corrupt individuals. An educated family head constantly asked me ‘are u 
sure we will not be arrested; won’t you write something that will make the 
police arrest me?’ His perception changed during my follow-up field visits. 
Unlike southern and the northern regions of Ghana, this area has not been 
exposed to many researchers and so, it was a new experience for many 
people. I already mentioned how in Ghana, most rural people expect tan-
gible and immediate intervention from researchers or from people like me 
who are asking about their problems. It was disappointing to many, and 
frustrating for me as well, that I could not make such promises, and this 
also sometimes affected participation and responses. I believe that as re-
searchers, we have a duty of care and we need to be very observant in such 
situations, so we do not extort data from people who may formally agree 
to participate but might not understand the full picture and implications 
of their responses. It took me several rounds of explaining my research, 
follow-up visits and conversations, promises of anonymity, and sharing 
some of my own experiences and relating to theirs in order to build trust 
and actual consent. 
Notes 
1 One of the six newly created regions of Ghana since December 2018. 
2 Herakles capital is an Africa-focused private investment firm involved in the telecom-
munications, energy, infrastructure, mining and agro-industrial sectors 
https://www.forestpeoples.org 
3 Lands held under the custody of traditional chiefs and kings. 
4 http://www.landmatrix.org/en/ 
5 Oil palm is the source of sweeping brooms, fuelwood, local soaps, mushrooms, palm 






3 Agricultural Policy, Farming Systems, and Food Politics in Ghana  
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Chapter three sets the historical, social, economic and political context of 
the research. It looks at the social structures that shape land and labour 
institutions and how agricultural policies, past and present influence in-
vestment drive in Ghana, and their implications for rural livelihoods.  
3.2 Plantations and Commercial Agriculture under Colonial 
Administration: Impacts on Land and Labour  
Land holds a sacred significance in the diverse traditional beliefs in Ghana: 
as the property of an earth spirit among the northern ethnic groups; to the 
Ga people, it is connected to sacred lagoons; and to the Asante people, 
she is a supernatural female force for the sustenance of man. Concepts of 
land ownership were thus intricately linked to the practice of ancestral 
worship (Asante, 1965). Prior to the predominance of farming economies, 
people did not claim exclusive user and ownership rights, tribe members 
had equal rights to wander over and hunt upon the land which belonged 
to their group. Later, when people settled down to farming as the main 
economic activity, and stool subjects reduced portions of land into their 
possession for the purposes of cultivation, there developed the concept of 
the subject's usufructuary right to stool land, that is to say, the right to 
occupy, till, or otherwise enjoy an unappropriated portion of stool land 
and to appropriate the fruits of such use (Asante, 1965, p. 853).   
Historically, Ghana’s (and many other West African Countries) agricul-
tural productions system has been fashioned around family farming and 
small-scale peasant practices aimed at simple reproduction. Farmers re-
sorted to shifting cultivation and land rotation, not only as established pat-
terns of agricultural behaviour, but as a means of preserving the soil's 
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fertility (Asante, 1965). For instance, in the early nineteenth century, much 
of the agricultural activities in the Ghana remained largely undeveloped, 
subsistent and in closed system (Amanor, 1999). Even in the preceding 
century, oil palm trees were more or less wild crops (not cultivated in a 
planned order) that grew on family and communal owned stool lands1 and 
therefore natives had conventional entitlements to harvesting mainly for 
subsistence and under certain conditions such as sharing proceeds with 
the chief (custodian of the land) for the maintenance of the stool (Gyasi, 
1994; Maier, 2009). This does not deny the fact that market exchanges 
have always existed even in pre-colonial periods, however, with colonial 
influence and their extractive inclinations, there were efforts to expand 
capital into rural areas — through the introduction of export crop planta-
tions and the development of commercial farming systems.  
The plantation system was introduced to the coast of Ghana by the 
Dutch in the early eighteenth century and their establishment expanded 
from the late 1800s under the British colonial administration. For instance, 
in the aftermath of the slave trade, palm oil became one of the major crops 
integral to the economies of West Africa, serving the pressing demands of 
the chemical, cosmetics and pharmaceutical industries in Europe 
(Huddleston & Tonts, 2007). Following the British’s plan to expand large-
scale commercial farming, Tudhope, the Gold Coast Director of Agricul-
ture from 1907-1924, is said to have suggested that  
in European countries and America, one of the aims of an agricultural de-
partment is to experiment, to educate and to advise farmers, thus assisting 
them to produce large and good crops which for the most parts are grown 
for home consumption. The aims of a tropical agricultural department are 
similar with this difference, that to be economically successful those crops 
which produce articles for export receive most attention (in Graham page 
39). 
The plantation system, however, received resistances from some farm-
ers, partly because of inter-ethnic conflicts and inter-colonial disputes over 
territorial expansion and acquisition (Huddleston & Tonts, 2007). As of 
the 1920s, when the world prices for oil palm were falling steadily, the 
British diverted interests in cocoa production, centred around smallholder 
systems. Indeed, the plan was not to entirely replace small-scale farms with 
plantations. As Carrere, (2010 p.47) has noted, under the British colonial 
administration, ‘the peasant system was considered a tried and inexpensive 
method of producing tropical export crops’ and the British dreaded the 
          Agricultural Policy, Farming Systems, and Food Politics in Ghana 57 
negative implications of alienating peasants which could cause conflicts, 
and disrupt the export economy. An extract from a report of Commission 
on Economic Agriculture under the British rule, as recorded in Graham 
(1993 p33) further highlights this position   
the discovery that pure clean [palm oil] pays better than bad and dirty oil 
will effect a revolution in oil making and that coconut cultivation should 
recommend itself to the natives ... as the capital required is small, and the 
labour of cultivating the trees and collecting the nuts need not interfere with 
the cultivation of his food crops.  
Small-scale production persisted alongside the newly introduced plan-
tation mode of production that was to feed into the export economy. The 
prevalence of cash crops including cocoa, oil palm, rubber, coffee, coco-
nut, kola and shallot, grown for export, led to the commercialization of 
agriculture throughout the country. Plantations cause further changes to 
land access and use. Plantation-based cash crops are perennial trees which 
could produce income to land owners for decades. Permanent cultivation 
disrupted the classical usufruct access particularly among the Akans in the 
south, where rights to alienate farms gradually morphed into land aliena-
tion practices subject to formal reference to the stool (Asante, 1965). Co-
inciding with the British introduction of highly contested land bills in-
tended to institutionalize private property and land acquisitions, the 
European concepts of freehold, and other individualized property rela-
tions began to take roots in the country. Again, the economic yields of 
commercial agriculture led to a high demand for land as a commodity of 
commerce — transforming land use, food and diets, and access to labour 
especially in a rapidly growing population (Austin, 2007). 
This new economy required cheap labour flow to the forest zones from 
all parts (the southern colony and the northern territories) due to the un-
equal distribution of natural and economic resources (Yaro et al 217). 
Also, it attracted labour from the neighbouring French colonies. This con-
tributed to institutional innovations among landed classes in the south in 
accessing labour and a plurality of land tenure regimes. For cocoa produc-
ers, especially the absentee land owners, sharecropping became an effec-
tive channel to mobilize land and labour for the new cash economy, with 
several variants of it evolving over the years (Capps, 2018). At the same 
time, different forms of wage labour relations emerged on plantations. A 
sketchy overview of some of these changes in farmland use and labour 
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before and during British colonial rule in Ghana in shown in Table 3.1 
below. 
Table 3.1 
 Land and Labour under British Colonial Administration 
 Some Key events  Impact on Land, farms 
and the export economy  





• British abolition  
• Slave trade persists 
in eastern Volta till 
1850s 
• Gold rush  
 
• Abundant land  
• Valuable tree crops  
• Oil palm and gold ex-
port to Europe; 
• Kola nuts to Northern 
Nigeria 
• Pockets of land trans-
actions (Akyem)  
• Internal trade 
in labour  
1870-
1920 
• Anglo-Ashanti War 
• Colonization  
• Legal Abolition of 
slavery drives 
Akyem chiefs into 
debt 
• Internal market in-
tegration (e.g. 
common currency)  




markets (cocoa)  
• Mechanized 
transport 
• Crowns bill 1894 
• Restraints to regional 
kola nuts exports 
• Rise in mining and 
tree cropping 
• Increased transport 
of farm products, 
• Head loading from 
farm to local markets  
• Internal scramble for 
land (Akyem  
• Land rental)  
• Market in agricultural 
land rights (cocoa 
mortgage)  
• From coerced 
to ‘free labour' 
• Increased paid 
labour rela-
tions (biannual. 








• The great depres-
sion  
• A fall in cocoa price 
in the 1930s affect 
returns to land and 
labour  
• Surge in population 
density (esp. in 
southern Ghana 
 
• Expanded area cover 
and cocoa export 
• Increasing land scar-
city in the older co-
coa producing areas 
and the forest zone 
• Land alienation to 
migrants  
• Extended scope and 
coverage of land 
transactions through 
sales, long-term 
credit, and lease 








• Unfree labour- 
debt bondage 
• Innovations in 
labour rela-
tions 
Sources : Author’s compilation from various sources Amanor, 2001; K. S. Amanor, (1999, 
2012); Austin (2007); Wilson (1990). 
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3.3 Agricultural Policies at Independence: 1957-1999 
 
Unlike elsewhere in the African continent where even after colonial rule 
agriculture was dominated by settler colonialists, in West Africa agricul-
tural production was in the hands of indigenous peasants2 (Jonah, 1985). 
Yet upon independence in 1957, Ghana had inherited an economy de-
pendent on exports, yet, still not having the much-expected trickle down 
of benefits to local people’s food security. There were food shortages and 
a growing reliance on food imports and basic consumables even as Nkru-
mah’s government sought to transform the economic structure of the 
country. Strongly driven by a state-socialist ideological standpoint or as 
Oya, (2007) describes it, ‘a compromise between technocratic "develop-
mentalism" and rural Socialism’ and modernization ideas, Nkrumah and 
the Conventional People's Party (CPP) governing body approached devel-
opment from a socio-spatial equity, poverty alleviation and import substi-
tution industrialization viewpoint. While many of these policies were de-
signed to improve local food sufficiency mainly through boosting local 
production, the accompanying agricultural models, by and large, favoured 
large-scale production schemes, with the exception of the cocoa sector, 
historically a smallholder domain which continues to receive state support 
in subsidies, input supply and market, given its special contribution to 
Ghana’s economy (Amanor, 2012). A central view expressed in the five-
year development plan of the first republic (1951-1966), indicated that 
small-scale agriculture could not be easily modernized and adapted to the 
growing need for rapid economic development and industrialization 
(Dapaah, 1995). The government committed huge investments into agri-
cultural research and innovation, all of which were inclined towards mod-
ernization — mainly experiments with large-scale production of alterna-
tive cash crops, the use of improved seedlings, and mechanization to 
promote economic growth and development (Akoto, 1987).  
Towards the early 1970s when the global economic crises and increased 
debts affected many national economies, various governments also expe-
rienced social and political unrests associated with the not-so-successful 
interventionist policies. For instance, the period between 1966 and 1980 
was a politically unstable period in Ghana. Several policies were intro-
duced by different governments to revamp the agricultural sector yet many 
tended to be reactive and failed to address systemic issues in the sector. 
The National Redemption Council’s (NRC) operation ‘feed yourself’ was, 
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for instance, a bold step towards local food production, yet relied on the 
promotion of large-scale farms through extensive access to land, credit 
and other inputs3. As emphasized by Jonah, (1985, p. 88) 
 
In 1974 the N.R.C. introduced a Special Agriculture Scheme aimed at at-
tracting foreign investors into Ghana's agricultural sector with the aid of a 
package of incentives. This scheme was designed to be the Third Phase of 
the famous Operation Feed Yourself Programme. The incentives consisted 
mainly of tax waivers, import duty exemptions, liberalized profit transfers 
and Government assistance in the acquisition of land in case of difficulties. 
A critical review of the policy directions between the period of 1957 to the 
late 1970s suggest that the policy directions of the different regimes tended 
to prioritize large-scale, capital-intensive schemes over small-scale produc-
tion systems. This is not to say that state policies have over the years 
sought to destroy completely the peasant system of production with large-
scale schemes. Rather ‘the innovations were expected to be taken up by 
richer progressive farmers and then diffused to the laggards [smallholder 
farmers] as they realized the benefits of new technology’ (Amanor, 1999, 
p. 29). To date, most of the policy strategies have approached small-scale 
schemes from the intention of integrating them into competitive markets 
and the value chains of commercial systems, which have more often than 
not hindered their growth. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Ghana also had her share of economic crises. 
During this period, the average national growth rate was around 0.2 per 
cent, whilst that of GDP from agriculture was -1.2. Exacerbating these 
issues was the fact that at an annual growth rate of 2.6 per cent, Ghana's 
population rose from 8.6 million in 1970 to 12.2 million in 1980, partly 
contributing to a 28 per cent decline in food production (Dapaah, 1995). 
To intervene in the economic crisis, Ghana, with assistance from the 
World Bank Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1983 and through 
the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the late 1980s, the agri-
cultural sector became a target of liberalization policies. Guided by the 
need to get the prices right for state building (Bates 1983), emphasis was 
placed on the removal of subsidies and marketing boards, while export 
agriculture (with the introduction of non-traditional exports crops i.e. hor-
ticulture, fruits, and vegetables) got back on the list of policy priorities. 
This policy direction was also supported with market-oriented land ad-
ministration reforms to facilitate private investments in agricultural lands 
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and international trade. Free trade affected the demand for local food pro-
duce, as Ghana opened up its markets to cheap food imports.  
Although small-scale producers still dominated the food crop and co-
coa sector, the introduction of non-traditional exports crops contributed 
to a rise in the number of medium-scale farmers and transnational inves-
tors who capitalised on the open land and agricultural market. The 1980s 
and 1990s marked a continuation of the structure of the 1970’s plantation 
and out-grower models under private ownership (Yaro et al 2017). In the 
1990s, several private sector partnerships and takeovers of the pre-existing 
state-owned plantations occurred, while an enabling policy environment 
was also created for new large-scale land acquisitions by private investors. 
Since then, Ghana has been inclined towards minimal administrative role 
of the state in agriculture. The role of the state has been to create an ena-
bling environment for investments in agriculture through market-led land 
policies, supportive financial regulations, and attempts to incorporate 
small-scale farmers into values chains among others, thus expanding the 
landscape for land deals in Ghana.  
3.4 Post-2000: Invest in, Industrialize, and Modernize 
Agriculture  
3.4.1 Making Ghana an attractive investment destination in 
Africa 
 In Ghana, the rise in transnational large-scale agricultural land acquisi-
tions sits within a broad investment promotion agenda and regulatory re-
forms by successive governments. The role of external capital inflows, es-
pecially through private sector and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in 
the economic growth and development in Africa has received strong at-
tention in policy recommendations and academic research in the current 
neoliberal development paradigm. FDI is the largest source of external 
finance for developing countries. Since the 1990s, FDI to Africa has been 
on the rise, and particularly, the international community have been strong 
advocates for considerable investment for the financing of international 
development agendas. Making reference to the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), Addison & Mavrotas, (2006) cited the potential of FDIs 
in capital accumulation and revenue mobilization to host governments for 
MDG-based financing of infrastructure and service provision. The current 
era of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), has also driven the so-
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called Sustainable Development Investments (SDIs) aimed at steering 
‘foreign direct investment towards the achievement of the Goals. Govern-
ments are therefore encouraged to create favourable investment environ-
ments and, where possible and relevant, provide appropriate levels of ac-
cess to SDG-related sectors for private and international investors. In 
some sectors that are not yet open to foreign investment, a gradual open-
ing could be achieved through, for example, services contracts and public–
private partnerships’ (UNCTAD, 2017, p. 3).  
In Ghana, the post 2008 period has seen the highest FDI to GDP ratio, 
with the highest of 9.52 per cent in 2008, and averaged at 7.23 per cent 
between 2008 and 2017; higher than the world average during that period. 
The 2019 World Investment Report (WIR) ranked Ghana as the largest 
FDI recipient in West Africa, and has in the past three years, been among 
the top five hosts of FDI in Africa. Although inflows decreased by 8 per 
cent in 2018, the trend shows an exponential growth from 2006 till date 
(see Figure 3.1). Most of these investments have been oriented towards 
the oil and gas industry but increasingly, the telecommunication, hospital-
ity, food and agricultural sectors are also becoming attractive to foreign 
investors.  
Figure 3.1 Trend of FDI inflows to Ghana 
 
 
Source:  World Investment reports (2000-2018). 
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privatization and liberal market reforms, Ghana, (similar to the cases of 
Senegal, Egypt, and South Africa) has been actively engaged in regulatory 
policies to attract investors through tax, customs and financial incentives. 
In the year 2000, when the New Patriotic Party (NPP) won power from a 
political party that was previously military inclined, the leadership of the 
party declared a golden age of business, created a Ministry for Private Sec-
tor Development with the hopes of radical economic transformation 
(Aryeetey & Owoo, 2015). President Kufuor, the leader of the NPP gov-
ernment, and many of his affiliates were known to be successful business-
men, thus the pro-market/business direction came as no surprise. In his 
pursuit of a private sector driven industrialization policy, the NPP govern-
ment established the President’s Special Initiative (PSI), a policy pro-
gramme to build state-private sector relations for the mobilization of pri-
vate initiative and the expansion of the industrial and export base (mostly 
agricultural produce) of the country (ibid). The PSI was confronted with 
implementation challenges on political and economic grounds, leading to 
its collapse after a few years. Nonetheless, successive governments have 
all pursued pro-market approaches to attract investments. The National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) government, after gaining back power in 
2008 also pushed for private sector development and Public-Private Part-
nerships (PPP) and foreign investments. There have been several institu-
tional establishments and the reorganization of the structures and man-
dates of existing ones to make them available to investors and also to 
ensure easy access to relevant business information.  
Between 2003 and 2017, there has been a steady fall in the cost of busi-
ness start-ups, radically falling from an index of 80.50 to 17.50. Even more 
significantly is the numerous tax reforms in the business sector (Osei & 
Quartey, 2005). Since 1989, Ghana has been in Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties (BITs) with several countries. However, since 2006, Ghana has signed 
tax treaties with countries including Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, South Africa and Switzerland on the avoidance of 
double taxation and several others yet to be ratified. The Income Tax Act 
2015 (Act 896) allows corporate income tax reductions from the standard 
25 per cent to 22 per cent for hotel businesses, to 8 per cent for non-
traditional horticultural and agro-export businesses, to 1 per cent in agro-
processing in the first five years, and to 20 per cent to financial institutions 
that provide loans to farming enterprises. Investments in tree crops in-
cluding oil palm, have received a 10-year tax holiday while agribusinesses 
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in rural areas enjoy additional incentives (Bekoe, et al, 2016). Manufactur-
ing business located in the special economic zones or free zone enclaves 
also enjoy an income tax holiday for a period of 10 years. Similarly, the 
state, through the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) has a 
mandate of identifying and promoting ‘strategic investments’ in priority 
sectors’ agribusiness who get special import duty concessions, and special 
tax waivers.  
Clearly, tax incentives do not necessarily guarantee investment inter-
ests. Other conditions such as fluctuating exchange rates, land tenure, po-
litical instability as well as policies that address poor access to infrastruc-
ture, information technology and energy etc. can influence the overall 
investment environment (Choi, 2003; Musila & Sigué, 2006). The impact 
of the remaining potential negativities to investors are likely to be coun-
terbalanced by the natural resources, weak governance structures, and the 
hegemony of trade liberalization at the global scale which also influence 
the policy space of host governments. As firmly argued by Chang (2006), 
since the 1980s, the policy space of national governments has been shrink-
ing due to macroeconomic conditionalities, and the role of the interna-
tional institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). A study 
of the pattern of investments promotion in Ghana by Dagbanja, (2014) 
suggests prior to SAPs, contribution to the national economy took centre 
stage in investment laws, but with the recent introduction of Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreements (IPPAs), investment policies em-
phasize more on minimum capital requirements, than its impacts on the 
national economy. As such, although these incentives build the image of 
Ghana as an attractive location for foreign businesses, they do not neces-
sarily translate into significant livelihood and development outcomes at 
the local level. Particularly, the net impact of mineral, oil and gas sectors 
dominated by foreign investors is very modest, and with an increasing 
public dissatisfaction. Chinese investors have gained strong holds of small-
scale ‘illicit’ mining. The resultant effect is the resource conflicts between 
miners and farmers, not to mention the environmental and human dan-
gers associated with such operations. The discovery of oil in Ghana in 
2003, drove high job creation expectations which are yet to manifest 
among the ordinary people who are increasingly accusing the state of 
power imbalances between corporate and community interests (Ayee, et 
al 2011).  
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The FDI drive begs the question of how countries like Ghana, with 
relatively weak regulatory policies and policy implementation challenges 
enhance employment when the profitability of such foreign investments 
is also dependent on cheap labour and access to land resources? In the 
2015 EXPO Milano Exhibition, the ministry of food and agriculture made 
available a list of public lands and priority crops earmarked for large-scale 
investments while inviting partnership opportunities from the Western 
countries. In a recent paper by Dzansi et al, (2018) purported to be a guide 
book to investors interested in the recent ‘one district one factory’ policy, 
instead of problematizing the employment situation in Ghana, they list the 
availability of cheap skilled and unskilled labour as an advantage to be har-
nessed. The ‘one district one factory’ is the flagship project of the current 
NPP government under president Akuffo Addo as part of his industriali-
zation drive. The project aims to provide ‘direct financial support and in-
centives to investors. This includes securing ‘litigation free land’, access to 
utilities and support to transnational corporations (GIPC, pg. 41). Inter-
views conducted at the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) re-
vealed the enormous efforts to which they go to support investors to ac-
quire land for their projects, without corresponding assistance (e.g. to 
negotiate such deals) to local host communities. Whereas most of the sup-
port to investors is already institutionalized in the registration processes 
and incentives, the needs of communities are largely overlooked, or at best 
handled on ad hoc bases. For instance, per the mandate of GIPC, inves-
tors are supposed to meet some financial standards with an accompanying 
bank certification. However, land leases and information on acquisition 
processes are completely thrown to the background, especially when the 
investor indicates that the land has already been acquired. If the investor 
needs land, GIPC acting in the interests of the state, helps secure the land, 
without being commensurate with the models of production and the po-
tential impacts on communities.  
3.4.2 Boosting National Food Self-sufficiency, Promoting Cash 
Crops, and Creating Jobs 
Like many other West African countries, agriculture plays a key role in the 
economy. Almost fifty percent of the national labour force is employed 
within the sector (FAO, 2015). Reports show a trend of growing oppor-
tunities for agricultural growth and developmental prospects, many of 
which have been associated with increased local and global demand for 
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food and improved policy environments (Hollinger and Staatz, 2015). The 
economy relies on food crops including cassava, yam, maize, plantains etc. 
and major cash crops including, cocoa, pineapples, cashew, and palm oil. 
As of 2019, agriculture contributed to 54 per cent of Ghana’s GDP, ac-
counted for over 40 per cent of export earnings while at the same time 
providing over 90 per cent of the food needs of the country (FAO, 2020). 
It is said that the country is fairly food secure as iterated by President 
Akuffo Addo in 2018 when he unveiled the Ghana Zero Hunger strategic 
review report, 
we were the first country on the African continent to attain the Millennium 
Development Goal No. 1 of halving poverty and hunger, for which the 
country received an award ‘for reducing the level of its malnourished pop-
ulation from 7 million in the early 1990s to less than 1 million today’. 
Yet the food security situation is far more complex than the assurance 
above. There are seasonal and geographical disparities. Also, Ghana’s food 
security is still embedded in an import dependence economy (rice, toma-
toes and poultry) — a system that negates the fundamentals of food self-
sufficiency — a kind of food sovereignty which past governments sought 
to address. Whilst the national food production meets domestic demand 
for roots and tubers, just about 30 per cent of demand for rice is met 
locally. Over a billion dollars is spent on rice imports annually. In 2014, 
more than 67.48 per cent (an increase from 27.12 per cent in 1993) of 
consumed chicken meat was imported mainly from the USA, Brazil and 
the European Union. These production deficits have often been at-
tributed, narrowly to the surge in urbanization and the demand for cheap 
food, population growth, high cost of production and processing, and low 
productivity. The NPP, since 2016, has rekindled policy discussions and 
programmes for national food self-sufficiency. By this the government, in 
2017 launched a four-year programme, dubbed ‘Planting for Food and 
Jobs’ (PFJ). Similar to operation feed yourself, PFJ ‘focuses on maize, rice, 
soybean, sorghum and vegetables and it is expected to benefit small farm-
ers and the youth. The goal of the policy is to the address ‘the twin-prob-
lem of the migration of youth to city centres in search of non-existent jobs, 
and reduce Ghana's importation of foodstuff’. The PFJ is expected to 
reach at least 1 million farmers, 5,000 nucleus farms and 2,000 Farmer 
Based Organizations (FBOs) that are engaged in production of the prior-
itized food crops by 2020 (Rep. of Ghana, 2017). In principle, this policy 
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challenges conventional notions of food security, and suggests alternatives 
that build the local economy as recognized in the PJF strategic plan: 
…attaining food security through self-sufficiency has been a policy priority 
in Ghana. While self-sufficiency signifies that Ghana produces all its food 
needs, food security implies the availability and physical access to food by 
the population, irrespective of whether or not it is produced within the 
country. 
At 34th National Farmers in December 2019, the vice president of Ghana 
also charged the agricultural ministry to ensure national sufficiency in 
poultry. Also, in response to a statement by the Minster of Agriculture 
declaring maize sufficiency under the PFJ, the Vice president said to him,  
 …you have announced that we’ve stopped importing maize this year, so 
very soon, in the next couple of years, I want you to announce that we’ve 
also stopped importing chicken. That is the challenge that I want to give 
you in the next couple of years. We have to pursue a very deliberate policy 
intervention to make sure that we can grow and eat our own chicken.  
A year into the implementation of the PFJ, the Ministry of Agriculture 
suggest that the project had benefitted some 745,000 farmers. The pro-
gramme is also expected to complement the Government’s 'one district 
one factory' initiative to serve as forward linkage to the implementation of 
relevant national programmes and initiatives e.g. school feeding. The pro-
gramme, for example, has a smallholder component that seeks to support 
farmers through subsidized fertilizer supply, extension services, improved 
seeds, access to markets and technology. Yet, its implementation does not 
adequately address structural inequalities of land access for the rural work-
ing poor. 
Since 2000, policies to support food crops have also been accompanied 
by plans to boost cash and tree crops for local, regional and international 
markets. This is evident in the expansion of subsidies in the form of ferti-
lizers and agro-chemicals in the cocoa and cotton sector, the construction 
of ‘cocoa roads’ to facilitate distribution and marketing and the recent tree 
crop policy. In 2003, the NPP Government, under the president John 
Kufuor, launched the President’s Special Initiative (PSI) which targeted 
the textiles and garments, salt mining, oil palm, and cassava starch produc-
tion sectors, to champion Ghana’s drive to expand its markets to global 
levels of competitiveness (Asante, 2012). Oil palm, which is a staple in the 
Ghanaian food, soap and drinks industry was not only facing deficits of 
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about 240,000 tons per year in production for domestic consumption, but 
also its potential to compete with South East Asia in meeting the demands 
of the West was not being achieved. The project was implemented 
through oil palm research, and nursery plantations established though pri-
vate operators. As such, nucleus farms, smallholder farms and out-grower 
schemes were established to feed oil mills in selected oil palm viable areas. 
Although the politics around the initiative could not lead to the material-
izing of an ambitious target of bringing 300 000 ha of land under oil palm 
cultivation, it certainly contributed to the expansion in investor and farmer 
interests in the sector, not only through the establishment of estates but 
also in other related businesses along the value chain (Gyapong, 2018).  
In 2012, the Ghana Commercial Agricultural Project (GCAP) funded 
by USAID and the World Bank was launched. The 8-year project, has a 
goal of moving ‘farming from the present subsistence level to a commer-
cial level that ensures wealth creation and food security in the country’ 
(Republic of Ghana, 2015a). In an interview with an official, she indicated 
the project has undergone restructuring to include irrigation and the sup-
ply of seeds to support the PFJ. However, a main component of it was the 
promotion of food crops such as rice to bring in cash to local communi-
ties. In some cases, there were indications that smallholders incorporated 
into the value chain as contract farmers may have experienced some forms 
of displacements but were apparently resettled and prioritized for the out-
grower scheme of the project. The project has also come up with a ‘model 
lease agreement’ to guide large-scale investments in Ghana. Yet as in many 
cases, such models may not necessarily be consulted or binding on inves-
tors, who are not required as part of business registration processes to 
present lease documents. 
 
3.5 Labour and the Organization of Family Farming in 
Ghana  
Despite the influx of agribusinesses and large-scale investors, over seventy 
per cent of the total food produced in Ghana is still done by peasants and 
smallholders. There is no generally accepted characterization of what con-
stitutes a large, medium or small-scale farm in Ghana. However, farm sizes 
are conventionally measured in small units i.e. in acreage or even lower, 
i.e. ‘ropes’ (one-ninth of an acre) all of which attest to the peasant nature 
of farming in Ghana. In rural agrarian settings, family farming is 
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predominant. Family farming covers a broad range of situations. None-
theless, it is generally characterized by the particular connection between 
the structure and composition of the household, assets, farming activities, 
paid and unpaid family or wage labour (Toulmin, & Gueye, 2003). Farm 
households, which could transcend family ties constitute the domestic 
group or unit which works a common field. Not only in Ghana, but across 
West Africa, family farming makes up a significant share of rural people's 
way of life. The persistence of family have been linked to their adaptability 
(Gyasi, 1994), robustness (Bélières, et al 2002; van der Ploeg, 2010), and 
their embeddedness in strong family relations and cultural bonds or what 
Ngwainmbi, (2000) refers to as the ‘economy of affection’. Contrary to 
the predictions of the demise of the peasantry, family farming persists 
even under unfavourable policies.  
Nonetheless, over time family farming has gone through several trans-
formations such as the growing fragmentation of large households, nucle-
ation, individualization and seasonal variation in household dynamics 
(NEPAD, 2013; Touré & Seck, 2005). Also, as a farming system which 
functions both as a production unit and a complex social organization, 
family farmers have, and continue to experience changes in their modes 
of production and reproduction, particularly in the labour dynamics. The 
literature on family farms in Africa is scanty, but there is evidence of sub-
stantive and complex wage labour relations among family farmers 
(Amanor, 2010; Van Hear, 1984). Unlike the Russian peasant that Cha-
yanov studied, peasant farming today is embedded in a 'new rurality', and 
not confined to a dependence on a free family labour (Kay, 2015).  
While earlier research in Ghana by Van Hear (1984) attributed the via-
bility of the family farm as being a fall-back haven for members, recent 
studies reveal otherwise. Many youths do not find farming attractive due 
to declining returns, inadequate government support and growing urban-
ization4 that propel them to pursue non-existent off-farm and city jobs 
(Ariyo & Mortimore, 2012; Richards, 2005). There is also a declining moral 
economy, intergenerational struggles and control of youth by elders which 
are manifested on the one hand, in the increasing withdrawal of youth’s 
labour services in family farms, and on the other hand, the increase in land 
sales and sharecropping (Amanor, 2010). When the youth choose to en-
gage in farming, many would instead become labourers and sharecroppers 
outside their family lands where their remuneration is guaranteed and 
yields are individualized. In such cases, they also compete with migrant 
70 CHAPTER 3 
 
 
farmworkers. Some of these family farms are also differentiated in assets 
and resources. Again, in some cases, wage labour needs may not neces-
sarily emanate from a lack of family labour, rather from expanded repro-
duction for both consumption and marketing (Bernstein 2010). There are 
instances when family farm heads and other household members sell off 
their labour supply to other farms to supplement family income needs for 
social and economic purposes. Such practices usually arise from the chal-
lenging livelihood contexts related to land degradation and under unfa-
vourable rural agricultural policy environments (Scoones, 2015; Windfuhr 
& Jonsén, 2005).  
As already highlighted in the preceding sections of this chapter, colo-
nial trends of commodification began with the introduction of cash crops 
and the forced commercialization of crops, a means of consumption and 
production, which made wage labour supply necessary. Following the ex-
pansion of neoliberal policies, high population growth rates and urbaniza-
tion since the late 1970s, the range of export commodities and those tar-
geted at the domestic market have increased commodification, the 
demand for land, and has also affected labour relations significantly. Alt-
hough sharecropping is common at frontier areas, wage labour relations 
and out-grower schemes have developed rather quickly (alongside out-
grower schemes), eventually becoming the preferred arrangements for 
most farmers (rich and poor farmers), who can afford wages, and on gov-
ernment and private owned plantations. Generally, there is wide a range 
of different types of farm wage labour systems in Ghana that have still not 
received sufficient research attention; labour types differentiated by task, 
crops, seasons, location, and payments contracts. Alongside wage labour 
and sharecropping, mutual support schemes, locally known as ‘nnoboa’ 
among the Akans, also prevails in cocoa producing areas and in other food 
sectors like maize cropping.  
In recent times, the pool of family labour available for family farms 
have been shrinking, many seek jobs in the urban areas and in agricultural 
wage employment to meet their cash and basic needs (Amanor, 2010; 
Bryceson, 2000). Yet, with a large army of labour reserves in both urban 
and rural areas, not only are urban jobs non-existent, employment oppor-
tunities available are often associated with precariousness and exploitation, 
even when these jobs address some specific livelihood needs. There is ris-
ing depeasantization and some degree of proletarianization as land-poor 
farmers who are affected by increasing commercialization, are often 
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expelled from the land or some are able to move into wage labour that are 
premised on inequitable power relations often along class, demographic, 
and livelihood lines (Bryceson, 2000). 
 
3.6 Farmland Tenure Systems 
Agricultural land tenure in Ghana has evolved significantly, but the influ-
ence of the colonial legacy lingers on. In recent times, customary tenure is 
still loosely interpreted in literature and policies as land under the control 
or custody of chiefs. Yet, as Nugent, 1996, (p. 204) firmly argued, ‘the 
trajectory of politics since independence has conferred its own peculiari-
ties upon the relationship between the state and traditional authority’, and 
they are characterized by constant negotiation and struggles by different 
social groups over access and user rights (Peters, 2013; Yaro, 2012). For 
instance, the enactment of the Lands Act for public and vested lands gave 
the state executive control over naturally occurring land resources even 
though lands remained under the customary or private ownership. These 
land policies guided state-led large-scale land acquisitions in the 1960s and 
1970s for oil palm plantations.  
Since the 1980s, land has become even more commodified. The Land 
Title Registration Law of 1986, made it possible for formal registration of 
interest in land. The 2003-2018 World Bank-funded Land Administration 
Project (LAP), has also facilitated the development of land markets 
through programmes such as registration, titling, and boundary demarca-
tions (Yaro & Torvikey, 2018). The Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
(MOFA) in 2015, developed the Large-Scale Land Transactions Guide-
lines to pre-empt and to address challenges with land investments. The 
‘model lease agreement’ introduced under GCAP are meant to promote 
land security but could also expose communities to indiscriminate land 
transfers.  
The existing land and investment regulations that are meant to protect 
the country and the locals also give leeway to investors to acquire un-
capped amount of land under lease and business models that suit their 
business priorities at the expense of local development. For instance, in 
Ghana, the extent to which people can hold the state accountable on land 
deals depends on the land tenure guiding the acquisition. Ghana’s policy 
of ‘non-interference’ in customary and market-based land tenure 
(Amanor, 2008) promotes capital accumulation without profound 
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legitimation pressures while states receives its revenue. Although the 
state's limited role in customary land transactions empowers traditional 
land institutions, it also relieves the state from accountability, thereby 
complicating the balance of power in land transactions and the ability to 
mitigate negative livelihood implications for peasants and farmworkers. 
Under these market-oriented policies, coupled with high population 
growth rates and urbanization, customary systems have not only been 
pressured to adapt to commercial agriculture but also deepens inequalities 
in the system of land access and use. There are numerous accounts of 
chiefs and families reinventing customs to facilitate land deals (Boamah, 
2014a; Yaro, 2012). Apart from the changing nature of customary institu-
tions that makes their ‘traditionality’ contested, it has also created a fairly 
‘suitable’ environment (not without conflicts and tensions) for the individ-
ualization of communal lands and the privatization of family lands that 
become fertile grounds for land concentration and commercial-scale agri-
culture. The past years have seen increasing price values of land and di-
minishing access to land. It is not only perpetuating poverty and food in-
security but also instigating national insecurity in some places. Typical is 
the rising trend of land conflicts between pastoralists and sedentary farm-
ers, between settlers and colonists on the agricultural frontiers, and sea-
sonal food insecurity among farmers (Monsalve et al 2006). 
Currently, about eighty percent of land in Ghana is held customarily 
under chieftaincy and family institutions, and the rest, vested in the state 
(Ubink & Amanor, 2008). While colonial rule had a huge impact on pro-
moting chiefs in these areas to lay claims over land amidst conflicts, there 
are some ethnicities where pre-existing family land systems have persisted. 
Similarly, other customary land tenure institutions which are intrinsically 
linked to farming systems like share cropping, shifting cultivation, land 
rotation and other usufruct arrangements which are not always within the 
domains of chiefs’ authority are often relegated to the category of ‘lesser 
interests in land’ and although acknowledged in statutory instruments, 
they don’t attract any deeper policy outlook. 
Broadly, in northern Ghana, earth priests are prominent in land mat-
ters, while chiefs and queen mothers control land in the South. In the 
North, land tenure litigations involving chieftaincy and earth priests have 
been the primary source of insecurity over the past few decades (Ubink & 
Amanor, 2008). In the parts of the Volta region, the eastern stretch, chiefs, 
but also families, control land. In Southern Ghana, there is also a general 
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distinction between the majority Akan group, who practice matrilineal in-
heritance and others including the Ewe, Ga, Dangme, and the Krobo eth-
nic groups who inherit land though the patrilineal side. As argued by Yaro 
et al., (2018), in the forest zones of the South, the matrilineal system 
evolved among the Akans so as to exclude Northern migrants from land 
control as they had become central to the production of emerging com-
mercial crops like cocoa and oil palm though sharecropping arrangements. 
These broad generalizations along spatial boundaries do not presuppose 
some fixed geo-ethnic characterizations but it is important to keep in mind 
how migration and inter/intra ethnic relations affect these tenure systems.  
3.7 The Scope of Contemporary Corporate Land Deals in 
Ghana  
Compared to the FDI stock in extractive industries (mining and gas), for-
eign investment in the agricultural sector is rather low - a situation that 
mirrors global trends despite the increasing global agricultural land rush. 
Nonetheless, in absolute terms, in the last decade, Ghana has attracted 
considerable foreign direct investment in the agribusiness sector covering 
many commodities including horticulture, fisheries, cereals, cocoa and oil 
palm — all of which reflect the broad investment promotion trends in the 
country, as explained earlier. Over 40 transnational plantation land con-
tracts ranging between 50 to 400,000ha have been concluded since 2000. 
Western investors including those from Italy, The Netherlands, France, 
UK, USA and Norway are prominent players in farmland investments, 
especially the oil palm and non-traditional export sector (Amanor, 2012). 
Yet in recent years, the so-called 'rising powers' have also been playing 
new roles in agricultural investments, with almost one-fifth of land deals 
in West Africa involving China, Brazil and India. In 2011, China launched 
the West Africa regional office of the China-African Development Fund 
(CADFund) in Accra to facilitate and accelerate the industrialization and 
agricultural modernization in West Africa (Cousins et al., 2018). Other ex-
amples include Brazil's involvement in commercial rice production in 
Ghana for both domestic and international markets, and other ancillary 
investments from China in the form of irrigation services, agro-pro-
cessing, agricultural technology and research (Amanor, 2013; Bräutigam & 
Xiaoyang, 2009). In all of these developments, the role of national elites 
cannot be overstated — the state, local agricultural entrepreneurs and tra-
ditional authorities who operate on their own and in diverse partnerships 
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with foreign elites to facilitate land deals (Keene, et al, 2015; Moreda & 
Spoor, 2015). Many of such partnerships for agricultural land investments 
tend to put control in the hands of landholding and capitalist elites 
(McKay, 2017), often to the disadvantage of peasant livelihoods — a con-
dition which food sovereignty movements actively resist.  
Currently, the Northern, Brong-Ahafo, Ashanti, Volta, and Central re-
gions of Ghana have become a hub for large-scale cultivation of rice, 
maize, and other non-traditional exports crops including cashew; the cen-
tral, western and Eastern regions are dominated by oil palm, fruits, and 
cereal production (Boamah, 2014b; Tsikata & Yaro, 2013). A large pro-
portion of these investments are also targeted at the export market. In 
comparison to other country contexts, the size of acquisitions may not be 
among the largest and about 20 percent of such land deals have been aban-
doned5. Many of the abandoned deals were either intended or actual 
jatropha projects that failed to meet the expectations of investors and 
communities. The present findings seem to be consistent with what is hap-
pening in several other countries including Mexico, India, China, Ethiopia 
and Mozambique where jatropha failed to be the miracle crop that was 
going to provide alternative source of fuel and develop rural communities 
— a common reason being crop failure (Antwi-Bediako, et al, 2019). That 
said, over the past two decades, over one million ha of land have been 
acquired, transforming access, use, and control of land in rural communi-
ties that are already struggling with inequalities in land tenure systems and 
diverse livelihood challenges.  
 
3.8 Civil Society and Land Grab Politics in Ghana 
The global land rush has spurred small, modest and big anti-land grab mo-
bilizations from various civil society groups including social movements, 
NGOs, producer organizations, transnational and local advocacy groups, 
activist researchers and critical research institutes. Examples include, the 
food sovereignty movement, Food First, Green Peace, Transnational In-
stitute, among others. While some focus specifically on land-related issues, 
many of them do their campaign within the broader agrarian-environmen-
tal context to include land, food, water, and climate justice for peasants, 
small producers and other affected groups. The extent of influence of dif-
ferent civil society groups is shaped by the particular regional and local 
dynamics. For instance, compared to Latin America, the food sovereignty 
          Agricultural Policy, Farming Systems, and Food Politics in Ghana 75 
movement has a less established base in Africa. Nonetheless, numerous 
organizations, networks and platforms at national, regional and continent 
levels are engaged in food sovereignty related campaigns and advocacy. 
Their campaigns are not mere replications of the La Via Campesina prin-
ciples but are often shaped by their local or regional contexts and histories 
(Gyapong, 2017). For example, whereas land reform is central to food 
sovereignty campaigns in southern Africa due to their history of class and 
racial oppression (Wesso, 2009), the West African campaign is critical of 
free trade and thus, centres on equitable integration of smallholders into 
global markets. In Cameroon for example, other players such as Green 
peace and grassroots mobilizations have been very influential in resisting 
state-supported oil palm investments in forest lands by SG Sustainable 
Oils Cameroon (SGSOC). 
The situation in Ghana is quite different. Arguably, there is not a strong 
national-based civil society mobilization against land grabs. Generally, a 
land investment discourse supersedes the land grab narrative. It was not 
surprising when people, curious about this research often asked me ‘is 
there land grabbing in Ghana’? Due to the existing land tenure system, 
most of the recent transactions have not occurred on state lands but indi-
vidual and community lands where chiefs, family heads, and development 
brokers have been the direct mediators of the process. Again, it appears 
that in many instances, the land deals have been administered by the ‘right 
legal’ procedures even if they do not benefit local communities. As ex-
plained in chapter one, affected communities often resort to everyday ac-
tion and very low-level nascent mobilizations.  
Nonetheless, there are a number of civil society groups that have played 
significant roles in the land grab debates and politics, although with vary-
ing class, identity, and ideological interests, which shape their demand 
framing. Among producer groups in Ghana, the Ghana Federation of Ag-
ricultural Producers (GFAP) serves as the umbrella unit for farmers’ col-
lective action6. GFAP is a federation of four national farmer- based organ-
izations which was established in October 2009 and launched under the 
theme of ‘enhancing agricultural development with a united voice’ 
(Nyamekye Hannah, 2015). Its constituent farmer-based organizations in-
clude Ghana National Association of Farmers and Fishermen (GNAFF), 
Peasant Farmers Association of Ghana (PFAG), Farmers’ Organization 
Network in Ghana (FONG), and Apex Farmers Organization of Ghana 
(APFOG). Its mission is to champion the cause of unifying all farmer 
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groups in Ghana and to advocate for favourable policies for Agricultural 
Producers in Ghana (Nyamekye, 2015). Most importantly here is that 
GFAP is the current national platform representing Ghana in the Network 
of Farmers’ and Producers' Organizations in West Africa (ROPPA)7. 
ROPPA8 has been the main voice in the anti-land grab demands in the sub 
region. The present formal9 base of ROPPA, is made up of thirteen10 na-
tional platforms from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Si-
erra Leone and Togo. They comprise various rural farming groups: crops, 
horticulture, livestock, poultry, pastoralists, beekeepers, food processors 
and other farming professionals  
The class base of the Ghana platform seems to be that of mainly mid-
dle-to-rich farmer groups who have different political tendencies on land 
grab governance. As Tarrow, (2004) indicated, collective action decisions 
often occur within a complex web of interests, incentives and traditions 
that influence the claims/demands that are prioritized. This is reflected in 
the differentiated interests of farmer associations. As such, even though 
ROPPA’s regional campaigns against liberalized markets, and continuous 
demands that small-scale family farming systems are not taken over by 
large-scale industrialized schemes, its translation at the national level may 
be different. For instance, the president of GFAP who at one point coor-
dinated an Alliance for Green Revolution Alliance (AGRA) project in 
Ghana is once said to have been driven by an admiration for commercial 
agriculture and therefore his interest is ‘how small-scale farmers could one 
day be commercial farmers’11. Again, when some farmers are keen to en-
gage with global markets to improve their livelihoods, some may not be 
averse to the intensive use of weedicides or experimenting with genetically 
modified seeds. In Ghana, seeds of contestation have erupted around a 
planned government introduction of GM cowpea (a staple legume in 
Ghana) seeds.  
Food Sovereignty Ghana (FSG) remains the most influential non-pro-
ducer radical campaign and activist group critical of land grabs, water pri-
vatization, environmental degradation and climate change, and particularly 
GM food technology that marginalize small-scale farmers and local food 
systems. In the past decade, they have particularly stood against GM pol-
icies and the Ghana plant breeders' bill that puts control over seeds in the 
hands of multi-national corporations but criminalises farmers. They have 
in the past filed law suits against the state, demanding a ban on GMOs 
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until adequate research into their long-term impacts are brought to light. 
Through legal procedures, FSG achieved a partial success in a temporary 
ban on GM crops in 2015.  
Other progressive NGOSs and non-producer advocacy groups engage 
in occasional and sometime reactive campaigns against land grabs. The 
Land Justice 4 West Africa has been campaigning for fair compensations 
for people affected by old state-led compulsory land acquisitions for oil 
palm. Faith-based organizations like the Catholic Caritas Ghana, and the 
Africa Faith and Justice Network (AFJN) have in the past, created land 
grab awareness in the Volta region, and particularly the case under study. 
Caritas perceives the moral role of the Church as an advocate for human 
rights and the care of the earth. This is in resonance with the world cath-
olic Bishops support call for peoples’ access to water and land for sustain-
able food systems as their input into the climate Conference of Partners 
(COP)21 in 2015. At the 2016 plenary session of the Ghana Catholic Bish-
ops conference, they agreed to spearhead the course of just governance 
and to engage with relevant state institutions to promote development and 
prevent the destruction of lands. The case of AFJN’s activism against land 
grabs is further elaborated in chapter six. It represents one of the few, if 
not the only civil society organization that has actually intervened in an 
ongoing land grab process in Ghana.  
3.9 Chapter Conclusion 
Agricultural commercialization in Ghana has been historically influenced 
by the impact of colonial era polices that have evolved over the years to 
their current globalized form which are characterized by the increased de-
mand for land and labour. Resonating with Yaro, et al (2018), while com-
mercialization emerged over two centuries earlier, the fast rate of land con-
centration is rather recent and intricately linked to the country’s 
modernization and investment drive. The snapshots of agricultural poli-
cies and accompanying projects illustrate their triple goal of food security, 
increasing incomes and jobs, and the expanding export base of the econ-
omy under enabling institutions. However, within the state apparatus, the 
predominant class is inclined towards a neoclassical modernization para-
digm of promoting private property through market-led and administra-
tive land and investment policies that contributes to the increasing rural 
farmland expropriation for capitalist projects. The rise in capitalist agricul-
ture in Ghana is not akin to one in which smallholder systems have been 
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largely overtaken by plantations, because of the persistence of peasant 
farming even in cash crop production. The situation at hand is that the 
vast share of the policies have been targeted at the modernization of small 
holding systems, their integration, and often subordination into the mar-
kets of large-scale and out-grower schemes, and the creation of an ena-
bling environment for private investments into large-scale agriculture. All 
of these occur amid the tensions that often exist in the autonomy and 
capacity of state and customary institutions to balance the double impera-
tive of accumulation and legitimation to equitably benefit marginalized ru-
ral groups who are dependent on land development.  
Driven by an investment rather than a land grab narrative, Ghana con-
tinues to promote FDI in capitalist agriculture in oil palm, rubber, mango 
among other tree and horticultural food crops mainly for the export sec-
tor. Borrowing the words of Amanor (2010), this overriding investment 
discourse ‘tends to present the story of those able to secure and alienate 
land in collusion with dominant political interests and policies, while it 
neglects the perspectives of the losers and their disillusionment with the 
contemporary world’. Unlike other countries with well-grounded agrarian 
justice movements, there is not a strong base of civil society resistance 
against land grabs in Ghana and the few existing ones are also diverse with 
different class interests, all of which affect the extent of national awareness 
of land grabs, as well as the outcomes of civil society action.  
In effect, there are silent and increasingly large-scale farmland acquisi-
tions in many rural communities that are sustained by investment and local 
economic discourses without substantial benefits to vulnerable and mar-
ginalized groups within affected families and communities. In the subse-
quent chapters four, five and six, I provide empirical evidence from the 
example of the SGSOG oil palm land deal in Ghana to discuss the ongoing 
impacts on land access, family and wage labour, as well as the differenti-
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Notes 
1 The stool is an ancestrally consecrated stool that represents the source of author-
ity of the chief or king of an ethnic group. Among the non-Akan ethnic groups of 
the Northern regions, the authority of a chief, king or a priest is symbolised by the 
consecrated skin of an animal. The skin or stool land is therefore land that is con-
trolled by the occupant of the stool or skin i.e. chief, king or priest. He/she holds 
all the land in trust and on behalf of his people and has allocative and distributive 
rights over such lands (Danquah, 1928; Gyamera et al., 2018).  
2 The marketing of produce, however, was controlled by foreign monopolies.  
3 Three models of agriculture were promoted: the plantation model, and out-
grower model which was largely influenced by the peasants resistance to displace-
ment from the compulsory land acquisitions, and clusters of medium and large 
commercial farms (Yaro et al., 2018). 
4 In the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone, the civil wars of the 1990s influenced the 
urbanization of the youth. 
5 My estimation based on data from http://www.landmatrix.org/en/ 
6 http://www.fao.org 
7 Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et de Producteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest. 
8 ROPPA was born out of an initiative from farmers’ organizations and agricultural 
producers across West Africa. It was established to represent the interests of small-
holder farmers and their national organizations to promote family farms — the 
dominant mode agricultural, forestry and pastoral production in West Africa 
(ROPPA, 2014a). ROPPA was formally constituted during a regional conference 
of peasant organizations in June/July 2000 at Cotonou (Johnson et al., 2008; 
ROPPA, 2014c). Prior to this conference, there had been on-going resistances and 
struggles by the Sahelian and Francophone West African Civil Society and peasant 
organizations against the ills of globalization and the adverse effects of the struc-
tural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) – unfavourable agricultural policies, poor 
rural socio economic infrastructure and poverty (Mckeon, 2009; McKeon, 2005),  
In addition to the acclaimed western manufactured plights, farmers’ organizations 
saw the need for representation and participation in their own national level rural 
development policy making processes. To strengthen their political cause and to 
gather a greater super-national support, they began processes of exchange across 
the sub-region (McKeon, 2005). Thus, between 1998 and 2000, several consultative 
meetings were held on the way forward, of which one way was to develop a capac-
ity building fund to support farmer organizations. The July 2000 assembly sought 
to decide on the sustenance of the capacity building fund and subsequently the 
creation of ROPPA. Although there is no clarity as to whether or not the formation 
of ROPPA was a preconceived mission or happened spontaneously at the Coto-
nou conference, undoubtedly these organizations identified with similar rural de-
velopment and farming constraints, which they were driven to tackle together. 
 
 




Existing Peasant organizations such as the National Committee for Rural Peoples' 
Dialogue (CNCR) of Senegal is generally acknowledged for playing a key role in 
the establishment of ROPPA (Hrabanski, 2010; McKeon, 2005). The earliest of 
ROPPA’s joint activity with Vía Campesina found so far in the literature available 
is in May 2001, indicating approximately a year after its inception.  ROPPA is not 
a member of Vía Campesina as Vía Campesina consists of national and local peas-
ant organizations. As such, some of the national platforms including CNCR are 
rather members of Vía Campesina.   
9 Sourced from http://roppa-afrique.org after skimming through the composition 
of all the sub-local associations of the national platforms. 
10 From the ROPPA website, they have farmer organizations from Cape-Verde 
and Nigeria, but it is not known which particular organizations they are and the 
existing nature of engagement. 




4 Class, Gender and the Politics of Land Access and Exclusion  
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
This is an empirical chapter that focuses on the land question (who gets 
what) within the context of the land grab1. It presents an analysis of the 
intersecting role of state and customary institutions in the making of the 
land deal; an illustration of the class and generational dynamics of impacts; 
access to and exclusion from rents and compensations and the modifica-
tions of the existing social relations of production and access to food. The 
first three subsections provide a thick description of how farming is orga-
nized in the affected communities. The remaining subsections (4.4–4.8) 
unpack the land deal process and how it has modified power relations 
within the family and farming systems and the implications for women, 
youth, sharecroppers, migrants and ethnic minorities.  
 
4.2 Chapter Conclusions  
This chapter examined the micro politics of dispossession, and the con-
testations around land rights and entitlements to rents within the inter-
secting spheres of the family, land tenure and farming practices. While 
chiefs continue to seek opportunities from land deals to redefine or con-
solidate their authority over land, claims to land in the domains of families 
are also being restructured by powerful actors — a process which influ-
ences land access and farming practices. At the local level, the demarcation 
and formalization of boundaries reduces the complex patrilineal system of 
land access to a narrow version of land ‘ownership’ held mostly by a few 
second-generation men who control rents. Indeed rural farm households 
in many areas of Sub Saharan Africa, especially West Africa, do not organ-
ize the distribution of resources and incomes on the basis of norms of 
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sharing and pooling (Whitehead, 2009) and this is reflected in the fact that 
customary institutions are not necessarily sites of equity; a situation that is 
exacerbated when they are further integrated into capitalist markets. The 
evidence of the exclusion of women and the youth from the rent benefits 
challenges idealistic notions that existing kinship based entitlements to 
land do not involve not only land-based production, but even secures 
‘rightful share’ of cash among members (Ferguson, 2015). The dynamics 
among the affected Ntrubos shows that not only are existing inequalities 
between men and women being reinforced, but are breeding new forms 
of control within the customary setting. Though the political dynamics 
may differ in customary land tenure contexts with different degrees of 
family and chieftaincy authority, smallholders who are women, youth, and 
sharecroppers without sufficient control over land resources are the worst 
affected groups (Kuusaana, 2017).  
In many rural settings, land remains an important asset. Regardless of 
the changing rural economies often characterised by occupations in off-
farm jobs, petty trading and services, access to land is still central to the 
security of rural livelihoods and social reproduction. The dynamics of dis-
possession as shown in this chapter does not only constitute a structural 
violence of the appropriation of land and resources, but also the depletion 
of capacities due to gendered and differential experiences embedded 
within the realm of social reproduction (Fernandez, 2018, p. 158). 
Whereas the relative land availability seems to slow the pace of a break-
down in the processes of social reproduction especially regarding subsist-
ence, the reducing farm sizes, limited access to fertile and proximate lands, 
changes in the social relations of both intra-clan land access as well as 
access for migrant sharecroppers, raising concerns about the stability and 
sustainability of the present and future generation. Yet, market-based land 
investment policies hardly address the inherent inequalities associated with 
land transactions. Whether or not the dispossessed or affected communi-
ties benefit from such land transactions largely depends on the models of 









5 Labour Incorporation and Implications for Family Farming  
 
 
5.1  Introduction  
Chapter five is an empirical chapter on the labour question (who does 
what). At the core of this chapter is the assessment of natural inclusion 
into the plantation work, looking at class, identity (gender, ethnicity and 
migrant status and generational dynamics of (non) incorporation (from 
land paper). It also provides some evidence on the impacts on small-scale 
farming in terms of family, wage, and unpaid labour supply and access to 
mutual support labour schemes.  
5.2  The Peasant Farmworkers and their Attachment to Land  
In order to provide a better understanding of the ways in which land deals 
affect rural communities, the character of the nature of rural is key. Fluid 
inter- and intra-country migration plays a huge role in the making of peas-
ants in West Africa even though most of the debates on migration tend to 
focus mainly on rural-urban flows. Nine out of ten of all the farmworkers 
are small-scale farmers or peasants, and from the survey, a little over a 
quarter (28.5 per cent) of farmworkers migrated specifically to work on 
the plantation. Yet, there are many others (farmworkers, land owners, 
chiefs and other community members), who during my interviews either 
through life history accounts or through fluid conversations made it a 
point to explain to me how and why they have become farmers in the 
countryside, sometimes challenging the identity that they thought I had 
imposed on them; some proud of their relation to land, others not, and 
also pushing me to re-think the way I perceive their fragile relation to land 
as well as their work on the plantation. From the survey and interviews, I 
encountered diverse groups of peasants1 plantation farmworkers not em-
phasizing their modes of production, but their mobility and shifting 
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connections to land. From their own descriptions of themselves and their 
perceptions of farming they can be classified into three main groups.  
First, is the category of ‘real peasant farmworkers’. This includes small-
scale family/petty commodity producers, often middle-aged or elderly 
men who may or may not have had rural-(peri)urban-rural migration ex-
periences, and sometimes also engaged in small non-farm side activities 
(e.g. trade), yet show strong affirmation of their peasant identity. There 
were cases of people returning from ‘hustling’ in the city to find permanent 
jobs on the plantation, usually as security, but also used the opportunity 
to invest in their farms as they would have wished beforehand and there-
fore have no intentions of going back to the city. In the case of one par-
ticular worker, since 1991 he has been on the move from his own village 
in the Northern Region of Ghana to several other places until finally set-
tling in the region since 2004 to work on both plantations. Although aside 
from his own farming, he is currently enjoying the ‘luxury’ and a somewhat 
long service reward as a night security at the residence of the British direc-
tors, he always boasted about his farming skills, and his passion for agri-
culture during our conversations. This however does not pre-suppose a 
romanticising of the current state of a not-so-supportive policy environ-
ment which he constantly criticised especially when it came to access to 
markets and inputs. Narrating his story, a harvester on the plantation,  who 
since 2001 migrated from a nearby town and used to rent land for yam 
cultivation on the now enclosed land stated,  
When I was on my own farm, I was my own boss... I was a ‘real farmer’, 
nothing compared to this meagre work we are doing here. I could load 2 
trucks full of yam per year. I could get 50 bags of maize. We are just man-
aging now. I am share cropping 2 acres of cocoa for 4 years now. Farmers 
have become farm labourers, but I can earn about 1,800 cedis per month 
(gross) in peak seasons, but trust me you can’t earn this much, if you are not 
a ‘real farmer’ (07 June, 2018, Fankyenekor). 
The second category is the ‘adapting peasant farmworkers. The vast major-
ity of these peasants may or may not have been born into peasant families 
in these communities, and at some point, migrated to other (peri) urban 
areas to engage in industry, commerce, and other urban jobs but had to 
return to the their villages due to social and family demands such as taking 
care of the aged or sick, and marriages etc. In a rural context built around 
family care and support rather than hospices for the aged, several farm-
workers gave accounts of having been compelled to leave their jobs in the 
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city to cater for their sick parents or siblings depending on the generational 
dynamics and other domestic relations of care. In the case of caring for 
parents, it is often times gendered, in most instances elderly sons expected 
to take care of sick and aged fathers, and likewise daughters and their 
mothers. For instance, the daughter of the only female family head among 
the 15 landlords, indicated that she used to work in a restaurant in the 
capital city but has returned because of her mother’s illness. Others, by the 
request of their aged and dying fathers, had to return to continue the work 
on family farms, especially when the family size is small, lands are not 
highly fragmented and when it involves cash crops. A young male farm-
worker narrated,  
I was born in Brewaniase and schooled there before going to Accra [the 
capital city] to work in a candle and soap factory for three years. I returned 
to the village after my mother died. I had to come back to the village at my 
father’s request. Later my father passed on and I had to stay and take care 
of the farm as the eldest son. I have been in the village since 2014 and have 
no plans of returning to Accra. I went to Accra for greener pastures to 
swerve farming but I am now satisfied here, doing farming (23rd Feb 2019, 
Abrubruwa). 
There are also women peasants often originally traders in the peri-urban 
communities who had to follow their husbands (some teachers, and pro-
duce buyers) into these villages upon transfer. Over the years, this group 
has taken up peasant identities and consolidated their ‘rurality’ through 
marriages, and investing in their own and family farms, and to different 
degrees, has adjusted to peasant living.  
Distinct from the two groups above, are the ‘one foot out peasant farm-
workers’. These farmworkers are different from the few, especially semi-
skilled urban-rural migrants who do not engage in any own farming activ-
ities at all, as in the case of the truck operator2 who expressed ‘I don’t like 
farming, I see myself as a fine gentleman. I used to run away from farm 
work when I was a child’. Rather, the one foot out peasant farmworkers, 
include mostly educated and/or entrepreneurial minded male youth farm-
workers who consider their work on the plantation only as a stepping 
stone to a ‘bigger dream’. Most of them are currently engaged on their 
own farms, while working on the plantation, and have plans towards 
higher education, and/or with aspirations in the teaching, nursing, police, 
other ‘reputable’ professions or trades. Others, including a few young 
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women are also saving income to enrol in hairdressing and cloth making 
apprenticeships, preferably in the city.  
5.3  Class and Demographic Characteristics of Farmworkers  
 From the survey done in this study, 93 per cent of the 200 farmworkers 
who participated have access to farmlands in their communities or in 
neighbouring locations, while 88 per cent are engaged in small-scale farm-
ing with farm sizes ranging from 0.1 of an acre to approximately 11 acres. 
Resonating with the literature on intra-household gender inequalities 
(Razavi, 2009; Whitehead & Tsikata, 2003), men tend to have access to 
multiple and scattered farm plots (up to three different farmlands) and 
bigger farm sizes than women. Table 5.1 shows the approximate farmland 
sizes (up to three different farm plots) among the farmworkers. 
Nonetheless, interviews conducted with most of the women suggest 
their ability to cultivate and benefit from their own small plots of farm-
lands independent of their family/husbands’ lands. Figure 5.1 shows the 
gendered differences in land sizes of a total of 176 farmworkers who pro-
vided information on the first recorded plots). Being a settler society, 
sharecropping remains the most common form of land access (see Table 
5.2). For the minority (7 per cent) of workers who had no access to farm-
lands, the vast majority were urban-rural migrants who were either not 
interested in own farming, or were actively searching for a suitable land; 
and a few aging women who could not combine farming with their current 
jobs.  
 
Table 5.1  



















Farm 1 134 42 176 44% 42% 9.6% 2.8% 1% 0.6% 
Farm 2 35 3 38 48.6% 46% 5.4% - - - 
Farm 3 5 - 5 40% 40% 20% - - - 
Source: Author’s survey, 2018. 
 




  Farmworkers’ Farm Sizes (Farm 1) by Gender 
 
Source: Author’s survey, 2018. 
Table 5.2 
Farmworkers’ Forms of Land Access (Farm 1) 
Access Type Percentage (%) 
Family land 45 
Tenancy  54 
Free Occupancy 2 
Total 100 
N=176  
Source: Author's field survey. 
 
Indeed, among almost all the farmworkers surveyed whose lands were af-
fected, have had access to farmlands, yet with varying levels of access and 
control, and often described by those who lost all their family lands as 
being less desirable. Labour on the plantation is therefore characterised by 
a complex mix of landed, less landed, sharecroppers, dispossessed prole-
tariats and even some farmworkers (eight of them) who have their own 
sharecroppers. Although access to farmland is an important aspect of the 







≤1 acre 2 3 4 5 6 8 10 11–15
Male Female N=176 
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vast majority of the farmworkers are not driven into labour due to land-
lessness. Access to suitable farmlands, however, remains critical for the 
dispossessed proletariats who lost the entire family and share cropped 
lands.  
Many male adult farmworkers also depend on wages to invest and ex-
pand their own farms. However, as shown in Table 5.1, even if they are 
indeed able to materialize such expectations, the potential for a shift to-
wards a ‘middle class’ is unlikely. If we consider their farm sizes as the 
basis for classification it can be argued that the vast majority of the farm-
workers are still peasants or small-scale farmers. More than 80 per cent 
farm less than 3 acres on their first plots, and under 6 acres in the case of 
those with second plots. Yet, it is important to note that the figures in 
Table 5.1 are exaggerated estimates, given that farmlands are rarely demar-
cated formally. Besides, farmers and share croppers often find it difficult 
to distinguish between accessible farm lands and actual farm sizes because 
of the broader continuum of their seasonal farming practices of crop and 
land rotation, not to mention the intercropping of vegetables by women 
and sometimes the not-so-neat divisions between independently con-
trolled farms and family farms on co-shared lands particularly among 
sharecropping families. With the exception of cash crops, most people 
farm in the measure of ropes (subdivisions of one acre) at a particular 
point in time. In fact, what constitutes large, medium or small in land size 
classification in many rural contexts in Africa defies any rigid standards. 
In an interview with the chief, he considered two acres as a large farm. 
This is certainly not the case in the forest zones in southern Ghana where 
farm sizes are relatively larger. Meanwhile in some studies such as the one 
by Jayne et al., (2016) where they argue for a rising medium size farm in 
Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia, they used 0–5 hectares (up to 12 
acres) as the range for small-scale farms, and 500 hectares for medium 
farms; raising several methodological questions3.  
Preliminary indications from the survey and the interviews point to six 
main aspects of the rural life that intersect with land/farm size-based fac-
tors. These include their (a) identity: for example, among the farmworkers 
who are non-indigenes, the Konkomba people are the poorest as com-
pared to other migrants from southern Ghana or neighbouring Togo, 
alongside other gender differences; (b) household characteristics (c) pat-
terns of access and use of land and labour (d) degree of insertion into 
capitalist markets (e) type of housing: between mud and cement blocks, 
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thatch and aluminium roofing sheets and (f) education. For many of the 
workers, education is an important reason for working on the plantation 
— the youth (males) who are temporarily out of school depend on wages 
to pursue higher education; and wage labour is the primary source of in-
come for most women who are burdened with the responsibilities of their 
children’s educational needs. From the survey, only 5.5 per cent of farm-
workers indicated that they left off-farm occupations including appren-
ticeships, petty trade, factory and mechanic work, and transport service 
whereas 11 per cent were high school students prior to their work on the 
plantation.  
Figure 5.2 shows the demographic differences among the farm workers 
in terms of gender, level of education and age. As shown in Table 5.3, one-
third of the female workers are either divorced, separated, or widowed as 
compared to men where the proportion is just 9 per cent. These results 
corroborate with the workers’ age distribution where approximately half 
of the male population falls between 18 and 30 years old and approxi-
mately one-third have never been married. For women, about one -fifth 
are below 30 years and only 10 per cent are single or have never been 
married. The survey showed that 66 per cent of the women are between 
the ages of 31–50, and this is a child bearing and care giving period where 
rural women’s chances of education are very limited as compared to men, 
and because many of these women already missed basic education.  
Figure 5.2 
Demographic Characteristics of Farmworkers. 
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Table 5.3  
Marital Statuses of Farmworkers 
Status  Male Percentage (%) Female Percentage(%) 
Never married 41 27.3 5 10 
Consensual Union 6 4 2 4 
Married 90 60 28 56 
Separated 3 2 4 8 
Divorced 9 6 5 10 
Widowed 1 0.7 6 12 
Total 150 100 50 100 
 
Source: Author’s fieldwork 2018. 
 
5.4  A Gendered Division of Labour 
Labour on the plantation is divided by tasks carried out based on physical 
attribution, seasonality, and sometimes through discretionary decisions at 
the supervision level. The tasks are also gendered, with men having more 
opportunities to take up specific tasks. The core labourers engage in work 
that directly affect production: crop and soil maintenance, weed control 
and harvest-related activities. These include pruning, slashing, round 
weeding, spraying of weedicides, fertilizer application, irrigation, harvest-
ing, and loose picking. They are deployed through the gang system often 
consisting of 25 workers. Tasks reserved for men include harvesting, prun-
ing, spraying, fire control and loading (they load and transport the palm 
fruits to the processing site). During peak season, harvesters employ their 
own workers to be head porters or what they call ‘carriers’ to transport the 
harvested palm bunches to specific locations on the farm. They often con-
sist of women who could have social ties or not, with the harvesters. Slash-
ing is done by both men and women, while loose picking, which is a 
woman’s task, except occasionally when it becomes necessary for men to 
join.   
Another group of workers is the farm service workers, who are mostly 
skilled men engaged in technical operations. Their tasks have a close in-
teraction between production and processing. They include mechanical 
engineers and fitters, carpenters, plumbers, vulcanizers, heavy-duty truck 
operators and drivers.  
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The third group of workers are the support workers consisting mainly of 
security workers who also supervise fire control in the dry seasons. There 
are no women represented in management, administration and supervi-
sion. Table 5.4 gives an overview of how labour is organized on the plan-
tation. 
Table 5.4  
Gendered Tasks and Targets on the Plantation. 
Tasks  Gender Target 
(Standard) 
Target 
(Off Peak/ Poor 
Condition) 
Lucrativeness of  
Targets 
Harvesting  Men 86 Bunches 40–50 Bunches High  
Pruning Men 30–35 20–25 Above Average 
Loose Picking  Women 4 bags Daily Wage       Average 
Round Weeding Both 30 Palms (2m 
around tree) 
same Below Average 
Fertiliser Applica-
tion  
Women 200 palms (1 kg 
of fertilizer per 
tree) 
Same Average 
Slashing Both 9 m² × 15 trees Same Low 
Security Men * NA NA • Stable (fixed) 
Wages 





Technical Support Men Undefined  Undefined 
Operations Men * Undefined Undefined 
Loading Men 2 return trips 
daily (for a team 
of 4–6 people) 
Flexible  
Spraying  Men 10 fillings (15l 
knapsack) 
Same 
Irrigation Men Undefined Undefined 
Carrying Women Per palm bunches 
harvested  




* Including one woman employed in the task. 
Source: Author’s Interviews 2018.  
5.5  Precarious Labour and the ‘Weakening’ Bodies  
5.5.1 Casualization  
Labour casualization is often associated with insecurity and low income 
(Yaro, et al 2017). However, for those who consider it as a potential live-
lihood opportunity, they emphasize the benefits of flexibility in allowing 
workers to engage in more than one productive sector and even the pos-
sibilities of technology transfer to small-scale farms (Deininger & Xia, 
2016). At the same time, it could enable investors to hire and fire workers 
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with ease, make more elastic use of skills, introduce non-conventional 
work arrangements and lower wages according to their business needs and 
performance in ways that may not necessarily benefit workers (Arnold & 
Bongiovi, 2013, p. 6). 
Job, income and health insecurity characterize the nature of work on 
the plantation. Compared to the initial phase of the oil palm establishment 
— when clearing, nursery and planting took place, employment opportu-
nities have reduced considerably. The workers’ estimations put the figure 
at 500-plus, and official records indicate that at least 392 people have pre-
viously worked, or are currently employed on the plantation4.  
With the exception of the 53 permanent workers (excluding 8 supervi-
sors), the rest (70 per cent of the labour force), and 9 out of every 10 
women, are casual workers with six-month renewable contracts or no con-
tracts. For casual workers, their job security window is opened only during 
the peak seasons (from April to August). Outside this period, especially 
between November and March, many of them are laid off, and their fates 
lie in the hopes of early rains and field conditions, their gender, and their 
relations with supervisors. Unlike reports from similar studies in Mozam-
bique, both casual and permanent workers could apply to a social secu-
rity/pension scheme (O’Laughlin, 2017). Nonetheless, casual workers 
who seek progression to permanent contracts are usually the less landed, 
women, and those with limited alternative livelihoods, who want to benefit 
from job security, paid leave and particularly, access to loans, which are 
privileges preserved for only permanent workers. Interviews with the 
workers and management confirmed that, in the post 2013 transition to 
Volta Red, there has not been significant progression from casual to per-
manent contracts — a situation which the management justifies to be part 
of a cost-cutting strategy and also dependent on worker’s commitment, a 
claim that many long-serving workers could not agree with. Box 5.1 shows 
the differential preferences between two pioneer female workers of differ-
ent social and livelihood backgrounds and strategies.   
 Not so different from mainstream optimism in the employment poten-
tials of large-scale agricultural investments, the families and communities 
were under the illusions of massive job opportunities, with salaried, formal 
and permanent employment contracts. The casual system affects different 
groups and classes differently and so is their everyday ways of dealing with 
it. The differentiation comes with age, generational dynamics within 
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households, domestic norms, years of service, task, migrant status, educa-






































Box 5.1 Two Female Workers and their Contract Preferences 
Case 1: Actively seeking a permanent contract 
Gariwa 52 years, has five children and in a polygamous household. She has no formal 
education.  She has worked for about seven years, and even received an award for 
hard work and dedication but is still a casual worker. She is also a peasant who has 
been sharecropping corn, cocoyam and cassava since 2015 on a farm size of about 
half an acre belonging to a native, while at same time assisting her husband on their 
‘family farm’. They are northern migrants. She needs a permanent contract for secu-
rity of job and income, and also to enjoy some paid leave, and retirement benefits, 
she is tired and weakened. This is also important given the household reproduction 
dynamics: i) She is responsible for feeding her children and husband ‘I have to pro-
vide soup i.e. meat/fish, mill the corn, and cook food’. She does not receive house-
keeping money; ii) She needs income to pay wage labour on her own farm because 
family labour is not constant; iii) She is not entitled to income from the family farm, 
she has to fight for a share; iv) She has used up her savings to sponsor her daughter 
to travel abroad to do domestic work; v) A big chunk of income goes into school 
related expenses; her husband is investing in a house in their hometown. She does 
not see herself quitting anytime soon, unless she is physically incapable. She hopes 
for progression to a permanent contract, but in the meantime she has very little op-
tions. She takes some days off when she is tired, but usually seeks permission from 
the supervisors.  
 
Case 2: It’s too late to be a permanent worker 
Yaa is 51 years, has four children and has worked for eight years. She has primary 
education, and is married to a teacher/farmer in a monogamy. She used to be a trader 
before she followed her husband on transfer from the south to Brewaniase. She has 
been sharecropping corn and sweet potatoes (under one acre) for nine years. Her 
landowner who doubles as her residential landlord is aged, and she only gives her a 
fair share of the food to subsist. She farms mainly for subsistence. She provides food 
for her children, but with her husband’s support. She is tired of the plantation work, 
and now she is still working there only to save up to pay some debts and invest in 
her trade, she hopes quit in the next three years.  She does not need a permanent 
contract any more as it will only restrict her.  As of now, she takes her own annual 
leave from November 15th until the end of year, a period when she is also liable to 
being laid off. She uses the time to trade in second hand clothes, and also work as a 
seamstress. Occasionally, she also takes some days off with or without permission, 
and (sometimes with false excuses) for her own farming activities because she cannot 
use the petty income to buy staple foods. They are sometimes threatened about being 
fired for extended absenteeism, but she also knows that her experience cannot be 
easily replaced, ‘people come and go all the time’. 
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Job insecurity is manifested not only in the employment contracts but also, 
in the rate and frequency of labour mobility and informality in production. 
In principle, recruited workers are to be employed in their preferred tasks, 
but that often depends on vacancies and their physical attributes. This is, 
however, particular to men, as they have much more flexibility and options 
to choose from the many male tasks. While workers often commence em-
ployment in their preferred tasks, their retention is characterized by mo-
bility between tasks as determined by their supervisors. A pruner iterated: 
There are ranks in the job. Pruning is difficult, so during the peak seasons, 
they move some of us to harvesting in order to make more money. It de-
pends on one’s relations with the supervisor (03 June 2018, Dodo Tamale).  
For some committed and pioneer casual workers of up to eight years of 
service, they all consider this as an unfair treatment and one akin to peas-
ant farm labourers who are often looked down upon. Yet, while some still 
seek this progression, others actually do not want it any more. 
There are, however, some particular tasks such as spraying (weed con-
trol), where intake is largely by worker preference. The changes occur both 
within and outside related tasks, e.g., switches between harvesting and 
pruning, but also from machine operation to slashing. This practice is also 
the company’s way of managing the small numbers. For instance, a super-
visor mentioned that they do not lay off most of the harvesters: they are 
rather moved to pruning because they are hard to come by and their task 
requires a lot of training. Whereas workers switching between the above 
tasks may still find it lucrative, for others, it affects their productivity and 
income. Switching between tasks also affects workers’ ability to organize 
around task-specific issues. One worker expressed, 
My work is undefined. I am a casual worker, an operator and a driver. Some-
times they move me to join the oil palm processing mill workers; sometimes 
I transport firewood. If I am on the farm and there is a problem with the 
truck, my supervisors ask me to join the loading gang or do slashing (21 
May 2018, Dodi Papase) 
 
5.5.2 Income insecurity and Disparities 
Regarding wages, workers struggle with consistent delays, low income and 
wage differentiation. The remuneration scheme of the workers is premised 
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on a time productivity-skill based piece rates system. The baseline daily 
wage of GH₵14.045 applies to work in the core labour and support service 
for both casual and permanent workers. It is used as the yardstick for cal-
culating the piece rate or daily targets. This piece rate daily wage is about 
45 per cent higher than the national minimum wage of GH₵9.68.  
The casual workers in the skilled service such as operators receive a higher 
daily wage of GH₵19.5, while the remuneration of permanent skilled staff 
ranges between GH₵19.5 and GH₵25 plus allowances. This includes gen-
der, age, skill, experience, contract, engagement in other occupations, and 
the lucrativeness of tasks. Slashing is not lucrative and their average 
monthly income ranges from GH₵200 to GH₵450 as compared to har-
vesters and pruners who indicated that their average monthly incomes 
ranged between GH₵500 and GH₵1000. Harvesters can realize eight 
times more their daily targets during peak seasons as shown in Figure 5.36  
 The attendance sheet of the harvesters corroborates their claims that 
during peak seasons, many earn a net income of over GH₵1500 per 
month (after paying their carriers). Several factors influence the monthly 
income brackets of the workers. The harvesters who employ seasonal car-
riers have also been instructed by their supervisors not to pay them below 
the base wage daily wage, a situation that practically means that GH₵15 
has become a flat wage even though these women carriers are compelled 
to function alongside the productivity of their harvesters. Meanwhile, 
women remain in the lowest income brackets, with a vast majority taking 
a monthly wage range between GH₵200 and GH₵350 below the ex-
pected monthly wage provided they are regular workers. During the May 
2018 peak season, the best most of women could do was to double their 
daily targets of 4 bags while the male harvesters could achieve 8 times their 
daily targets (see Figures 5.37 and 5.4) 
 Other tasks in the core labour such spraying and irrigation are not ac-
companied with lucrative targets. Local perceptions around chemical 
spraying connotes a major health risk and therefore workers are not even 
interested in overworking for extra income. Workers in the support ser-
vices and farm service labour have relatively stable wages and are compen-
sated with some bonuses. Compared to the conventional local farm labour 
rates, the plantation wages are far lower. For instance, sprayers earn half 
of their local rates yet they prefer to be on the plantation due to the relative 
availability of employment and income if compared to doing ‘by day' 
small-scale farm jobs. In effect, attractiveness to the plantation work is a 
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result of some these constrained choices. Slashers also earn only a third of 
what they would have been paid for the same amount of work on small-
scale farms. Women are highly affected when they are made to do slashing. 
In a conversation with one of the authorities, he emphasized that even 
though slashing is tedious, women are more respectful, truthful and follow 
instructions better than men. 
Figure 5.3 
 Harvesters Output in a Peak Season (May-June 2018)  
 
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2018.  
 
 Even for those women who do their own farming, slashing or weeding 
is the one farm activity for which they regularly hire in labour or seek sup-
port. Indeed, the issues with the contested targets and labour supply for 
slashing transcends the organization of labour on the plantation to the 
wider societal discourses and perceptions about farm labourers particu-
larly those hired to weed/slash. For most peasants or small-scale farmers, 
their prime labour need is for weed control. Not only are the local conno-
tations of weeding as related to ‘labouring’ often associated with 
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landlessness, joblessness, migrants and other minority groups, it is some-
times even derogatory. Under such unfavourable conditions, it remains 
the task with the least labour supply. 
Figure 5.4 
Women Loose Pickers’ Output in a Peak Season (May- June 2018) 
 
 
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2018.  
 
 
5.5.3 Health Care and Wellbeing Insecurity 
The more labour is embodied in its reproduction, the less it costs the em-
ployer (Picchio, 1992, p. 97) and in this case, casual labour makes it is easy 
to evade the responsibility of protecting the occupational health of work-
ers. By transferring such risks and responsibilities onto workers, they do 
not simply construct a flexible labour force, but one that normalizes pre-
carious work (Burgmann, 2016). Most large-scale production schemes in 
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Ghana rely heavily on chemicals that are manually applied by farmworkers. 
All the workers are susceptible to various forms of injuries associated with 
poor field conditions and inadequate supply of protective clothing. The 
reality is that, although many of these farmworkers double as own-farm-
ers, the plantation-style of production requires continuous learning which 
sometimes takes a while to master. Although they have regular access to 
boots, other supplies such as protective clothing and nose masks for spray-
ers, gloves for pruners and loose pickers, and rain coats are either under-
supplied or of poor quality as per the workers expectations. Workers often 
raise these concerns at their weekly meetings with authorities, but the re-
sponses are rather persuasive, requiring them to be patient in waiting. 
Workers, especially those in the tasks of spraying, harvesting and pruning, 
are very much aware of the health implications of their work, and there-
fore seek some preferential treatment in accessing health services, e.g., the 
reinstitution of biannual health screenings. In a study in sugar cane plan-
tations in Mozambique, O’Laughlin, (2017), found similar incidences 
whereby the intensification of work exposed farmworkers to severe dehy-
dration, eye infections and respiratory difficulties and long-term respira-
tory conditions like chronic kidney disease associated with dehydration.  
Again, most of the drivers, truck and heavy equipment operators are 
not licensed to operate8, so they are not insured against accidents. Their 
financial struggles around not having access to licenses are further com-
plicated on the one hand by their casual statuses, which deny them access 
to loans, and on the other hand, by the company's unwillingness to com-
mit to the responsibility of facilitating access to the license. For many of 
these operators, they believe that the company′s position is linked to the 
fear that they would go and seek better job opportunities elsewhere when 
they obtain their licenses — a situation that is very likely, according to the 
operators. In addition, they have to work with faulty machineries, to which 
over time, they have learned to adapt. Demonstrating this, a driver said,  
You see, this truck has no starter and no brake. The steering wheel is poorly 
aligned and you can see that manifest in the front wheels. I have to start it 
in third gear and bring it to a halt in fourth gear. Experience is the best 
teacher over here (13 July 2018, Volta Red, Fankyenekor). 
This puts not only truck operators and drivers, but all workers who are 
also transported in these trucks at risk of accidents and injuries. Per their 
work regulations, the company takes responsibility for any work-related 
health issues, especially for injuries and minor illness but other indirect 
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and long-term health threats and sicknesses are often ignored or inade-
quately addressed. Even though almost 70 per cent of the workers are 
already subscribed to the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), 
workers also want to caution against the extra costs that are sometimes 
associated with the NHIS scheme. During my second visit9, the rules had 
changed — having NHIS is a prerequisite for employment retention. It 
became almost like a chorus whenever I spoke to the workers, particularly 
women, about the intensity of their work — ‘adwuma yi, eweaken yen10’ 
(we are weakened by this job). They looked frail and older than their ages, 
especially the pioneer workers who have worked for at least eight years 
and are still on casual contracts. Besides the tedious nature of the job, the 
distant location of the farm and their limited access to transport facilities 
put a heavy toll on their health. A woman farmworker complained,  
they don’t take us home on time, why won't we have malaria? However, 
when you get malaria, they say that it is not a farm work-related disease, so 
you do not get a medical cover (07 June, 2018, Brewaniase).  
Closely linked are the stresses and pressure on women’s ability to de-
liver their household responsibilities. A normal routine for off-farm resi-
dents begins from 5:00 a.m. until about 5:00 p.m., although the productive 
hours are effectively eight hours. Women have to start their day at least 
two hours earlier (by 3:30 a.m.), sometimes forced to wake and prepare 
their school going children. Their evening duties, including meals, also ex-
tend into the night. Even though the impacts depend largely on the house-
hold characteristics, in general, committed female workers do not get 
enough rest and end up being those within the lowest income brackets.  
The labour conditions on the plantation can be summed, by a former 
worker (see Box 5.2 for more on the perceptions of former male workers) 
who said,  
every employee wants to see progress in their lives, but this is not the case 
on the plantation. The conditions are not good, and they sometimes do not 
respect our views because we are uneducated and casually employed. We 
worked hard on the plantation because we were sensitized about the posi-
tive effects on our communities, but if they could not cater for the welfare 
of workers, how much more entire communities? For most of the people 
who remain farmworkers to date, they are there out of desperation (FGD, 
14 July 2018, Brewaniase). 
 





































Box 5.2 Former Male Workers’ Experiences 
‘I went to work with the company because I needed money for my cocoa farm 
business. The job on the plantation is not the kind of work to do for a long 
time…, I will only return to Volta Red when I need money urgently.  Now I 
have 3 acres of cocoa farm on my father’s land under Abusa share terms. I 
have four labourers who work with me from time to time’. JJ  
 
‘I worked with the company at several units right from the beginning — since 
the time of Herakles. I have been laid off for about 5 times since I joined the 
company; sometimes, I get angry but maybe they wanted me to rest. I wanted 
to contribute to the growth of the company. I do not intend to return to work 
with Volta Red; my brother, a former farmworker died after complaining of 
headache. I am the only son left to care for the family. Now I have about 2 
acres of land for cocoa, cassava and maize cultivation which I want to concen-
trate and expand in the near future’. Kofi.  
 
'I joined the plantation in 2013, because I needed some money to support the 
family and to live a better life.  It was difficult to combine the planation work 
with my own farm but I managed to do so. I stopped the work because of 
delay in payment of wages, no significant pay raise and the taxes. I now work 
on two and half acres of cocoa under a sharecrop arrangement [Abunu] and 
cultivate some maize. I am willing to work with the company when the salary 
issue is addressed’. Manu 
 
'The plantation work is the only work available for the people in the commu-
nity but I have stopped working there since 2011. I have been going to Sefwi 
[western region] since 2011 to work as a caretaker of cocoa plantations over 
there. The landowners also give me land to subsist on until I am paid at the 
end of the season, or annually.  I think the work at Sefwi pays better than Volta 
Red work, and it is less tedious, I don’t work every day, cocoa provides shade 
so I don’t work in the sun. It is favourable to young men who are single, and 
want to save money for higher education. Many young men are maintaining 
cocoa farms in Sefwi’.Yaw 
 
'I stopped working there because it is not the kind of employment I foresaw. 
It is farm work, why not do my own farm then instead of farming for someone 
and having to buy food?  I am a chainsaw operator, in the early days, I felled 
the timber and did all the logging-related jobs for Herakles, but the contract 
they offered afterwards was not as good as finding my own day-jobs'. KK 
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5.6 Labour Competition Between Plantation and Family Farms  
In a context where a subsistence ethic prevails, many farmworkers find 
ways and means to obtain labour for their own small farms by sacrificing 
their own time on the plantation, with family and wage support for the 
continuance of their family farms.  
5.6.1 The seasonality and Task-Specificity of Own Labour Demands 
To iterate, even among the farmworkers, small-scale family farming is still 
predominant and co-exists with the large-scale plantation. Most Farm-
workers, determined to maintain at least their subsistence, are compelled 
to divide their time and energy between peasant farming and labouring on 
the plantation. Gender, household demographics, class, and the nature of 
incorporation into the plantation, farm proximity and crop type determine 
farmworkers' strategies, trade-offs and outcomes of the competing de-
mands for labour.  
Given that small-scale farming and even the survival of the partially 
irrigated plantation rely on not taking chances on the weather, crop and 
task-specific seasonal self-labour demand is very crucial. From the work-
ers’ own approximations as recorded in the survey (see Table 5.5), many 
could commit three days a week to their own farms, a situation made pos-
sible by their widespread shunning of Saturday work on the plantation and 
Sunday sacrifices, in addition to the fact that many of them are casual 
workers. In general, casual workers on average can commit to 23 out of 
the 27 working days per month. 
 
Table 5.5 
Farmworkers’ Labour Commitment to Own Farms and Plantations 
 






Days per month 12 5 10 18 




Days per month 23 21 24 26 
Source: Author’s survey, 2018.  
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However, as shown in Table 5.6 the dynamics of self-labour needs change 
in the oil palm peak and off-peak seasons, and especially during planting 
and harvesting seasons of the particular crops cultivated by farmworkers; 
maize being one of such important crops cultivated biannually by most of 
the workers.  
Table 5.6: 
The Dynamics of Seasonal Labour Demands on Own Farms 
Key Food Crops  Planting Seasons Harvesting Season  




Cassava May-August      December (onwards) 
Rice July-August November- December 
Yams & potatoes  July-August November- December 
Groundnuts July-August November-December 
Source: Author’s interviews, 2018. 
 
By the time the oil palm peak season starts in April, many farmers who 
may have been laid off during the dry season (between Nov-March) may 
have already planted their maize for the major season. The minor planting 
season also starts towards the end of oil palm peak season, thus around 
August-September, farmworkers’ attendance to work decline even as they 
divert their attention to their own farms. The most lucrative months for 
farmworkers on the plantation are May and June, and fortunately for them, 
they do not coincide with the planting or harvest seasons of their major 
crops; cassava planting may be affected but it has a wider window for 
planting and appears to be a very robust tuber which does not require as 
much attention as others like maize and rice. In any case, planting and 
harvesting are tasks that a farmer would always prefer to commit his/her 
own time to, even if other sources of labour are employed. A young 
farmer’s account of how he manages his time between plantation and his 
rice farm illustrates the dynamics,  
During the oil palm peak season, he puts his efforts into the farm work, but 
in lean season, he spends half of the week on the plantation and half on his 
own farm. During lean season, sometimes just about 10 out of the 25 people 
in the harvesting gang are regularly at work. Sometimes, the supervisors are 
not happy with that. But if you do that during the peak season, you might 
get into problems. Now that it’s peak, he has already sprayed his rice farm, 
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and when he gets paid and it’s time for planting, he will hire in labourers to 
slash and till the land. Last year, slashers charged him 15 cedis per one rope, 
they were high school students, who came during the weekends. Sometimes, 
he is not able to yield as much rice as expected had he not divided his 
strength. Sometimes rodents affect the farm in his absence. Before Volta 
Red, he was still taking labourers to slash, but he always plants his own rice 
(07 June, 2018, Volta Red, Fankyenekor). 
5.6.2 The Family Labour Dynamics 
Constant access to free family labour for production in modern day rural 
Ghana is no more the norm, coupled with the fact that women strive hard 
to educate their children for a future of life outside the farm. Access to 
family labour depends on three main factors. First, are the characteristics 
of the farmworkers’ household. Unlike in the past, when having children 
meant access to family labour, in recent times farmers themselves encour-
age their children to focus on their education although during holiday sea-
sons and weekends, young children are obliged to support production on 
their family farms. A divorced female farmworker narrated that,  
 
She does her own farming on land given her by an uncle. It is about 2 ropes 
[about 1/5th of an acre], and she farms cassava and corn for subsistence — 
she does not use family labour. Her first son has finished Senior High 
School and is working in Accra. He is hustling for income to further his 
education, and working with his aunt in trade. The rest of her children are 
also in school (07 June, 2018, Brewaniase).  
Many a time, access to family labour depends on the occupation of one’s 
spouse. Several migrant farmworkers indicated that their wives monitored 
their farms and their labourers in their absence. It was not necessarily the 
case for a majority of the resident farmworkers that were interviewed. For 
instance, men whose wives are traders may be able to gain occasional sup-
port on the farm, but not to rely on them for day-to-day maintenance of 
their farms. One of the pioneer farmworkers also expressed similar con-
cerns that he neither depends on hired in labour nor his family because 
his children are females, in school, and his wife is a migrant from Niger 
who is not a farmer, and moreover he does not want his children’s lives 
to be centred on farming. The general trend among adult farmworkers 
with young household populations and with very high hopes in education 
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is that, they either self-exploit, or employ wage labour more than they de-
pend family labour. Tasks such as weeding or slashing is often done by 
wage labourers, or paid family labour.  
Access to family labour is also usually task specific. Family bonding 
farm labour tasks like planting and harvesting are very common family 
tasks even when they attract some tokens and food gifts. Harvesting in 
particular usually requires the presence of the farmer and with trusted 
household labour support for monitoring purposes. Of course, harvesting 
cash crops like cocoa for example, attracts family labour, also because of 
the conventional monetary expectations, although they may not be stand-
ard remunerations per se. Some farmworkers could even get migrant fam-
ily members to return temporarily to support them during the cocoa har-
vest season. In many instances, where women have their own small farms, 
husbands and male adults/youth also take up the responsibility of chemi-
cal application for weed and pest control, but not necessarily the purchase 
of such inputs for the women. At the same time, others also worried about 
the over reliance on weedicides, and their inability to maintain their own 
farms as expected.  
The third major factor is the location of the farm and its proximity to 
the farms of other household or family members. In such instances, there 
is a difference in the experiences of farmworkers who were displaced from 
their farms as a result of the land acquisition and those who were not di-
rectly affected. Farmworkers who share farm boundaries with their family 
or farm separately on the same land with their households are most likely 
to get help on their farms, particularly in oversight duties, and also during 
weekends when many attend to their own farms. In the words of a female 
farmworker,  
I go to my farm on Saturdays. My husband and I work sharecrop for differ-
ent landowners, but we share a boundary… I do not have issues with my 
farm in terms of time, all I have to do is to buy the weedicides and my 
husband does the spraying for me (05 June 2018, Volta Red Fankyenekor).  
As earlier explained in chapter four, many families who have acquired al-
ternative lands following the land grab, are now farming on separate and 
distant areas which reduces the ease with which they used to support each 
other. In fact, the situation is even more difficult for young settler farm-
workers, who were displaced, have distant farms but still bear the respon-
sibility of supporting their ageing parents’ sharecrop farms. In an interview 
with a displaced settler farmworker, he narrated that,  
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Prior to the land deal, they [he and his siblings] had their own farms even 
though they farmed the same crops. At the same time, they also worked on 
their family farms, more or less their father’s and subsisted from it, but after 
some time he complained about being cheated because they were of age. 
So, they began to subsist mainly from their individual plots but still helped 
their father on his farm. Before the land was taken over, he had three other 
siblings who helped his father work on the 8 acres of land, but now there 
are only two available, including himself. After their land was taken, it took 
them one year to get another land. All their yams became rotten, the workers 
had harvested all their cassava in the plantation. Now everyone has gone to 
find their own plot to farm, it is not vastly available anymore. It is not easy 
but he still has to support his father’s new yam farm, which is smaller than 
the previous. Sometimes he and his brother, also a farmworker, absent 
themselves from the plantation to help their father. As for him and his 
brother, they can afford wage labourers, but their father cannot do so.  
Yet generally, casual, women, less landed and sharecropping farmwork-
ers have seen reductions in the farming of their food crops and difficulties 
in monitoring their farms due to the imbalance in the family farm-planta-
tion time and labour allocation. These labour implications are a reminder 
of how and why capital needs to maintain its own economic viability or 
reproduction does not cohere with the presumed social contributions of-
ten associated with such investments.  
 
5.6.3 Wage Labour: ‘I Will Farm with Money’11 
A significant number of people who clearly indicated that they worked on 
the plantation in order to invest in their own small to medium sized farm 
plots which implied inputs including fertilizers, weed control chemicals as 
well as labour. Such farmers are usually men with access to multiple farm 
plots, who cultivated perennial cash crops like cocoa and oil palm and 
other food crops. Many are permanent workers, skilled or semi-skilled op-
erators and security men, headmen (lower level supervisors) and migrant 
farmworkers who have to maintain their farms in their places of origin. 
When I asked a security man (middle age) how he was able to combine 
the several farms with the company work he said, 
It is all about labour. If it weren’t for this work where would I have had 
money from to invest in labour in my farm? All I have to do is carry my 
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cutlass, go walk though my farm, sweat a bit, and come back home (01 June 
2018, Dodi Papase).  
Migrant farmworkers who are able to maintain their farmlands also do so 
with paid labour especially when they have at least one key family support, 
usually their wives to play oversight roles. If their farms are nearby, then 
they are able to visit during weekends and in the leave periods or in the 
case of casual workers, during the off-peak and laying-off periods. There 
are also different dynamics among women and casual farmworkers with 
relatively smaller food crop farm plots. Most women’s raison d’être for the 
plantation job is not primarily to scale up their farms as already explained 
in the preceding sections of this chapter. Women's ‘investment poverty’ is 
linked to the smallness of their farms, which inhibits excess surplus for 
reinvestment while their cultural responsibility of care and food provision-
ing compels them to prioritize their welfare of their families over accumu-
lation (see Reardon & Vosti, 1995). However, due to the intense nature of 
the plantation work, and in the case of those who as a result of the dispos-
session are separated from their family farms, they still divide their time 
between the two spheres of farming and farm work. They reserve the 
weekends, forgoing the Saturday plantation work, to cater for their farms. 
Yet depending on the crop type and the stage of the farms, they employ 
wage labour regularly to undertake tedious tasks often related to land prep-
aration and ploughing, weed clearance and making of holes and mounds 
for planting. The plantation work amplifies the demand for wage labour, 
but even prior to it, women still employed hired labour for weeding/slash-
ing and the making of mounds. Another dimension to the accessibility to 
paid labourers is its cost, which is also task based and dependent of exist-
ing social relations as explained in chapter four. A female casual farm-
worker narrated,  
After I have harvested corn and made dough for sale, I save some of the 
money to pay the labourers. I cook for them, and pay them to work. The 
wage varies sometimes, depending on the relations. When I have received 
my salary from Volta Red, I can pay them within three days, otherwise it 
can be up to one week (03 June, 2018, Dodo Tamale). 
Women farmworkers also juggle between their own small farms and their 
family farms (often managed by their husbands or adult sons) as explained 
by a woman,  
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she helps her husband during planting of corn and cassava, and rice harvest-
ing. She goes to her own farm on Saturdays, and hires labour in the week-
days if needed, but seasonally, she takes days off from the plantation to 
spend some nights on her the farm when there is a lot of work to do, be-
cause it is too far from home (26 June 2018, Fankyenekor). 
5.6.4 Changing Access to Mutual Support Schemes  
Some farmworkers expressed their difficulties in maintaining their affilia-
tion to mutual support farm groups. Their commitment and community 
perceptions are contributing factors as narrated by a male farmworker, 
who doubles as a ginger farmer, 
 I hire labour. I won’t have time to combine both. Ginger is tedious, you 
need labour for every stage. The farmers are able to do ‘nnoboa’ but we 
[most of the farmworkers] are not part of the groups because of Volta 
Red…we cannot be committed (19 May, 2018, Dodi Papase). 
Table 5.7 
Farmworkers’ Sources of Farm Labour (Farm 1) 
Source of Labour Percentage (yes) 
Self 69.8% 
Wage labour 54.7% 
Family labour 53.9% 
Mutual Support 9.4% 
Source: Authors survey, 2018.  
 
Some of the dispossessed land owners, sharecroppers and farmworkers 
who had to search for suitable lands but have become dispersed and dis-
tant from their former household farm units and neighbouring hamlets 
also had similar concerns. Also expressing it impacts on farming, a farmer 
said, 
prior to our displacement, I could farm up to 2.5 acres …because together 
with the people living on the land, we could do nnoboa [mutual labour sup-
port]. Now we farm on my wife’s family land, but I farm only 1 acre (11 July 
2018, Brewaniase). 
Table 5.7 shows the number and percentage of farmworkers who re-
sponded ‘yes’ to particular sources of labour for their own farm work on 
their first indicated farm plots. It was therefore not surprising that mutual 
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support schemes were the least reported sources of farm labour. However, 
more youth, than elderly people, still found some means to support one 
another when necessary. 
 
5.7 Women’s Work, (Re)production and Livelihoods 
In this chapter, I have provided empirical evidence on what appears as a 
coexistence of peasants and small-scale family farming with the capitalist 
oil palm production in the study area. As already highlighted in chapter 
four, because the land deal didn’t not lead to a complete displacement or 
dispossession, a strong subsistence ethic prevails in these rural communi-
ties primarily through sharecropping and own small-scale farming along-
side the farm work no matter how small their farm sizes. Even some mi-
grants with farms in their places of origin are able to depend on family 
support for their maintenance of their farms. Besides the organization of 
labour on the plantation is also such that the casualization of labour pro-
vides a favourable condition for semi-proletarianzation so that workers do 
not depend entirely on wages for their social reproduction. More or less 
small-scale farming and the low wages subsidizes the cost of production 
on the plantation and capital accumulation (Luxemburg, 1951; Wallerstein, 
1983). It reinforces the arguments of feminist agrarian political economist 
who have in the past few decades raised concerns about the role of women 
in social and capitalist (re)production and why women continue to be ad-
versely impacted (Elson, 1998; Fraser, 2017; Whitehead & Tsikata, 2003). 
The challenges that women face transcend simplistic notions of gender or 
sex discrimination in terms of employer preferences or in wages, as recog-
nized even in many mainstream economic narratives. They are rooted 
deeply in the fabric of society. In other words, the existing relations of 
production represents what Fraser, (2014, p. 66) refers to as the ‘institu-
tionalized social order’ of capitalists societies such that those who carry 
out most of the work in the reproductive economy-women, are the most 
disadvantaged (Elson, 1999).  
Labour market remains a key point of intersection of the reproductive 
and productive economies. Yet, as demonstrated in this chapter, men and 
women have differentiated resource and material endowments, and the 
latter have limited ability to benefit fully from the new economic ‘oppor-
tunities. Men have more farm plots than women (see Table 5.1) and on 
their first reordered plots, 70 per cent of the women farm under an acre 
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as compared to 28 per cent among men (see Figure 5.1). Men can there-
fore have high expectations to expand their farms and grow cash crops 
based on their relatively higher earnings, even though so far there is no 
convincing evidence of significant increases in farm sizes. The situation 
would have been different if women had strong claims to male-controlled 
family farms in terms of income and food but this is not the norm in these 
societies where the responsibility of household staple starches like corn 
and cassava, as well as educational costs continue to put great burdens on 
women. Men, who are producing on relatively larger lands, can afford to 
sell the bulk of their foodstuffs (by virtue of the trading skills of women) 
while the social norm for women is to produce enough grains and vegeta-
bles to sustain their households. In some instances where women resist 
this social order it often leads to marital breakdowns and if there are af-
fected dependents, even the entire responsibility of care may shift to the 
woman, thereby making it seemingly more reasonable to maintain the sta-
tus quo rather than resist.  
The correlation between demographic distribution of the workers in 
terms of gender, age and marital statuses (Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2) fore-
grounds the inter-relationship between production and social reproduc-
tion. Unlike other crop sectors such horticulture where labour is highly 
feminized (Kay, 2015), oil palm remains a male dominated sector. Yet, the 
vast majority of men have better guaranteed access to the household sup-
port of care than the few women engaged in both wage labour and social 
reproductive activities (small-scale production, domestic labour and care). 
Women, primarily as wives, mothers, grandmothers, sisters and nieces play 
a key role in domestic work to support the large share of youthful, unmar-
ried and married men (see Table 5.3) working on the plantation. In fact, 
even among the migrants who reside on farm including the male supervi-
sors, there were instances where I observed that some women who to 
whom they have no kinship ties are still vital to their dinner preparation. 
Not to mention the migrants whose wives oversee their small farms or 
their labourers, wives are often regarded as more reliable than other kin-
ship ties in such duties. Meanwhile, 30 per cent of the women farmworkers 
are divorced, separated or widowed; although such situations would not 
necessarily render them landless as explained in chapter four, they are 
forced to pursue their reproduction through insecure, oppressive wage 
employment (Bernstein, 2010) and under relatively weak bargaining 
power. As Picchio, (1992, p. 97) notes, 
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The paradox of the value of labour is the fact that the more labour is em-
bodied in its reproduction, the less it costs the employer… [particularly] 
tragic for women as the system’s contradictions and conflicts materialize in 
their personal lives.  
In an interview with a carrier in her mid-forties (see section 5.4 about car-
riers) when I asked about her marital status, she responded ‘m’aware nso 
mayɛ okunani’ i.e. she is a ‘married widow’. Her story below characterizes 
her reaction.  
She has been carrying for more than two years. She does not have any for-
mal education and caters for nine children, one of whom is in senior high 
school [cost subsidized by the state]. She followed her husband to their cur-
rent community in search of fertile land [her husband abandoned their co-
coa farm in their hometown because of ongoing family disputes]. Her hus-
band has been working as a harvester but she does not work with him during 
the peak season; she regularly carries for another man whom she has no 
kinship relations. Her husband is not seriously engaged in farming that can 
support their family. Prior to work on the planation, she was a head porter 
for cassava farmers. Usually she would mill the cassava into dough, and then 
she is entitled to one-third of it. However, the farmer would first buy her 
share of the dough and make payments to her only after the dough has been 
sold [by the farmer]. This was her main source of cash while she and her 
children subsisted on their two acres sharecrop maize and cassava farm. The 
nature of the cassava dough transaction did not give her secure access to 
cash, so she found the seasonal access to wage labour a relatively better op-
tion; she hopes to be incorporated formally as a casual worker even if as a 
cleaner. She exclaimed ‘that is called ‘ohia bone’ – ‘cruel poverty’. She is under 
the impression that her boss [the harvester] pays her one-third of the value 
of their daily output- just like sharecropping [her actual wage is far less than 
that] (03 June 2018, Dodo Tamale). 
Several Marxist scholars emphasize the contradictory nature of such rela-
tionship and their crises tendencies i.e. to destabilize the necessary back-
ground conditions for capital accumulation by jeopardizing social repro-
duction, ecology and political power (Fraser, 2014, p. 71). In some 
exceptional settings, as noted by Cousins et al., (2018, p. 1081), growth 
and social provision could be complementary. The story above, as well as 
the several other examples from fieldwork and those shown in this chap-
ter, illustrates the complex interaction between capitalist production and 
social reproduction the differentiated rural settings. First, the large extent 
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of semi-proletarianzation among farmworkers, the vast majority whose 
livelihoods are barely diversified beyond family farming, reiterates the sig-
nificance of land access and productive autonomy; with women and mi-
grants being immensely impacted both by the establishment of the plan-
tation and pre-existing social norms and institutions. Domestic or 
household economy (centred on women and children labour) is vital to 
the balance between own farming and the plantation work, thus allowing 
such co-existence, but it does not only serve an enabling function for cap-
italist production. Indeed, the situation appears much more complex as 
evidenced in a company that is still struggling to efficiently maintain the 
plantation and it workers; the poor retention/commitment of labour while 
at the same time most women have seen a reduction in their own farm 
sizes and crop diversity; women’s attraction to the exploitative wage job 
as a means to slow down labour reproduction through investments in their 
children’s education (complemented by the state’s subsidized cost of sen-
ior high schooling and the national health insurance programme) yet their 
husbands controlling family planning decisions; and the youth workers 
also saving up to further their education or to enrol into apprenticeships 
outside farming. In effect, the implications of such ‘co-existence’ on social 
reproduction is differentiated along the lines of both social and land-based 
classifications, socially constructed gender roles, and the extent of their 
livelihood diversification and political strategies.  
5.8 Chapter Conclusions 
The evidence from this section contributes to studies that have cautioned 
about the limited employment prospects from plantations, and the gender 
disparities in the few opportunities created. Mezzadri, (2016, p. 1881) 
maintains that ‘groups subject to harsh forms of social oppression, like 
women, already enter Marx’s "abode of production" with a lower "price-
tag" stuck to their body, and this sets the basis for higher exploitation 
rates’. What we see in this study, is that the exploitation of women is nec-
essarily linked to gendered wage rates, gendered job opportunities, and 
tasks that leave women in the lowest income brackets. The interrelation-
ship between organization of labour on the plantation/production and 
that of subsistence farming is also not unidirectional. The evidence rein-
forces arguments that are critical of optimistic narratives about the em-
ployment creation prospects of large-scale land investments. Even when 
jobs have been promised under ‘consultative’ agreements, it may be 
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difficult to realize the expectations of decent jobs, especially when the in-
stitutions that are expected to protect workers are either non-existent, in-
adequate and even repressive. 
Notes
1 Throughout the thesis I use peasants interchangeably with small-scale farmers, 
family farmers and petty commodity producers.  It does not represent an analytical 
category of farmers with no linkages to markets.  
2 Occasionally works as a farm labourer too. 
3 See Carlos Oya, (2004) on rural class formation in groundnut producing areas of 
Senegal where he adopts contextualised and stylised methods in the attempts to 
classify farmers.  
4 The official numbers could be lower than the actual numbers because some have 
worked without contracts, such as the use of students in the past, occasional task 
sharing by family members, the carriers who work unofficially with harvesters, and 
others who are temporally hired when there is urgent need for workers- e.g for fire 
control. 
5 Approx. 2.9 USD as of September 2018. 
6 Divide their daily output by 86, i.e. the target for a daily wage. 
7 The numbers represent the number of bags of loose palm nuts collected (the daily 
task for a full wage is 4 bags). DP is daily pay and can represent several situations 
whereby the supervisor allows a worker the daily wage even when they have not 
actually worked (sick leave, or when a worker is given temporary oversight duties) 
or when the field conditions did not enable them to meet their daily targets among 
others.   
8 Most of them also do not have licences for operations because they trained on 
the farm and do not have the financial resources to apply for one. 
9 As of January, 2019, two major truck accidents had occurred between August and 
December, 2019. 
10 A popular discourse used by the farmworkers especially women to describe their 
physical health as a result of intensity of labour. 
11The words of a female casual farmworker about her future plans for her own 
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6.1  Introduction  
In this chapter, I assess the political reactions from the perspectives of the 
dispossessed families and the farmworkers as well as the relations between 
their demands1. It is grouped into three main sections. Section 6.2 explores 
the various forms of political agency employed by the affected land-own-
ing families vis-à-vis the strategies of the investors and middlemen. I ana-
lyse how and why their political reactions and demands have changed over 
time, highlighting the role of the state, class and family politics and advo-
cacy. Section 6.3 examines the everyday politics of farmworkers against 
exploitation and for better terms of incorporation and the constraints of 
organized action and unionization among the workers. The third major 
section, 6.4, looks at a broad range of relational issues including the dif-
ferences in class and generational interests, and between farmworkers and 
the affected families.  
 
6.2  Land Dispossession, Investor Strategy and Local 
Responses  
6.2.1 Mobilizing Support and Containing Conflicts 
In chapter one, I have explained how and why it is important to look at 
the state-society interactions to examine land grab resistance. The answer 
to the question ‘why some land grabs breed strong resistance, while others 
appear to be received in more benevolent ways’ often suggests that it de-
pends on several factors. Different theoretical perspectives from classical 
collective action paradigms, Marxist and social movements theories em-
phasize different factors(see Hall et al., 2015). Peasants may or may not 
act, collectively organize, confront or oscillate from organized electoral 
activity to violent confrontations (Scott, 1985). To analyse peasants’ ac-
tions, Fox reminds us to look at how and why different actors are able to 
pursue their goals, and how it changes through conflicts and convergence. 
The question then remains, how did the investors win support from the 
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many family heads, and why was there no strong collective resistance? It 
is very crucial to understand how the underlying politics across the inter-
secting spheres of state institutions, traditional authority, and class rela-
tions influenced investor strategy in the acquisition of the land.  
 
i. Legitimizing the Project   
To mobilize support and acceptance of the project, two major strategies 
were adopted by the investors through, and with support from middle-
men. First, the project was legitimized right form the onset. In chapters 
three and four, I illustrated the enabling role of the state through invest-
ment regulations and the PSI as well as the NGO discourse of the devel-
opment brokers. To reiterate, that these affected communities per their 
geographical proximity to the northernmost half of Ghana and their re-
moteness from the capital city, they bear the existing vertical inequality 
that compounds the ethnoreligious north-south divide in terms of infra-
structure, basic social services and income. As such, it is not surprising 
that they showed enthusiasm about a company that was going to be the 
first of a kind to make their communities visible and create jobs for the 
youth. Narrating how the project was conveyed by the family heads to 
their members, a family member said,  
My uncle is the one who gave his land. He informed us that an NGO has 
come looking for land to work. His personal land was not sufficient so he 
told people who might be interested. The people brought a surveyor and 
demarcated the land…. So, they formed a committee, and they took them 
to a hotel to sign an agreement. When they heard they will be paid in dollars, 
they were happy (11 July 2018, Brewaniase). 
With a long-term goal of becoming an NGO, they agreed to the four-year 
moratorium put on rent payments ‘they said they cannot pay rent if they 
have not harvested any fruits’2, it would be the landowners’ contribution 
to their own development. 
 
ii. Strategic Consent  
 
Through the middlemen and some supportive family heads, they advanced 
a strategy of ‘assumed consent’ to win support for the project. Even 
though the project had been packaged in a very appealing way, one does 
not expect a unanimous agreement from all the families, particularly be-
cause of the different class relations. However, after a middleman 
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convinced a few of the family heads, especially those with their land on 
the edges to agree, they spread the news as though everyone had already 
consented to it, thus compelling the others with lands in the centre to 
conform. In the end, the investors, with support from middlemen, ar-
ranged a meeting in the capital city where they signed an already written 
lease agreement by the company’s lawyers without any opportunity to re-
view it. In fact, the leadership of the land owners association and a few 
other educated members requested that they be allowed some time (about 
three months) to review the deed of document, but this was denied by the 
middleman, who projected the urgency of allowing the project to com-
mence. Once all the landowners had blindly endorsed the lease document 
— accompanied with some money enticement, the final approval had to 
be from the chief — who in this area, is not necessarily the custodian of 
their land as explained earlier in chapter four. One of the family represent-
atives iterated,  
He [the middleman] brought the lease agreement in the night for the Chief 
to sign it. How could he get time to read? He is educated, he could have 
reviewed it. The chief got very angry but he signed it because we had already 




iii. The Fear of Food Insecurity, Confrontation, Confusion and Calm 
 
Despite the strategic approach by the investors to win support from the 
people, the class dynamics within the families spurred resistance and con-
flicts in the initial phase (within the first four years) of the transaction. All 
the fifteen extended families interviewed indicated that portions of the 
land were either family farmed, farmed by sharecroppers and/or both. 
Nonetheless, vast portions were fallow lands, or unfarmed by the owners 
due to its distance from the settlements, the incidences of bushfires, access 
to other nearby family lands and of course they always farm small sizes at 
a time. Out of the fifteen family groupings, at least three of them had 
family members losing all their available lands and thus could not conceive 
the reality of being downgraded to a landless class associated with settlers 
or foreigners. For two interrelated reasons, they began to confront the 
middlemen and company. First, is the loss of their ‘dodi’ or subsistence 
lands, and second is the complete inaccessibility to the acquired land to 
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hunt or as path to other farms. While many of the family representa-
tives/heads interviewed have had alternative farm lands from their mater-
nal and paternal lineages, or even from their spouses, for those who lost 
all these forms of access, it meant they now had to look for a sharecrop 
arrangements. Farmers, who had property and tenants have now become 
sharecroppers themselves. Unfortunately, as already explained in chapter 
four, the rent factor broke down the moral economy of permitting usu-
fruct land use among members the Ntrubo clan. Besides, others just hesi-
tated to rent out their lands to those who ‘chose’ to sell theirs. In a move 
by the company, apparently meant to address their food related concerns, 
they promised to a hire a piece of land in a neighbouring village for those 
completely dispossessed to subsistence. Yet, as at the time of the research, 
there was still a stalemate on the provision of the land. According to the 
management of the Volta Red, the families refused the proposed offer and 
disagreements ensued among the family heads regarding who should be 
entitled to access the ‘promise land’. However, those family members who 
have completely lost their lands are not satisfied about the location, size 
and the fertility of the proposed land. Most of them are either sharecrop-
ping or farming on their spouses’ family lands.   
Also concerning food, most of the families interviewed assumed that 
they could have some access rights to the plantation, yet this was far from 
reality. Partly, this assumption is premised on the existing local system of 
sharecropping and land rental, whereby tenants’ use of land, does not pre-
vent land owners from accessing own their land for herbs, hunting, or 
timber. The company gave them a short period of time to uproot all their 
food crops prior to the establishment, and this was chaotic for several 
reasons. Some crops had not reached their maturity stages; some could 
not be transplanted; transplantable ones required immediate access to new 
lands; there were no guaranteed markets for the surplus during the rushed 
harvest, that meant crops like cassava that are only harvested when needed 
either had to go waste, or abandoned in the concession. Given that cassava 
is a staple food, those who could not harvest theirs in the given period, 
became furious about the restriction that followed, when even farmwork-
ers had access to the remnants. The situation was the same for people who 
had timber on the land. Also, the completely dispossessed families re-
quested to be allowed to plant some corn, in the unmaintained portions 
or just before the oil palm seedlings are transplanted from the nursery, all 
of which were denied. Traditionally, the area acquired has also been the 
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source of sand for construction, and ‘bush meat’ for the families. In an 
interview with a dispossessed female farmworker, she iterated, ‘now if you 
do not have money you cannot eat meat’. These issues sparked confron-
tations, mainly from the dispossessed landowners. A key informant who 
played a major role in the process, mentioned that they received threats 
from the people for deceiving them. He added, that in 2009, 
when they were creating tracts, one of the landowners, on two occasions 
confronted them with a gun [a sporadic incident], so the manager asked me 
to take stock of damaged tree and cash crops so they could be compensated 
[eventually two years after the land deal.] (11 July 2018, Dodo Tamale). 
Nonetheless, the payment of the compensation was also perceived by 
some farmers as rent. A landowner will say, ‘it was a deliberate act of the 
investors to confuse them’ only to understand it later. In the immediate 
aftermath of the transfer, some landlords also demanded their lands back, 
but could not pursue it further due to the lease agreement. Besides they 
were inhibited by the committee leaders and the chieftaincy institutions 
from articulating positions that may result in conflict. In the same way, 
many of the youth agitated when they heard about the details of the lease. 
Even within the families, it is apparent that the family heads, mostly adult 
men did not consult the women and the youth. This is quite a norm in 
these patriarchal communities where generational relation plays a big role 
in decision making (Park, & White, 2017). A young man whose father’s 
land was affected stated ‘we were angry about this land acquisition but we 
could not do anything because our fathers are still alive’. 
They planned to evict the company, but the elders and chiefs controlled 
the situation. Although the chief did not play a significant role in the initial 
process, after realizing the bad deal, the land family heads ran back to him 
to intervene in the pending issues as a traditional leader with the respon-
sibility of maintaining social peace. A family head expressed, 
When we realized our mistake, it was already too late, so we went back to 
the chief to plead with him, and recognize that no matter what, he is our 
father and that we needed his assistance in addressing the issues (12 July. 
2018, Dodo Tamale)..  
In 2013, when Volta Red took over the company, they also inherited a 
lawsuit by the families against SGSOG, asking for changes to some clauses 
in the lease agreement. The Paramount chief, as an arbitrator in land con-
flicts, mediated both the ongoing court suits by the families against 
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SGSOG for the case to be settled traditionally. He also facilitated a new 
memorandum of understanding for the amendment of some sections of 
the lease ‘agreement’, after which his involvement, once again waned.  
Moreover, four to five years after the land grab, when the land owners 
had not yet received any rents from the company, the somewhat shady 
character of the deal became apparent. It was also then that they realized 
there was even a clause in the deed of lease that stated that disputes con-
cerning the lease could only be settled in a court in Paris. At this point, 
there were no divided interests on the need to take some form of legal 
action against the company. Yet, even by 2013, in the public eye, the plan-
tation had undergone three faces of ownership or at least name changes 
— from SGSOG to Herakles Farms, and then to Volta Red Farms (dis-
cussed earlier in chapter four). This made it difficult for family heads to 
know with whom they were dealing. In fact, during the fieldwork, there 
were many instances when discussions were inclined towards comparing 
which of these three ‘companies’ operated best or worst. While, it is almost 
certain that SGSOG and Herakles are more or less the same company, the 
Volta Red factor remains unclear. There is still a grey area with regard to 
the ownership or affiliations of Volta Red. On several occasions during 
group interviews and discussion, I witnessed debates between participants 
about the ownership of the company — whether it is Ghanaian or foreign 
owned, or the differences between the three companies. As of February 
2016, the Director of Volta Red doubled as the Chief Operating Officer 
of SG Sustainable Oil Cameroun (SGSOC)3 and some of the company 
documents still bear affiliation to SGSOG. This finding supports previous 
research by Clapp, et al (2017) and Visser, (2015) that asserts that the di-
versity of actors, and the complexity of financial instruments are factors 
that hinder the crafting of effective governance mechanisms to check the 
externalities associated with such land investments — as in this case, cer-
tainly influencing the potential and impacts of the political reactions from 
the affected groups.  
 
6.2.2 ‘Our Eyes Opened’: The Role of Advocacy Politics   
Contemporary land grabs have reinvigorated the actions and influence of 
domestic and transnational agrarian movements (Edelman & Borras, 
2016). Yet, the study area, and more broadly in Ghana, are not strongholds 
of social movements. Within the first six years of the land acquisition and 
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the establishment of the plantation, the company faced no civil society 
pressures and none of the people I interviewed had been familiar with the 
land grab phenomenon.  
A major event that helped shape the local politics around the land deal 
was the emergence of a transnational advocacy group, the Africa Faith and 
Justice Network (AFJN). AFJN is based in the USA, their organizational 
members are mainly Christian missionaries, and they have networks and 
numerous coalitions in Africa. They describe who they are as ‘a commu-
nity of advocates for responsible U.S. relations with Africa’.4 Prior to their 
presence in the study area, they had already joined forces with Green Peace 
and other international NGOs, campaigning against SGSOC. However, 
as an advocacy group, their focus transcends land grabbing to broader in-
ternational issues concerning food systems, toxic dumping, just govern-
ance and women's empowerment. A closer look at their press releases and 
communiqués shows their ability to mobilize information on ongoing in-
justices in particular places to persuade states or powerful organizations 
for policy changes5.  
They consciously framed the issues around the oil palm investment in 
a way that attracted attention and related to the ongoing struggles of the 
dispossessed families. Between 2014 and 2016, AFJN followed up on, and 
conducted an action research on the oil palm investment — a period 
where the land grab discourse emerged among the landowners' committee 
and their families. Using the tactics of information politics (Keck & 
Sikkink, 1999), AFJN networked with a Catholic Parish in the district, con-
ducted several community awareness forums, FM radio presentations, 
held discussions in the Volta Region, and guided the family heads on how 
to engage with Volta Red to pursue their demands. They also shared the 
experiences of famers affected by the project in Cameroon to create 
awareness, educate and empower communities, and advocate for policies 
that ensure responsible investments. In an interview with the Ntrubo par-
amount Chief, he maintained that the landowners' committee realized the 
gravity of the issues at stake concerning the land deal when AFJN came 
into the picture. A local AFJN group was formed constituting an Assem-
blyman (local government official), the paramount chief, two sub chiefs, 
secretary to the landowners’ committee, and two landowners to continue 
the mission of AFJN within the district and the Volta region.  
In contrast to radical social movements such as La Via Campesina that 
oppose large-scale investments and therefore call for regulation to stop 
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land grabbing, AFJN’s framing was situated within the B regulatory ten-
dency (as discussed earlier in chapter one). Such a direction is not surpris-
ing, given the compromises within which advocacy networks operate and 
the fact that they are political spaces characterised by constant negotiations 
(Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Lerche, 2008). AFJN has to lend itself to the values 
of its member organizations, but also the affected families and communi-
ties did not oppose the establishment of the plantation per se, instead were 
looking for fair terms of incorporation. As such, it was explicit in their 
demand framing and campaigns that large-scale investments be not out 
rightly rejected, rather they should be done responsibility i.e. to reduce 
negative impacts on communities. Following the middle ground ideology 
of AFJN, some of the families even saw possibilities of co-production with 
the company. That is, they proposed that they be allowed to produce oil 
palm on the unmaintained portions and sell to the company under agreed 
terms on in a system similar to sharecropping. Other family members and 
even the unaffected community members also suggested that the company 
allows parts of the land for cocoa or corn production all of which suggest 
their desire to be integrated into the project rather than completely de-
nouncing it ( see Larder, 2015 on a rice investment in Mali ). One of the 
community elders interviewed emphasized the main message in the years 
of AFJN, ‘investments involve capital, land and labour and thus should be 
premised on a joint agreement and equal benefits6’. In a 2014 report by 
AFJN (AFJN, 2014, p. 6), under a short section titled ‘Development and 
Business’, it reads 
 AFJN is not against business or economic development in Africa, and in 
our community meetings we were very clear: 'It’s your land, if you want to 
lease it, go ahead. But, be sure you 1) clearly understand the terms of the 
contract and 2) are getting what you want in exchange for 2-3 generations 
without your land.' We are not interested in causing problems between local 
and foreign entities, nor are we dissuading Ghanaians from undergoing 
business ventures with global and/or foreign companies. 
Although to some extent Volta Red seemed to have been threatened by 
the presence of AFJN, the company capitalized on the latter’s accommo-
dating tactic which eventually reinforced their so-called ‘friendly’ approach 
to addressing the pending court issues. Field interviews suggest that be-
tween 2014 and 2015, the chief, the investors and middlemen persuaded 
the family heads to pull the case out of court to be settled amicably with 
the hopes of win-win possibilities. In any case, given the circumstance of 
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the signed lease document, one could not be optimistic about the potential 
outcome of the legal action, but neither would settling the case outside 
court guarantee positive outcomes. In the end, they settled on an adden-
dum to the lease agreement to change the Paris clause, provide scholar-
ships (still very limited) to one child each of the land owners children, and 
take up some social responsibilities, all of which were efforts to calm 
nerves. The landholders’ inability to modify their most pressing issues re-
garding the annual rent of 5 dollar per ha, the 4-year ‘rent holiday’ and 
their concerns about employment, reveal not only the impacts of ideology 
in civil society politics, but also, the power relations that still persisted.  
6.3  Labour Politics: Class Consciousness and Everyday Action 
As discussed in chapter one, in rural peasant economies such as that de-
scribed above, characterized by exploitation and subordination — agrarian 
political theorists provide competing explanations of the nature of politi-
cal reactions that emerge i.e., revolt (radical and overt politics) and non-
revolt, which are essentially linked to class relations, traditional community 
structures, or individual incentives (Paige, 1975; Scott, 1985). Since 2008 
when work started on the acquired land, the farmworkers have not en-
gaged significantly in overt politics to demand changes in unfavourable 
terms of incorporation. However, there is an increasing level of class-con-
sciousness among the workers, although sometimes contentious. A laid-
off and dispossessed semi-proletariat, expressed, ‘We have become surplus7 
to them, if you die the job will continue’. Knowing this, how do they trans-
late their claims and assertions into action against exploitation, and action 
for better terms of incorporation? Adopting some tenets of ethnography, 
particularly observations, informal conversations and interviews, I illus-
trate their everyday politics in dealing with the precarious nature of work 
on the plantation.  
6.3.1 Deception, and Non-Compliance 
During fieldwork, my Sundays were precious moments. This is the official 
resting day for permanent workers. Casual workers who worked on their 
farms on Saturdays also take rest on Sundays, and of course with 89 per 
cent of the workers being Christians, the hours between 1:00 p.m. and 
6:00 pm were a precious window of opportunity to talk to most of the 
workers who were then closed from church. It was one of these Sunday 
122 CHAPTER 6 
 
afternoons in July 2018 that I visited two relatives, Kofi and Kwame in 
their home at Brewaniase. They are displaced sharecroppers working on 
the plantation. Kwame is a permanent worker and has worked with the 
company since its establishment. Kofi, on the other hand, is a casual 
worker. After they lost their land, he worked on the plantation for a while 
and decided to travel to the city to work for some years. In 2016, he re-
turned so he could farm, and also help in catering for his aging and wid-
owed father. He has since returned to the plantation working in pruning 
and harvesting. He described how risky it is, and what he does to ‘address 
it’, 
We do not have hand gloves for pruning, so sometimes, I also do shoddy 
work. My supervisors expect me to collect the branches and pack them at 
specified locations so that they do not hamper the work of slashers. Yet 
without gloves, I cannot work fast and I often finish work with injuries to 
my palms. So sometimes I do not collect the branches. They cannot monitor 
everyone, they cannot tell who did it, unfortunately, this affects the slashers 
too (15 July 2018, Fankyenekor). 
The most contested piece-rate targets have to do with slashing. Cur-
rently, slashers have to weed a total land area of about one third of an acre 
(9m²×15 palms) regardless of the field condition. However, this reflects a 
lower adjustment (from 9m ²×25 palms) upon the introduction of women 
into this task since 2016 but also a response from management to the 
complaints of the slashers. Nonetheless, it still appears a big challenge for 
both men and women: men who seek further reduction in the target, and 
women who want a gendered consideration. While the women have had 
some success in requesting the support of men in fertilizer application — 
to carry the fertilisers to the locations of use, they are not satisfied with 
the conditions of slashing. A female farmworker  complained that 
all the targets are demanding, but slashing is really tough. They said they 
cannot loosen up the targets for women — because we all are the same. 
…they say what men can do, women can also do…what can we say? (07 
June, 2018, Brewaniase) 
While some have acquiesced to this situation, others who are relatively 
better off in terms of having alternative livelihoods or other household 
support systems often evade the slashing season. In a conversation with a 
female worker who is also a part-time seamstress, she expressed,  
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tomorrow I won’t go to work. I have told my supervisor that I’m not well 
and I might stay home for about three days. But honestly, it is because I 
know that the loose-picking season is ended and we are about to start slash-
ing. Slashing is tedious and we hardly meet out targets (07 June 2018, 
Brewaniase). 
Sprayers in particular are very conscious about the health implications of 
their tasks even though their claims are often premised on health hearsays. 
They capitalize on those perceived dangers and often break their working 
time rules by justifying the need to go home to wash off the chemicals. 
Like many other workers, Kofi also iterated the importance of his tasks 
within the entire production chain, thus his role in the functioning of the 
plantation. Based on the way he values his position within the plantation 
system, he expected that he be allowed to work under favourable condi-
tions, particularly, the flexibility to do a real piece rate i.e., get paid for 
what he can do in a day and not be forced to spend the whole day on the 
farm. In his words,  
If you work below your target and do nothing the rest of your time, they 
[supervisors] won’t say anything, but they won’t allow you to leave before 
2:00 p.m. even in the off-peak seasons. If you do so, you will not be marked 
for a wage (15 July 2018, Fankyenekor). 
He argued that his father had trained them in farming, and now the com-
pany is benefiting from it. Thus, he could not accept why they won’t allow 
them to work on their own farms. Sometimes, he secretly informs the 
headman or makes up a story that he is sick in order to avoid getting into 
trouble with authorities. Open deception is very common among the 
workers and depending on their relations with superiors, and the occupa-
tional history of the superiors themselves — whether or not they have 
been in their shoes before. This is confirmed in the words of a headman 
who said,  
A worker will call to inform you of their inability to come to work because 
of ill health — when you know very well he is telling lies, but you can’t do 
anything about it. After the 20th [day of the month]8, you can confer that, in 
our attendance sheets, many people absent themselves to do ‘jobs'. Such 
attitudes affect us very much. For example, it reduces productivity especially 
when they do not inform us in time because of their anger (19 May 2018, 
Dodi Papase). 
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For casual workers, not being entitled to annual paid leave means they 
have to take their own breaks as and when necessary; sometimes they rest 
during the lay-off periods. Furthermore, the intensity of labour also breaks 
them down occasionally. However, not being able to justify requests for 
sick leave when they are not tangible work-related injuries leads to ‘new 
discoveries’ on ways and means around them. A young, literate and male 
farmworker narrated,  
sometimes when I’m sick of feverishness, I do not report that. I know the 
clinics in our communities do not have adequate capacity to detect all illness, 
so I complain of severe chest or neck pain that is directly related to harvest-
ing. When I do that, I can get medical cover and also convince the medical 
officer to get me an excuse duty note for about 3 days. During this period, 
I can rest, and also receive my daily wage (10 July 2018, Brewaniase). 
 
6.3.2 Acquiescence? 
Structural differentiation plays a key role in shaping political reaction. The 
location of land, its fertility, and access to inputs are important in deter-
mining the extent to which farm workers benefit from their land and con-
sequently, the extent to which they depend on the income from the plan-
tation work (Paige, 1975). Going back to the data on the class positions of 
women, they are often the ones with narrow choices as many of them 
depend largely on the wage income. The situation is not so different for 
dispossessed proletariats, and migrants, especially urban-rural migrants, 
who may also be skilled, educated and not so interested in farming for 
extra income. Ouma, (2018, p. 120) in her study of a rice field in Kenya, 
asserted that ‘there is great incentive for such workers to conform to the 
idea of a “subservient worker”, for the benefits that such repute may 
bring’. This is certainly not a case of false consciousness as one operator 
stated, ‘we are just hustling for them, I don’t want to become an enemy so 
I have stopped complaining’. 
In addition, given the discretionary mode of labour management, fre-
quent indebtedness to superiors, and other existing top-down patronage 
relations, it is always important to maintain some level of compliance to 
safeguard one’s ‘future’ in the job. It may also not necessarily be about 
being in the good books of supervisors, but the need to secure wage 
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income to maintain their households. Below, is the story of Adwoa, which 
illustrates the context of acquiescence on the plantation.  
Adwoa is a 51-year-old woman who has worked for nine years on the plan-
tation. She is migrant, landless and has been divorced for seven years. She 
and her former husband had a lot of farmland in their hometown. They 
even had eight acres of oil palm and she intercropped vegetables. In the 
early 2000s when they heard of the PSI, they moved to a village in the East-
ern Region to work at the nurseries. In the meantime, they left their crops 
in the hands of family members and that did not work out well. At the same 
time, her husband had refused to cater for their five daughters under the 
perception that girls will not bring any wealth to him in future, but rather to 
their husbands: a reason for their divorce. She has been working all these 
years to take care of the children’s education. Although she has been a per-
manent worker upon recruitment, she complains ‘the work is tedious, but if 
you are not educated do not have any other tradeable skill, what do you do? 
Now I can see that I’m tired and very weakened but what can I do?’ She 
does not envision working until pension, but her goal is to clear the educa-
tional costs, move to the capital city to stay with her children, and perhaps 
start a trade. Now, she comports herself to safeguard her employment and 
permanent contract status (10 July 2018, Volta Red, Fankyenekor). 
6.3.3 Absenteeism: Production and Action 
Everyday resistance also resides in the multitude of alterations or actively 
constructed responses that are continued and/or created anew in order to 
confront the modes of ordering that currently dominate our societies (van 
der Ploeg, 2010). One of the key findings in relation to how the workers 
respond to casualization and low income is their consciousness about the 
need to continue with their own farming regardless of the time competi-
tion and trade-offs associated with it. Historically, these settler communi-
ties emerged out of a ‘dodi’ system, literally meaning ‘cultivate to eat’, 
whereby natives gave out portions of land freely to settlers to cater for 
their food needs. Following the fast spread of commodification of the ru-
ral, and with cocoa becoming a major cash crop in these areas, the gifting 
of agricultural lands has become rare, and the system replaced with ten-
ancy agreements. However, farming for subsistence remains an important 
feature of the people’s social reproduction. As was evident in the survey 
conducted, almost everyone cultivated some corn or cassava, and even 
cash-crop sharecroppers are often allowed by their landlords to intercrop 
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some foods for their own subsistence. In addition, in times when they are 
laid off, some casual workers search for short-term farm labour opportu-
nities such as rice harvesting where the remuneration is paid in bags of 
rice rather than cash.  
Although occasional or seasonal purchases of food items are normal, 
there is a societal expectation of being able to produce one’s own staple 
foods or at least to get food crops from one’s land through tenants. In a 
conversation with a young operator who is also a migrant, he said, 
I have just acquired a piece of land from my landlord (residential) to plant 
corn and cassava. My friends have been teasing me and I also realized that 
I can’t be buying food all the time. They have agreed to support me with 
their labour to start the farm this year so that I don’t waste my money on 
food (08 July 2018, Brewaniase). 
Given this background, the farmworkers’ cash needs are not directly tar-
geted at food even though many depend on the income from the planta-
tion to support their own farms — semi-proletarianism that sustains cap-
ital accumulation(Fraser, 2014). Apparently, many of the workers use their 
wages for household needs like educational costs and shelter. Indeed, in 
2017, the farm management heeded the request of the farm residents, 
many of whom are less-landed migrants and allowed them to farm por-
tions of the land that were not maintained — of course, this was also a 
management strategy to control weed and fire in the unmaintained por-
tions. Nonetheless, the scheme had its shortfalls regarding labour compe-
tition and conflicts of interests whereby supervisors were also implicated, 
thus leading to its annulment after a year. The workers have also been 
permitted to collect foodstuff9 from the farm, although they are some-
times restricted when it competes with their transport space. In addition, 
for many casual workers, they could not risk being laid off and being food 
insufficient at the same time. This consciousness is a major driver for the 
continuance of their small-scale farming alongside the plantation work. 
The competition that exists between the planation work and own farming 
is real, but most of them will not compromise on their own farms to the 
extent of being short of staple foods.  For instance, September is both a 
major harvest season and minor planting season for maize, as well as being 
an off-peak but not necessarily a very lean period for oil palm. During this 
period, as shown in Figures 6.110 and 6.2 11, women’s attendance to the 
plantation is very low (shown in the number of ‘0s’) compared to their 
June commitment in the peak season.  
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Yet, even in peak seasons, most casual workers will not report on Satur-
days12. In general, their physical presence on their own farms is reduced 
and often replaced with hired labour and chemical inputs, but in the fam-
ing seasons i.e., during planting and harvesting, they spend ample time on 
their own farms as compared to the plantation work. In an interview with 
a supervisor, he confirmed that 
people have been working with us for a very long time, but their attitude 
towards work is bad. At the time that we need workers for our work, that is 
when they have left the job to go to their own farms. Sometimes it takes 
two to three months, especially when it is corn season. Imagine if you en-
gage such a person as a permanent worker. Sometimes when you make them 
permanent, their mentalities change and then you realize that the casual 
workers even work harder (08 June, 2018 Volta Red, Fankyenekor).  
Occasionally, some casual farmworkers whose farms are adjacent to the 
plantation, exploit the transport service to work on their farms, without 
reporting to work. The average number of working days for most of the 
workers ranges between 18 and 20 days out of the expected 26–27 days or 
even lower during the farming seasons. Workers have been seeking the 
elimination of Saturday work, but since that has not been granted, more 
than half of them do not turn up on Saturdays. Interestingly, they do not 
face sanctions either — a situation which management has come to terms 
with, given the societal context of their operation. A worker explained,  
getting people to work on the farm is difficult. They have to search for a 
new person, train him or her and hope that he or she stays on. What I can 
do in 30 min on this farm, a new entrant might take over 2 hours to do and 
this will affect the company (16 May 2018, Dodi Papase). 
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Figure 6.1 
 Women’s Attendance to Work on the Plantation in June 2017 
 
 Source Author, 2018. 
 
Indeed, although the company lays of workers seasonally, and also, is un-
able to recruit workers to maintain the entire plantation, the narrative 
above is a true reflection of the daily labour supply challenges. In the clas-
sic literature on capitalist development in the countryside as well as the 
contemporary debates on land grabs (Li, 2011; Marx, 1977), a major con-
cern has been the issue of surplus population whose labour is not needed 
on the farm. In this case, although labour appears to be abundant, they 
may, on some occasions, not be readily available because of the unfavour-
able working conditions, the need to subsist, and, of course, their relative 
access to (tenant) lands to do their own faming, and, in some cases, access 
to other livelihoods’ opportunities. During my visit in the off-peak season, 
I had several encounters with laid-off workers in multiple activities. 
Whereas some, particularly the women, were anxiously waiting to be called 
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back to work, there were also several instances of workers who had been 
asked to return to work but were not ready. Some were engaged in farm-
ing, others were labouring on small-scale farms, others had taken up con-
struction contracts, others prioritized their health conditions after previ-
ous accidents, while a few young men were considering migrating to cocoa 
producing regions down south to work as tenant labour13.  
Figure 6.2 
Women’s Attendance to Work on the Plantation in September, 2017 
 
Source Author, 2018. 
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6.3.4 Farmworkers’ Actions and the Constraints of Organizing   
Several factors account for the emergence of everyday politics as the main 
form of contention by workers in this case — as we see in their’ demands 
for minor reforms in the organization and conditions of labour. Of course, 
the findings re-affirm Scott’s (1985) argument that so far as the subsist-
ence ethic of the peasantry is not threatened, revolts are unlikely. In some 
ways, the maintenance of the moral economy persists as evident in the 
nature of tenancy agreements that exists between foreigners/settlers and 
natives. However, when one pulls away from the confines of singular tel-
eological assumptions, then we find several other practical reasons that 
affect their politics — why everyday actions appear to be the most viable 
means to expressing their agency and what inhibits their incipient efforts 
to undertake collective action.  
Indeed, everyone on the plantation is there for regular access to cash 
income, but it is in the unpacking of the purpose of this cash income that 
we can understand their politics. For instance, a parent’s cash needs for 
children’s education normally depends on ages and stages of their depend-
ents, and even the financial demands from the type of educational institu-
tions. The farmworkers who are currently enrolled in secondary or tertiary 
education or savings towards higher education do not have the incentives 
to engage in any overt/organized resistance because they will not stay for 
long. Similarly, the cash needs for investments in one’s own farm is also a 
function of the available land size, the form of ownership, access to family 
labour, the maturity of the farm, types of crops grown, etc. In such in-
stances, their political reactions occur at the conjuncture of self-interest 
(Popkin, 1979) and other structural conditions. 
Again, the ways in which labour is structured in a plantation allows 
permanent workers more organizational opportunities than casual work-
ers. Some permanent workers sometimes schedule their annual leave dur-
ing their faming season to allow them time on their own farm — of course, 
worker–supervisor relations play a major role in such decisions. Security 
workers, who are all permanent staff, have informally re-organized their 
formal working hours from 12 hours a day to a continuous 48 hours so 
that they can have two full days every week in order to have ample time 
for their farm activities and other businesses like motorbike transport ser-
vices. The situation is however different for casual workers who find it 
difficult to unite on common issues. In addition, there are always tensions 
that emerge in their incipient attempts to mobilize. Lower level overseers 
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and headmen are often left in a competing dilemma of whose interest to 
represent — workers or management? Most of the headmen have been 
core labourers before, or usually shift between labouring and overseeing, 
thus many can identify with the challenges faced by workers, yet there is a 
constant sensitization from management on the need to protect, and ex-
plain the company's position to the workers, so as to prevent any outburst 
of violence. In the words of one long-serving worker, 
We have attempted a strike before. It landed the headmen in trouble be-
cause some workers informed management that the leaders spearheaded it. 
They [the headmen] were rebuked for that (18 May 2018, Dodi Papase). 
There are several instances of workers doubling as unpaid or paid labour-
ers of their supervisors or other high-ranking authorities in return for fa-
vours, small loans, income or gifts, etc., which brings in emotions, fear, 
and subtle control in their political reactions. ‘Fatherly’ relations between 
those in authority and workers, is not only typical of many rural settings 
where paternalistic and patronage relations dominate, but also it is embed-
ded in the existing societal contexts, which is akin to the kind of intergen-
erational, and top-down relations between the elderly and the young, fa-
thers and sons, chiefs and subjects, teachers and students, etc., 
characterized by the societal expectation of high regard to authority which 
often expresses itself openly or/and subtly as subordination and control 
(Amanor, 2010).  
Transcending the local begs the question, what is the role of the state? 
Mainstream optimism in large-scale agricultural investments have always 
been linked to labour opportunities for host communities (UNCTAD, et 
al 2010). However, the growing power and reach of global capital have 
exceeded the ability of nations and labour movements to regulate them. 
The existing regulatory institutions for agricultural labour management in 
Ghana are non-applicable, inadequate and repressive as I explain further 
in chapter seven. It is therefore not surprising that some workers consider 
delays as normal, or even better than their previous workplaces. Again, 
how does one confront a company about low wages when they adhere to 
labour laws of the country and pay almost 50 percent higher than the min-
imum wage?  
The workers’ eagerness to mobilize is constrained on three fronts: not 
knowing what their rights are, and how to pursue them, thus the fear of 
possible violation of state laws; their remoteness (location-wise) from the 
south14 which makes it difficult for alliance building with labour unions; 
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and third, and often the norm, the company has been hostile to the idea 
of strikes and trade unionism, specifically the idea of joining the Ghana 
Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU)15. Despite the constitutional safe-
guarding of workers’ rights to unionization, as at the time of my visit, man-
agement had not given approval for security and casual workers to join 
the union on the grounds of the company’s internal security and the flu-
idity of casual workers. While the leaders continue to fight this decision, it 
is being met with a covert process of false conscientization about unions 
being violent. It appears the aim is to inhibit voluntary participation in the 
union even if management is later compelled to comply with the law. This 
is often interpreted by the workers as ‘if unions are violent, then it is all 
about protests and strikes, then there is a likelihood of police arrest’. As 
such, workers who need to keep their jobs would rather stay away and/or 
resort to the everyday individualized actions. Permanent workers agitated 
about the lack of an enabling environment to unionize. Casual workers 
and those in security were also puzzled about being prevented by manage-
ment to join the Ghana Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU) under the 
rhetoric of the ‘company’s internal security’. Although the law allows even 
casual workers to form unions, it is apparent that these provisions need to 
be accompanied by the necessary institutional support for such marginal-
ized groups. Officials at GAWU registered logistical and human resource 
constraints in their efforts to mobilize the workers (Field notes, 11 Jan. 
2019). At the same time, prioritizing uncommitted semi-proletariat casual 
workers who are geographically distant from the capital and other oil palm 
plantations in the south, presents practical challenges for GAWU, which 
is under-resourced (Field notes, 04 March, 2019). The farmworkers, there-
fore, resort to everyday individual forms of political reactions to deal with 
the unfavourable working conditions.  
6.4  Land-Labour Politics: Class and Intergenerational Tensions 
As of 2015, the lawsuit against the company had been taken from court 
and the company has been operating peacefully. Since 2016, the AFJN left 
the scene, and the local group formed to keep an eye on the investment is 
no longer functional16. Given these contexts issues, how do the affected 
families perceive the present situation of the land grab and how have their 
perceptions changed over time? What kind of political actions could be 
envisaged between now and 2060 when the lease is expired? Among the 
family heads/representative, there is an almost unanimous sense of regret 
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for agreeing to the land deal. This perception is even more widespread 
among the individual families who were not consulted in the acquisition 
process. This regret is associated with the loss of trust on different levels.  
At the family level, the youth, women and other members continue to 
accuse their family heads for not involving them and for not doing due 
diligence before agreement. Moreover, because they only started receiving 
rent post-2013, the affected families have now come to fully comprehend 
the real value of the rent, and this is particularly troubling for those with 
small plots. Following the ongoing perceptions of unjust disbursement of 
rents by family representatives, other affected family members seek to col-
lect their rents individually, a situation that is not viable for those small 
plots since the cost of transport alone may consume almost all their in-
come. There are also perceptions from the youth and affected family 
members that some key leaders in the landowners' committee have alli-
ances with the management of the company, thus diluting their efforts to 
effect changes. There were complaints from the youth about the reluc-
tance of the committee to forward their written grievances to the com-
pany. A key informant stated,  
When the committee calls for a meeting with the company, they always give 
excuses for the meetings to be called off. They only meet the company when 
it’s time to take the yearly rent to the families. The landowners and commit-
tee do not meet until there is a delay in their annual rent payment (11 Feb. 
2019, Abrubruwa).  
Antagonism between the family heads, families and even the general 
community on the one hand, and middlemen and the investors on the 
other hand, has been centred around the issue of the company’s inability 
to deliver on its promises. Apart from the provision of a few boreholes 
and some educational support to basic schools, many other social respon-
sibilities have not met the expectations of the people. Yet for the most 
people, they could even manage without these social facilities if the prom-
ised extent of employment was upheld. From the time of SGSOG to Volta 
Red, the numbers of jobs created have been declining. It is not encourag-
ing that a 3750ha of land employs less than 250 workers, with an average 
attendance even lower, sometimes under 100 workers reporting to work 
in a day. Only 1000ha was being maintained as of 2018, but also the pre-
carious working conditions deter retention. A family head interviewed in 
2018 emphasized, 
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The last time we went for a meeting, they asked us to pray for them to get 
labourers — they are not getting workers. We want the company to do well. 
The work being done is a quarter. It is left in the bush. They cannot employ 
workers. They cannot provide jobs (10 July 2018, Brewaniase). 
The lack of clarity on the ownership of the current company, implies that 
the people continue to compare the employment situation under SGSOC-
Herakles to Volta Red, often reproaching the latter. A family head stated,  
This company is weak. Volta Red is weak. The first company employed al-
most 1,00017 workers, they also employed high school students on vacation 
— 2 buses — to get some money. Volta Red is weak. Herakles was better. 
Today workers are not up to 200. There were women selling food at the 
canteen, today you do not find anything there. Volta Red is weak (14 July, 
2018, Brewaniase). 
This is was a common perception among the farmworkers. Most of the 
existing permanent contracts were given under Herakles, they used to have 
annual end-of-year parties for them and the catchment communities, and 
they received a 13th month payment, all of which have been scrapped un-
der Volta Red. Closely linked, is the community-wide disappointment with 
the siting of the oil mill processing in the adjoining district, thus blocking 
employment opportunities for the people in the Brewaniase environs. The 
lack of electricity on the plantation is the popular discourse around the 
distancing of the mill, yet the people’s obliviousness about the company 
blurs their ability to understand the politics behind the scenes. The current 
manager, is also a native and political figure in the adjoining district where 
the oil mill is situated and thus could also be a strategy to strengthen his 
influence.  
In the midst of all of these pressing issues, there hasn’t been any fierce 
confrontation or resistance from the families. There have been reports of 
one-time protest at the entrance of the plantation when their rents were 
delayed. I witnessed a five-month delay in the payment of rent during my 
fieldwork, yet their anger seemed to be contained. Unlike the period in the 
first four years, where the land-food question generated fears and thus was 
central to the completely dispossessed who strongly opposed it, it appears 
that their discourses in this recent past are more inclined towards the la-
bour question. Although the land grab has reduced their access to, and 
control over alternative and new lands, and thus their food supply, it did 
not completely destroy their subsistent ethic due to relative land 
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availability. Almost every landowner who lost land has found a new place 
to farm. They complained about poor soil fertility, size of land, sharecrop-
ping and the distances to their new farms, yet that does not deter them 
from producing food, at least for household use, thus the large extent of 
semi-proletarianism and the ‘dodi’ practice. 
 One cannot ignore the stark generational differences in perception 
around the land deal. When asked the seemingly simple question ‘would 
you take your land back after the 50 years, or renew the lease agreement’?, 
the responses (from the majority of family heads who have ample alterna-
tive lands) fell on the continuum of indifference (leaving the decision to 
their children), to that suggesting a renewal of the agreement under better 
terms and conditions. Most of these adult family members still take con-
solation in the impression that, if the terms of employment and rent are 
improved, then the youth and the whole community will benefit in the 
long term (see Box 6.1 for the differing views within the affected families).  
Additionally, the management and supervisors also constantly sensitize 
workers about the company being young, and the need for some time to 
reap the actual employment benefits.   
Nonetheless from many of the affected youth interviewed, it is more 
than clear that their generation is doomed by the actions of their parents 
and grandparents. One common characteristic was that many of this dis-
possessed youth are former workers on the plantation who stopped due 
to the working conditions. Their perceptions were more inclined to getting 
their land back even before the 50-years term. While their fathers caution 
against the future suitability of the land for production and the likely ten-
sions on the reinstitution of old boundaries that have been erased, they 
seemed more optimistic about the future. The nephew of a family repre-
sentative expressed that after 50 years, its [the land] quality will change but 
they will plant some other crops; if cassava and maize, it could be teak. 
Some members of the traditional authority iterated the generational 
tensions caused by the deal. The land transfer and acquisition has brought 
up covert conflicts within families because the youth want to take their 
land back while their fathers are benefiting from the token rents. Many 
youths do not benefit from the land since they neither work it nor are 
entitled to rents. If there be any significant resistance in the future, the 
youth are likely to play a bigger role. Currently there is a lack of clarity 
among the people on the duration of the lease agreement — a treasured 
document, under lock and key, with only one copy for all the affected 
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families. Most people have confused the 25-year period for replanting to 
be the actual termination period, subject to another 25 years upon renewed 
negotiations. As such, their point of reference for further action is between 
now and the next 15 years which could also create serious tensions be-
tween families and the company. There has been a lot of awareness among 
the youth. A key informant revealed that recently one young man living in 
the city wrote a letter to the manager, prompting the company about the 
illegal transfer of his father’s land to the company by his uncle without his 
consultation. There are also incipient attempts to mobilize. Particularly, 
the male children of the landowners want to form a legally recognized 
association to register their concerns. During an FGD in Dodo Tamale, 
one youth expressed, 
The issues are compiling anger among the youth, ‘eboboba’ [there is pres-
sure building up] — we will take action one day. We are contemplating what 
can be done. We want to form an association of youth of the landlord fam-
ilies. We feel that Volta Red tricked us by making our fathers take the matter 
away from court. Maybe the state could have intervened. We are scheming, 
because of the generational impacts. Even the climate has changed. The rain 
pattern has changed, we used to get some rains even in December, and the 
dry season usually didn’t last for 3 months, …and the rains do not fall be-
cause of the destruction of the forest. Now we cannot even get wood to 
build, and they have collected all as firewood to be used at the processing 
mill. Our fathers have played us wicked. It may appear that we are not seri-
ous, but one day the tension will build up into a big issue! 
The nature of political reactions between the dispossessed and farmwork-
ers, and those who fall in both categories shows overlapping, competing 
and parallel claims and demands to land and labour related issues. The 
demands for better work conditions and increased job opportunities are 
typical examples of areas where the interests of the dispossessed families, 
farmworkers and the community overlap. These demands are based on 
their assumptions that the company is ‘weak’ but its growth would auto-
matically translate into better livelihoods via improved employment con-
ditions. As expected, issues regarding rents and compensations remain the 
‘problem’ of the dispossessed Ntrubo families, sharecroppers, and settlers 
who are struggling to maintain their previous claims to the land. When it 
comes to the question of access to the plantation, some tensions exist be-
tween farmworkers whose lands were not affected and the families who 
lost all their lands but are not employed on the plantation.   







































Box 6.1: Family Perceptions of the Plantation and the Future  
We are not happy about the rent. If we give the land out after 50 years, the 
negotiations will be tougher. But I don’t have a lot of my land affected. Fam-
ily head, 60–70 years, and with alternative family land.  
 
I am not too affected by the land grabs. It has created employment. My 
children are in the city, I want them to go school, ...we have suffered 
because of illiteracy. Family head, 80 years plus, and with alternative family land. 
 
All of my father’s land have been affected by the plantation. I am now share-
cropping. I stopped working with Volta Red four year ago because the salary 
was not good. I cannot refute the decisions of our elders, but we will have 
the right effect changes that benefit us, the younger ones, when our fathers 
are gone. The son of a family representative, 25-30 years 
 
They have already signed it: the elders have not said it is bad, what can I say? 
People are poor, and food crop farming is not yielding anything, so they 
need jobs. Let’s go and see what they have done to the land: it is nicely 
cleared and beautiful …[but] the company cannot farm the land. If this com-
pany was doing well, you would not meet people in the town. If they had 
even used the unfarmed portion for corn or cocoa, it would have been more 
useful. The daughter of a family head, 40-45 years, a returnee from the city.  
 
I know that there are issues. To err is human, of course there is delay in 
payment of rent, but the rent is good. To someone, a rag may be as a new 
cloth. I hope with the expansion of the mill capacity, production will in-
crease. Family head, 60–70 years, and with alternative family land. 
 
I boast of it that such a big plantation is on our land. It has become a land-
mark for us. Even this research is making the community visible.  Yet, the 
catchment communities are not benefiting, and the job is not attractive. Af-
ter 25 years, when they want to uproot and replant, something will happen. 
There will be fire. Family head, 50–60 years, and with alternative family land. 
We, the children have decided not to allow this to happen again. We will not 
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For instance, some dispossessed family members with limited land access 
complain about the injustices of the land deal when they refer to farm-
workers’ harvesting their [landowners] food remnants like cassava and co-
coyams and the hunting opportunities (even if illegal) for the farmworkers 
due to their access to the plantation, while they, the owners of the land are 
banned from entry for similar purposes.  
Another case in point is when the ambitious demands from some of 
the totally dispossessed landowners to either cultivate corn seasonally, or 
co-produce the oil palm under agreed conditions were denied by the com-
pany. Whereas, resident farmworkers were allowed access to portions of 
the land to farm corn, although this access was short lived. For possible 
reasons of encroachment, both unaffected farmworkers and the dispos-
sessed farmworkers whose farms are adjacent to the plantation have easier 
access through the plantation to their farms than the dispossessed who are 
not employed as farmworkers.   
6.5  Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has provided evidence on the nature and dynamics of politi-
cal reactions from the affected families and farmworkers in response to 
the land grabs. It is evident that responses from the affected groups are 
shaped by the socio-economic and political contexts within which land 
grabs emerge. Regarding the land question, traditional family and chief-
taincy institutions, investor strategy, and advocacy politics played key roles 
in containing any likely overt confrontations. However, this case is a typi-
cal example of when land grabs do not lead to total dispossession or a near 
complete displacement of a community. In such circumstances, where the 
relative land availability helps maintain food production on small-scale 
farms, adaptation has become more prevalent than resistance.  
Regarding labour, farmworkers mainly unorganized, have resorted to 
everyday actions to express agency on the plantation. In a context where 
organized action and unions are either non-existent or limited, everyday 
politics that the workers engage in as described in this chapter, appears to 
be the most viable means to expressing their agency in the struggles for 
better terms of incorporation (see appendix three for more on their dif-
ferentiated demands and politics). However, a question that cannot be es-
caped is: to what effect are these everyday reactions? Do we risk romanti-
cizing their individualized politics or could it indeed have substantial 
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benefits for peasant farmworkers? They do so to ensure access to food, 
extra income, rest and wellbeing. While the general conditions of work are 
not favourable, the extent of impacts, and their diverse individualized pol-
itics are influenced not only by class relations, but also the relations in the 
organization of labour which is also embedded in, and reinforced by ex-
isting social structures of inequality. Conscious of how they have been ad-
versely incorporated into the plantation work, farmworkers strive to gain 
some benefits through everyday actions of deception and production. In 
so doing, labour expresses its autonomy and presents itself as a social sub-
ject rather than mere object of exploitation through a process of ‘self-val-
orization’, to understand the creative of reactions (Burgmann, 2016; Negri, 
2005). 
Unfortunately, these everyday forms of agency could also keep them 
stuck in the very casual system they despise, especially when ‘good behav-
iour’ and commitment are often deemed as the pre-condition for progres-
sion. Interestingly but not surprising, a critical look at the demands from 
farmworkers, land owners and even the community wide perceptions sug-
gest that corporate ‘investment’ discourse still override a land grab narra-
tive especially as demands from family heads are directed more towards 
rents, improvement in employment conditions, and co-production than 
land reclamation. Also, the farmworkers’ multiple and individualized eve-
ryday politics do not necessarily change the structure of social relations 
associated with capitalist agriculture; all of which attest to the difficult and 
fragile rural livelihood conditions that underlie and shape peasant politics 
in the midst of land grabs. Employment and subsistence food production 
are important and connecting nodes in the farmers’ and farmworkers’ re-
sponses, but unfavourable transformation of the latter can change the 
cause of the existing land grab politics. As the future implications of land 
access become imminent, organized action from the dispossessed youth 
and the younger generation against the company may unfold sooner than 
later. In as much as employment is important for their everyday cash needs 
especially for education and housing, the significance of land access for 
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Notes 
1 Part of this chapter has been published by the author (Gyapong, 2019). 
2 Interview with a dispossessed young adult. 
3 Indicated in a letter by Greenpeace which was addressed to Jonathan Johnson 
Watts, and also from key informants.  
4 https://afjn.org/about-afjn/who-we-are/ 
5 https://afjn.org/focus-campaigns/ 
6 An untranslated quote Field Interview, 2018.  
7 Not translated — the original word used by the farmworker. 
8 The first working day of the month starts from 15th. 
9 Remnants from farms of the dispossessed tenants and landowners, usually cassava.  
10 0 represents absence. The numbers represent the number of bags of loose palm 
nuts that the worker collected — four being the daily target for a full wage.  
11 In September, it appears the system of recording had slightly changed, whereby 
the tally marks indicates that daily target of  four bags of loose nuts that were 
picked.  
12 See for example 3rd, 10th and 17th June.  
13 Particularly, rural areas in the Western Region of Ghana, where they can maintain 
large cocoa farms under negotiated terms, and often with less control. Engag-
ing in large-scale cocoa production in their own communities is risky because 
of the rampant bushfires in the dry seasons, and many of them claim that the 
best lands have been taken by the land deal. 
14 Due to the geo-politics, much of the political and economic activities are central-
ized in the southern belt of the country where the capital and the biggest cities 
are located. 
15 From key informant interviews and interviews with some farmworkers. 
16 Some members of the group linked it to organizational and financial challenges.  
17 The number appears exaggerated, likely to be 300-500 workers. At the time there 
were job opportunities for land clearance, building of housing units and 
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7.1  Introduction 
In this chapter, I reflect on the empirical evidence on the impacts of the 
land deal on farmworkers to critically evaluate the relevance, benefits, and 
shortcomings of the competing land grab regulatory tendencies1. Sub sec-
tions 7.2 to 7.4 present a critique of Ghana’s enabling environment for 
agricultural land investments vis-à-vis the existing labour policies and the 
underlying exploitation of farmworkers as detailed out in chapters five and 
six. Given that Ghana is not a strong base for civil society mobilization 
against land grabs, Section 7.5 examines a broader picture of land grab 
resistance within the West African context. Centring on the anti-land grab 
demands and discourses of the West African food sovereignty movement, 
I unpack the gaps and other issues in their demand-framing in relation to 
the evidence of farmworkers’ experiences.  
 
7.2  Institutions Governing Land Investments and Agricultural 
Labour in Ghana   
Several institutions govern labour in Ghana. The Constitution serves as 
the main legal umbrella for employment which safeguards the right to 
work, the health, safety and welfare of all persons in employment and sets 
some fundamental working conditions including equal pay, limited work-
ing hours and holidays. The constitution guarantees workers' rights to un-
ionization and prohibits forced labour. Specifically, the Labour Act, 2003 
(Act 651), and the Labour Regulations, 2007 (LI 1833) stipulate the legal 
framework for employment in line with the constitution of Ghana. It 
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addresses the scope for the protection, conditions of employment, and 
unionization while dedicating sections to women, youth and persons with 
disabilities. Part (X) of the labour Act, 2003 focuses on casual and tempo-
rary workers (Republic of Ghana, 2003). Here, the act emphasizes the 'fair' 
and non-discriminatory practices of remuneration. There are other com-
plementary laws such as the Persons with Disability Act 2006 (Act 715), 
the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1987 (PNDCL 187), The National 
Pensions Act, 2008 (Act 766) and the Internal Revenue Act, 2000 (Act 
592), all of which should in principle enhance the administration the la-
bour markets. 
The Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations serves as the over-
arching body for governing labour. In 2015, it formulated the national 
employment policy (Republic of Ghana, 2015b) in line with the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO) standards. The policy addresses four 
core issues of increasing employment generation, quality of employment, 
labour productivity, and enhancing governance of labour markets. It has 
decentralized and devolved departments and commissions responsible for 
the day-to-day administration of labour at the local level. In 2015, the Min-
istry of Food and Agriculture also designed the Community/Investor 
Guidelines for Large-Scale Land Transactions. The guideline sets a frame-
work for cooperation among investors, communities, and government 
and suggest their roles in the five stages of investment: preparation, initial 
engagement of stakeholders, impact assessment, negotiation and consent, 
and monitoring and enforcement of agreements (Republic of Ghana, 
2015a). In principle, labour governance of the agricultural workforce 
draws on the above regulatory and institutional frameworks, yet to what 
extent are they able to adequately secure agricultural wageworkers rights?  
Li’s (2017) findings from an empirical study on the impacts of oil palm 
plantations in Indonesia, is even more pessimistic about regulations as her 
findings suggested that regulations, government, and livelihoods end up 
being subordinated to logics of capitalist development, eventually giving 
no way out for anyone. In Ghana’s case, mention can also be made of the 
shrinking policy space of the state, alongside domestic politics associated 
with the hierarchical nature of existing land tenure system, the prevalence 
of patriarchal domestic institutions, unequal system of labour regulations 
and even corruption. 
In Africa, where there is high unemployment rates, and diverse liveli-
hood struggles, the labour question, i.e. employment opportunities within 
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plantations, terms of incorporation and the absorption or not of those 
displaced into other sectors of the economy, remains pertinent if land 
deals should have any developmental potentials. 
 
7.2.1 Job Creation Rhetoric and a Laissez-faire Investment 
Environment   
I have indicated earlier that one of the key assumptions for the promotion 
of land investments in Africa and other developing regions is the employ-
ment generation potentials. By this, policymakers put faith in institutions 
to ensure that agribusinesses provide jobs in the localities within which 
they operate. There are, however, several challenges with this assumption, 
especially within the Ghanaian context.  
First, there are no hard laws or national regulations that specifically en-
force employment creation on large-scale transnational farms. During my 
fieldwork, the failed promises of employment were the biggest disappoint-
ment for the affected families and communities. This situation reflects the 
non-concurrence between verbal promises of investors and the actual con-
tent of the lease agreement2 and bore the stamp of the land registry. Based 
on the lease document, the survey, and interviews with families, the com-
pany is upholding its stated obligations of employing at least one family 
member each of the original landowners provided they have the requisite 
skills and qualifications. ‘In the past, agriculture officers were trained with-
out necessarily needing higher education’; an elderly family head made this 
sentiment to show the ways in which education has been re-invoked to 
side-line their youth from benefiting from the jobs. The 35 workers who 
identified as direct proletariats, represent a very low percentage of the hun-
dreds of resident families that constitute the fifteen extended families af-
fected by the land deal. Likewise, most of the clauses in the lease document 
are vague and non-binding on the company. An example is one that ties 
their social responsibility to a condition of being able to acquire and plant 
about 10,000 more hectares of oil palm in the Volta region of Ghana. 
However, even at the time of the study (10 years after concession), the 
company was operating below its capacity — so in principle, the commu-
nity cannot hold them accountable. It appeared to be struggling to stay in 
business, and some workers confirmed that in the previous years, it was at 
the verge of collapse — some pointed to political-ecological reasons sim-
ilar to the incidences of failed farm projects in Ghana (Ahmed, Campion, 
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& Gasparatos, 2017; Tsikata & Yaro, 2013). Thus, not only have expecta-
tions of wage employment been unmet, but also the hopes of indirect jobs. 
Besides, the existing regulatory institutions in Ghana do not have the 
autonomy and capacity to dictate the business model of investors — while 
at the same time, the Free Zone Act (1995) provided extensive and gener-
ous financial incentives to foreign investors3. Although certain regulations 
such as that regarding environmental impact assessments and land regis-
tration/certification could be guaranteed, it falls outside the priorities or 
jurisdiction of state institutions to determine and monitor how they run 
their businesses, be it labour-intensive, mechanized, out-grower schemes 
or even the types of crop to be cultivated. Hall et al. (2017), provide rich 
insights into the emerging patterns and trends of the labour implications 
of different models, highlighting the diverse opportunities and risks for 
different social groups. For instance, the extent of mechanization or la-
bour intensity may depend on several factors, but primarily, investors 
would not compromise on what makes economic sense to their business. 
Promoters of oil palm plantations often emphasize the job creation, yet 
oil palm requires an average of one worker per five hectares which is lower 
than other crop types such rubber (World Bank & International Finance 
Corporation, 2011).  
Although large-scale farms could have potentials for extensive job cre-
ation, economic viability and ‘social sustainability’ do not necessarily co-
here, but no one seems to be responsible for this gap in logic. Critics of 
land deals often emphasize the perils of surplus labour resulting from re-
dundancy. However, this case shows an even more complicated situation: 
the plantation work is labour intensive and needs workers to be able to 
maintain the remaining 2,500ha, yet management is compelled to cut 
down cost to remain in business; people (especially men) want jobs, but 
the poor conditions deter them; women have minimal job opportunities; 
there are high rates of absenteeism from casual workers, yet without com-
mensurate sanctions due to labour supply constraints; management seems 
to be planning towards increased mechanization in the long term, which 
could further reduce labour opportunities. 
The voluntary guidelines are well intended to address or pre-empt irre-
sponsible investments, but unfortunately, in many cases, such soft laws 
are already too late and not binding. Most communities have already be-
come victims to contentious land acquisition processes that may require 
extreme and specialized interventions to revert their process or their 
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implications. In the Herakles-Volta Red land deal, the initial processes of 
consultation, and the content of the lease agreement-e.g. a four-year mor-
atorium on the payment of rents, and absence of binding clauses on em-
ployment creation raises many questions. Yet, the general expression from 
the original landowners is that akin to spilt milk: they are bound to the 
existing lease agreement prepared by lawyers of the company, and family 
heads are waiting for its 50-year expiration date to take necessary actions 
— a situation which the youth hope to change sooner rather than later, 
through organized action. 
Moreover, the guidelines are vague, issues on labour are less discussed 
as compared to land tenure, and their recommendations pay more atten-
tion to participatory consultations rather than the everyday power dynam-
ics that put the interests of investors over community needs (see Otsuki, 
et al 2017 on similar expereinces in Mozambique ). For instance, the Com-
munity/Investor Guidelines for Large-Scale Land Transactions in Ghana 
(hereafter the Ghana Guideline) treats communities, investors and the 
government as though they are stakeholders with equal interests and 
power. In the guideline,  
a proposed best practice is for investors to create a sequential plan for busi-
ness development, clearly identifying the timing of the sequential phases, 
the amounts and types of land needed in each phase, as well as the expected 
crops, returns, and employment projected in each phase… Doing so should 
help create win-win possibilities for both investors and communities. That 
is, communities can then ascertain the long-term demand for land in order 
to avoid initial acquisitions that are larger than necessary (Republic of 
Ghana, 2015a, p. 8). 
As indicated in chapter six, almost all of the affected families expressed 
regret in agreeing to the land transfer, but their major worry has not been 
primarily because of dispossession4 but rather, the failed promises of de-
cent jobs. Although the Ghana guideline recommends employment crea-
tion as a component of every large-scale agricultural investment, it is dis-
cussed from the angle of compensation and non-monetary benefits that 
should accompany land deals, rather than being pursued as an 'obligation' 
of the investors' or a 'right' to the affected communities. Such propositions 
do not necessarily guarantee that recommendations are upheld by inves-
tors nor may they even be feasible in the context of many developing 
countries characterized by political, social and economic instabilities. In-
deed, there are differences among investors depending on the scale, extent 
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and duration of establishment, the models of production and tenure agree-
ments. However, these individualized processes leave the livelihood needs 
of marginalized communities to the ‘goodwill’ of investors.  
 
7.2.2 Institutional Bypasses, Incomplete and Overlapping 
Mandates  
Transcending the soft guidelines to the well-institutionalized laws and reg-
ulations that guide employment relations, where is the place of wage farm-
workers? A critical gap in the existing labour institutions in Ghana is that 
they do not have binding responsibilities in the agricultural sector. For 
instance, the Department of Factories Inspectorates Division obtains its 
mandate from the Factories, Offices and Shops Act, 1979 (Act 328), ob-
viously excluding agricultural work. The National Labour Commission, 
which was birthed by the enactment of the Labour Act, 651 of 2003, has 
as its mission, 
To develop and sustain a peaceful and harmonious industrial relations en-
vironment through the use of effective dispute resolution practices within 
the context of the law, promotion of cooperation among the labour market 
players and mutual respect. 
Hence, in the event of employer-employee disputes on plantations, parties 
cannot rely on the labour commission to perform its core function of ad-
dressing complaints and disputes. Although per the mandate of the labour 
department, general enforcement of labour standards apply to the agricul-
ture sector, their scope of operation is too broad and all-encompassing 
(Akorsu, 2013). Thus, it came as no surprise when after interviews at the 
local government institutions, it became evident that they knew very little 
about the operations on the plantation, except the company's tax commit-
ments.  
The national labour laws and regulations have also been designed to be 
primarily applicable to industries and services. The 2003 Labour Act (Act 
651) emphatically eliminates agricultural workers from the coverage of the 
law even though they happen to be among the most marginalized groups 
in the country. Under the section on ‘special provisions relating to tempo-
rary workers and casual workers’, the Act does not only prioritize investors 
over workers, emphasizing that ‘an employer may hire a worker on terms 
that suit the operations of the enterprise’, but also states that the ‘section 
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does not apply to pieceworkers, part-time workers, sharecroppers, sea-go-
ing personnel in the fishing industry who are wage earners’. 
More than 80 per cent of the workers were engaged in what they consid-
ered as equally important activities such as petty commodity trading, farm-
ing and transport services. Many of them do these additional jobs not be-
cause casual work is inherently favourable to them — it is far below their 
knowledge of decent employment.  
Again, in Ghana, occupational health and safety of workers are under 
the Workmen's Compensation Law 1987 (PNDC 187), and the Factories, 
Offices and Shops Act, 1979 (Act 328) but these also fall short in address-
ing farmworkers issues. The former is a discretionary directive that is also 
more favourable to employers than workers. Meanwhile, plantation farm-
workers are often exposed to diverse forms of injuries, accidents and 
health risks (see chapter five) that go unaccounted for in these laws. In the 
few policy circles where labour regulations and institutions apply to farm-
workers, institutions struggle with fragmented and overlapping functions 
and mandates. Since 1985, when the Department of Factories Inspec-
torate was removed from the Labour Department, there has not been any 
clear distinction in their responsibilities. Regarding issues of occupational 
health and safety, other government institutions such as the Ministry of 
Health, Environmental Protection Agency, and Fire Service have several 
overlapping mandates in terms of monitoring (Akorsu, 2010). Under such 
circumstances, there could be either duplication of efforts, or no job done. 
Other practical and technical challenges hinder the ability of labour insti-
tutions to function effectively. The various labour organizations are inad-
equately staffed and do not have the necessary logistical support to carry 
out inspections and enforcement of standards and labour market research 
(Akorsu, 2010; Oya, 2013). In a study of the Indonesia Palm Oil sector Li, 
(2017) also indicates how sometimes companies can evade unfavourable 
reports through their alliances with politicians and other bureaucrats; a 
situation that resonates in the Ghanaian context. It is for such reasons that 
de Schutter, (2011) cautions against any overestimation of the capacity of 
the governance structures to facilitate land deals for local development.  
7.2.3 Legitimation of Status Quo and Repression 
De Schutter, (2011, p. 258) argued that research that investigates whether 
land investments represent an improvement from the status quo ante do 
not provide a holistic understanding of impacts. Policymakers and 
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researchers need to go beyond here-and-now narratives to ask if rural 
lands could not be used more productively, equitably and sustainably un-
der structural, institutional and agrarian reforms that distribute land to 
smallholders. Akram-Lodhi, (2007) and Whitehead & Tsikata, (2003), have 
also questioned 'win-win' assumptions in the promulgation of formal land 
administration programmes such as titling, certifications and land regis-
tries and how these regulations usually perpetuate existing inequalities in 
land access and control. In a similar regard, the issue of labour also calls 
for attention, yet is mostly under-represented in these debates. The agrar-
ian question of labour: who does what, and who gets what, in relation to 
the social divisions of labour and the distribution of income are funda-
mental issues for understanding capitalist development in the countryside 
(Bernstein, 2010). Asking these questions helps unpack how people are 
integrated and how dynamics produce social forces with different political 
possibilities (Bernstein & Pitt, 1974, p. 522; Bernstein, 2010). 
Farmworkers’ income is guided by the minimum wage regulations in 
Ghana5. The introduction of minimum wage dates back to the 1950s when 
Ghana became independent from British Colonial rule. Since the enact-
ment of the Labour Act 2003 (Act 651), the payment of a minimum wage 
is binding on employers even though in practice not many uphold it, es-
pecially in the private and informal sectors (Kumah, 2017). In the period 
between the 1970s and 1990s, minimum wage policies became unfavour-
able in the light of the world economic crises that were accompanied by 
cost-cutting structural adjustment programmes and the rise in debates on 
the distortion effects of minimum wage on otherwise efficient labour mar-
kets. Once again, the minimum wage has grabbed policy attention as an 
effective measure to address poverty and as a means of social protection 
for vulnerable groups. The assumption is that it provides a guarantee for 
low-wage-low-skill workers to earn “decent” wages and sustain at least a 
subsistence standard of living. All the same, others are sceptical about its 
effects on real income and employment in many developing country con-
texts (Obeng, 2015, p. 86). In the past three years, the minimum wage in 
Ghana increased annually by 10 per cent, yet this represents a rise from 
just GH₵8 to GH₵10.6 per day (approx. 1.5 to 2 USD6), which is woefully 
low to even maintain a subsistence living as compared to many developed 
countries where households can afford decent living with minimum wage 
earnings.  
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In chapter five, I have shown that even though the farmworkers were 
being paid almost fifty per cent higher (GH₵14.04) than the 2018 national 
minimum wage of GH₵ 9.68, it was still challenging to maintain a decent 
living for themselves and their households. Of course, per the organiza-
tion of labour (piece rate) and tasks on the plantation, the impacts are 
differentiated among the working groups: men, women, the ageing, landed 
and the less landed. Nonetheless, even for those who are better positioned 
to work long hours or engage in lucrative labouring tasks on the planta-
tion, high incomes are accompanied by negative trade-offs, especially on 
their healthcare. These centralized wage regulations do not reflect the so-
cial and cultural dynamics of rural spaces with large household sizes, ex-
tended family responsibilities and educational aspirations that force farm-
ers into becoming semi-proletariats.  
 
7.3  Finding Labour in the Peasant/Food Sovereignty Way: 
Some Silences in the ‘Stop/roll Back’ Narratives 
If the enabling policy environment for land deals in Ghana does not nec-
essarily support rural livelihoods and long-term employment benefits, do 
anti-land grab debates effectively capture the struggles of farmworkers? In 
chapter three I have argued that there is not a strong organized land grab 
resistance force in Ghana and so I look at the broader West African con-
text of anti-land grab narratives, while reflecting on some of the experi-
ences of farmworkers in this case and other reported studies. This also to 
critique the place of labour and farmworkers’ struggles, even in the de-
mands that are meant to represent farmworkers’ interests, as well as those 
that are critical of transnational large-scale farmland investments in Africa.   
One of the main arguments by anti-land grab movements, particularly 
the ROPPA and the west African food sovereignty movements is that land 
grabs threaten the history, recognition and the valorization of family 
farms. As such, mainstream discourses and programmes that promote un-
controlled large-scale agricultural land investments tend to shove family 
farming to a subculture that is under-valued and poorly recognized 
(ROPPA, 2014). As further explained by Nora McKeon in a ROPPA 
newsletter,  
Africa’s food security is without any shadow of a doubt based on the diver-
sified production models adopted by its millions of family farmers and their 
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links to those who consume their products. There is a severe disconnect 
between this reality and the model that is being proposed by these corpo-
rate-led programmes and, alas, enthusiastically accepted by many African 
governments and the leadership of the AU/NEPAD/CAADP. There is a 
severe disconnect between rhetorical recognition of the key role played by 
Africa’s smallholder family farmers and the fact that family farming is por-
trayed as an archaic model which is incapable of evolution (ROPPA, 2014c, 
p. 43).  
In comparison to large-scale commercial production schemes that have 
emerged since the advance of capitalism, family farms have proven to be 
relatively more resilient than previously predicted. Van der Ploeg (2010) 
reiterates the persistence of new peasantries with more diversified and re-
silient strategies in their livelihoods. Thus, arguments that simplistically 
assume and aim for their liquidation or replacement by large-scale produc-
tion systems have become increasingly less convincing.  
Second, peasant or small-scale farmers bear the brunt of land and re-
source grabs through dispossession and loss of livelihoods (La Via 
Campesina, 2015; ROPPA, 2006a). This dominant claim is often projected 
in contrast to mainstream perspectives that show optimism about the de-
velopment potentials of regulated land deals (see Deininger et al., 2011). 
The dispossession narrative does not only emerge from the discourses of 
(West African) food sovereignty movements but also resonates with sev-
eral theoretical postulations and empirical research on the impacts of his-
torical enclosures and contemporary large-scale land acquisitions (Hall, 
2013; Levien, 2013; Fonjong, Sama-Lang, Fombe, & Abonge, 2016; 
Nyantakyi-Frimpong & Bezner Kerr, 2017). In 2012, the leadership of 
ROPPA played vital roles in the Food and Agricultural Organization’s 
(FAO) committee for food security to reject and suggest alternatives to 
the World Bank’s principles for responsible investments for legitimatizing 
land grabs instead of protecting the needs of family farmers7 (ROPPA, 
2014c).  
Third, small-scale farming is often more productive and sustainable 
than large-scale models. This counter-narrative falls in line with the widely 
observed phenomenon and the theoretical debate on the inverse relation-
ship between farm size and farm productivity (Lipton, 2006). After Sen's 
(1962) farm management surveys in India, the relationship between size 
and yield became central to debates on agrarian development. Critics of 
the smallholder farming systems often question their productivity, 
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efficiency and competitiveness. Given the low agricultural productivity in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Collier & Dercon, (2014, p. 94) caution against the 
celebration of smallholder farms as a superior model of production. Col-
lier and Dercon do not necessarily disregard the growing evidence of the 
efficiency of smallholder farms. Nonetheless, from a methodological 
standpoint, they challenge such efficiency claims, arguing that in Africa, it 
is usually more of a celebration of the relative successes within small farms 
than actual comparison with large farms. However, van der Ploeg (2014, 
p. 1004) argues that 'when looking at land productivity — the most im-
portant lens from the perspective of environmental sustainability — peas-
ant farms generally achieve higher levels of production per unit of land 
than capitalist or entrepreneurial farms’. This perspective underlies much 
of the economic justification for the food sovereignty movements’ oppo-
sition to land grabs. Resonating with van der Ploeg (2014) is the move-
ment’s defence of the capability of family farms to produce (more than) 
sufficient good food for the households of family farmers and the growing 
world population. This translates into the ‘Africa can feed itself’ campaign 
in West Africa. ROPPA maintains that family farms can feed Africa's 
growing population, create jobs, and wealth if they are not perceived as 
backward or as only capable of subsistence and therefore should be sup-
ported with inclusive and bottom-up research and policies (ROPPA, 
2014b). Already, about 80 per cent of the food grown in Africa is done by 
small-scale family farmers (GRAIN, 2014), so with the adequate support, 
the continent will not have to rely on large-scale agricultural models. 
7.3.1 Farmworkers: In the Countryside and in Food 
Sovereignty Movements’ Anti-Land Grab Discourses  
As it has already been established, the promotion of family farms stands 
tall in the agenda for food sovereignty and in anti-land grab discourses in 
West Africa. What seems to be lacking in the narrative on the valorization 
of family farms is a linkage to its diversity and the changes that have oc-
curred over time, especially concerning the labour question. In West Af-
rica, farmworkers most often appear among the list of rural folks or ‘peo-
ple of the land’, however, in the movement’s demand framings, they are 
generally conflated with farmers. In the Niamey call for West Africa food 
sovereignty, the demand for ‘fair remuneration of the labour of family 
farms’ shows the movement’s interests in beneficial trade (ROPPA, 
2006b), but at the same time, it emanates from the ‘unpaid’, ‘small-scale’ 
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‘family labour — family farms analogy’. A critical look into the class base 
of ROPPA also provides further pointers to their emphasis on family 
farmers. The dominance of the interests of a crop farming class traces 
back to the origin of ROPPA. ROPPA was primarily an initiative of the 
Senegalese National Committee for Rural Peoples' Dialogue (CNCR)8 es-
tablished in 1993 to give farmers a unified voice in agricultural policies 
that affect them (Hrabanski, 2010; McKeon, 2005). The advent of cash 
cropping of groundnuts by the French colonial administration disrupted 
pre-existing sustainable family farming systems, degraded the fertility of 
soils, and subverted the complementary activities of cultivation and live-
stock farming (McKeon et al 2004). Later, farmers (groundnut farmers 
mainly) had also become victims of structural adjustment programmes, 
falling prices of products, low demand for products, and a lack of access 
to inputs (McKeon et al, 2004). Cash cropping is based on profitability 
and expanded reproduction as well as the petty commodity producers in-
serted in local markets. It is therefore not sufficient to say their capitalist 
intentions are just a matter of a small degree. The institution of ROPPA 
was therefore primarily to ensure that small-scale (crop) producers’ inter-
ests are reflected in policies at the regional level and also give a greater 
platform for dialogue. It is therefore not surprising that upon its inception 
ROPPA’s prime goal was to influence regional policy for the promotion 
of family farming and fair trade reflected in its early anti-liberalization 
struggles9 against the cotton sector and subsequently other base products 
such as cocoa and soybeans etc. (Grossman et al, 2006) which gave it a 
strong international recognition. 
Following this background, it does not appear too surprising that 
farmer, trade, and land related concerns have been central to ROPPA’s 
campaigns. Dispossession-focused framings however tend to push issues 
of rural wage and contract labourers (their food security, access to land 
and labour conditions) to the margins of land grab debates. ‘Local-global’ 
and ‘capitalist-peasants’ narratives of inequality happen to take precedence 
over other localised issues. All the same, in Ghana, and many other West 
African countries, traditional cash crops like cocoa may be owned mainly 
by not-so-poor family farmers even though their cultivation are often 
done by hired labour, caretakers and sharecroppers who may be landless 
or have limited access to land. As shown in this case, some young men, 
mostly migrants or settlers who neither find the wage labour conditions 
on the plantation nor sharecropping unattractive, are forced to seasonally 
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migrate to work as caretakers on cocoa farms in South Western Ghana. 
While many find such work more flexible and relatively more lucrative 
than the opportunities at home, the background conditions cannot be 
overlooked as well as the impacts on their families.  
Similarly, in out-grower schemes where family farmers are themselves 
exploited by large corporations, their farmworkers become the final ‘con-
sumers’ of the costs in such contracts through low wages and tedious 
working conditions (Baglioni, 2015). In many rural economies with infor-
mal labour systems, when a farmer or landless person falls into the labour-
ing class, their power and autonomy plummet. All the same, farmworkers 
also defy homogenous descriptions and, as shown in chapter five, almost 
all the farmworkers double as petty commodity producers (Gyapong, 
2019). For food sovereignty movements in West Africa to adequately ad-
dress food insecurity and the agrarian struggles of the working poor, the 
everyday relations between (family) farmers and farmworkers have to be 
empirically assessed to illuminate the contradictions and intricacies that 
arise on the ground in efforts to protect labourers and food sovereignty 
(Bowles, 2013). As Kay (2015, p.80) argues, ‘the problems of peasant 
farming and rural wage labour are not unconnected, but rural wage work-
ers raise particular issues that have not yet been fully discussed’.  
7.3.2 Dispossession, but also Exploitation: Differentiated 
Impacts and Responses 
Empirical evidence has been growing on the political economy of land 
grabs, revealing the differentiated implications on land relations and land 
use changes in rural agrarian societies (Borras & Franco, 2012; Hall et al., 
2015). For instance, a study in Ghana by Boamah (2014) showed the sig-
nificant role of chiefs in determining the impacts of land deals. In one 
case, migrant farmers who had defaulted the payment of ground rents to 
chiefs had their lands affected, whereas in another case, migrant charcoal 
producers who often paid their tributes were protected from disposses-
sion (Boamah, 2014a, p. 419). For farmers who may not necessarily be 
evicted, they also have to deal with declining farm-gate prices and increas-
ing competition from large-scale investors who are inserted into logistical 
chains and economies of scale which capture production and displace 
struggling smallholders (Amanor, 2012). In chapters four and five, I have 
illustrated such discriminations against women in their claims to land and 
entitlements to rents as well as their subordination into the wage labour 
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economy. Land grabs exacerbate the predicaments of women when land 
transfers deny them of their usufruct entitlements; when land use changes 
and reclassification reduces their land rights, and when land formalization 
and the compensation packages transform the rules of access to favour 
men (Behrman et al, 2012; Whitehead & Tsikata, 2003). Nevertheless, the 
situation could be even more complicated. For instance, in some settings, 
women's advocacy groups show optimism in market-led land policies even 
when they recognize that the power relations that structure demands tend 
to favour men. This is because they perceive it as an opportunity for 
women to circumvent discriminatory customs that limit their access and 
control over land (Tsikata, 2003). 
When land grabs transform land ownership and use, the agrarian ques-
tion of labour becomes inevitable yet often underexplored in anti-land 
grab demands of movements. There is a growing feminization of labour 
in large-scale horticulture agribusinesses (Dolan & Humphrey, 2000). It is 
a reflection of the broadening scope of agrarian change in many rural so-
cieties, coupled with enabling customary institutions that influence inves-
tors’ preference for women (deemed to have ‘nimble fingers’), who are 
less conflictual and more willing than men to accept lower wages 
(Bernstein, 2010; Kay, 2015). On the other hand, for other crops like oil 
palm and sugar cane, the task division of labour favours men over women 
and is therefore accompanied by wide wage disparities. On the Herakles-
Volta Red oil palm plantation studied, women constitute just about a quar-
ter of the working population and obtain lower incomes than men (see 
chapter five). They are engaged primarily in loose picking and weeding, 
compared to men who, also as a result of their physical attributes, can have 
opportunities in over twelve different tasks. In this study, it has been illus-
trated that during seasonal task variations, women benefit less in terms of 
job opportunities, and a larger percentage of women than men are laid off 
during the lean seasons.  
Thus far, women stand a high risk of being cash-strapped and unable 
to benefit from land resources fully, and therefore become attracted to 
wage labour on large-scale farms, even when they have to work under ex-
ploitative labour relations (Julia & White, 2012; Tsikata & Yaro, 2013). 
Women, in particular, when incorporated as wage labourers and contract 
farmers, are often caught in a complex web of being attracted to (seasonal) 
livelihood diversification and economic empowerment opportunities 
while at the same time, being exposed to structural vulnerabilities posed 
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by institutions that ‘work together’ to benefit and marginalize them. From 
empirical chapters four, five and six, it is apparent that given the existing 
land tenure systems, many women10 are more concerned about job oppor-
tunities and labour conditions than questioning the land acquisition itself11. 
The large majority of carriers who are women in very low-income house-
holds working informally with harvesters seek to be incorporated as offi-
cial casual workers. Similar accounts have been reported by Levien (2017) 
and Park & White (2017) in their work in Asia and other parts of Africa. 
Responses toward land grabs ‘extend far beyond "resistance" in its many 
manifestations — to demands for compensation, insertion and even coun-
ter-mobilizations against land deal resisters’ (Edelman et al., 2015, p. 467). 
When food sovereignty movements engage with some of these complex 
realities, it will imply dealing with contradictions of interests but also pro-
voke discussions based on the diverse experiences and different forms of 
struggles among the rural working poor, including farmworkers.  
 
7.4  Chapter Conclusions  
This chapter has reinforced the argument by Borras et al., (2013) that reg-
ulatory responses do not necessarily lead to particular outcomes but re-
quires evaluating what happens on the ground concerning the specific po-
litical-economic context within which they are implemented. Even when 
jobs have been promised under ‘consultative’ agreements, it may be diffi-
cult to realize the expectations of decent jobs. The regulatory environment 
in Ghana demonstrates how and why the institutions that are expected to 
protect workers are either non-existent or inadequate. Particularly, the 
public sector and industry-related labour policies are prevalent. They ei-
ther exclude or leave to the margins, agricultural wage labourers. Thus, 
several of the existing regulations tend to legitimize oppression and ine-
quality instead of protecting marginalized groups. Evidence from this 
study reinforces arguments that are critical of optimistic narratives about 
the employment creation prospects of large-scale land investments; nota-
bly, when there is not a strong business case to demand labour.  
 Yet, anti-land grab claims and demand framing ought to be pursued 
cautiously so as to not trip into the danger of essentializing the interests 
of certain groups and classes over others or conflating them under a broad 
categorisation. The governance framework for land investments and wage 
labour are largely characterised by absent, illusively present and repressive 
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institutions that are influenced by both global and domestic factors. In the 
past few decades, land policies and redistributive reforms have come to 
the centre stage of development, and they ought to be accompanied by 
labour reforms as well. Historically, how land and labour are combined, 
are the fundamental distinguishing feature of plantations or large-scale 
farms (Evans, 1995, p. 155), and this necessitates that attention is given to 
the labour question as much as it has been done in the context of land 
tenure issues. Farms are not mere units of agrarian production but embed-
ded in power relations and social institutions that are deeply rooted in 
people's lives (du Toit, 1994, p. 380). The complexities of agrarian trans-
formations within which food sovereignty has to be constructed in light 
of a raging land rush should embody the differentiated competing rural 
class and identity interests, all which are linked to livelihoods.   
 
Notes
1 Sections of this chapter have been published by the author in (Gyapong, 2020a, 2020b). 
2 The lease was written by a private legal firm in Ghana for the company without the in-
volvement of the affected landholding families, not even the family heads.  
3 See https://gfzb.gov.gh/index.php/incentives/ 
4 With the exception of two extended families that lost all their land to the acquisition. 
5  The minimum wage is a benchmark above which the company sets daily piece rates, but 
as explained earlier, because there are no regulations to protect pieceworkers, productivity 
rates and output standards could be arbitrary and as such the labourers often complain 
about being overworked.   
6 As of September 2019.  
7 See Koita, (2013) and Losch (2004) on ROPPA’s influential role in leading the resistance 
by smallholder cotton farmers against unfair international trade policies.  
8 Conseil National De Concertation Et De Coopération Des Ruraux. 
9 The liberalization of the cotton sector had led to several upheavals and strikes by produc-
ers in Mali. Economically dispossessed smallholder farmers rallied against excessive cotton 
subsidies in the USA and EU because it distorted prices and affected export returns (Koita 
2013; Losch 2004). ROPPA coordinated the ‘Big Noise Petition,’ to the WTO in Cancún 
2003 and Hong Kong 2005 meeting for the elimination of USA and EU cotton subsidies 
(Koita 2013). In Losch (2004 pg. 337), he quotes a 2001 submission by Mamadou Cissokho 
then honorary president of ROPPA on trade restrictions.  
10 This is also a general concern for most people interviewed, and it is linked to the broad 
structural and socio-economic inequality.   
11 It is worth noting that in this case, there is a variegated dispossession effect —due to 
relative land availability and access to alternative lands (although with differentiated degrees 
of access and control-broadly, between sharecropping settlers and native landowners) that 



































































































Permanently Out of 
school 
Interviewer  Residence  
Gender  [ 1 ]   Male   [ 2 ]  Female      
Contract [ 1 ]   Casual   [ 2 ] Permanent   Nationality  
comments   
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B. Land (Acres) 
1. Have you lost access to land within the past 5-10 years? 
1. [  ] Yes       2. [  ] No       
2. If Yes, which types of land?  (Choose all relevant)  1. [ ] Individual2.[  
]Family land 3. [  ]Tenant Land  4[  ].Communal 5. [  ] Public   
3. Which of the above selected, affected you the most? (choose 1) 
1. [ ] Individual   2.[  ]Family land    3. [  ]Tenant Land      4[  ].Communal    
5. [ ] Public   







6. >20 specify 
5. How did you lose your land? 
1.[ ] sale/lease (by self)  2. [  ] sale by spouse 3. [  ] Sale by family/clan 
(head)   4.[  ] Sale by chief  5. [  ] Sale by government  6. [  ] Natural 
Disaster 7. [  ] others………………………………………………… 
 Source of Access Land Accessi-
ble  
Farm size  
 



























1. Full Owner  
2. Entitled to use 
3.Tenancy  
4. Usufruct 
5. Just occupying 
 (public land ) 
Self 
Paid family Labour 
Unpaid family La-
bour 
 Wage Labour 
1.      
2.      
3.      
4.      
5.      
 Conclusions 161 
6. Who owns the lease of the land you lost now? 
 1.[  ] An individual peasant  2. [  ] An individual medium farmer 3.[  ] 
 Large-scale investor    4. [  ]  Volta Red     5.[  ]   A family/clan 6.[   ] Chief  
7. Did you receive any compensation if your land was forcibly taken? 1.[  ] 
Yes   2.[  ] No 
8.  If yes, in what form? ………… 
9. What is the monetary value of the 
compensation?...............................................................  
10.  How has the loss affected 
you?........................................................................................ 
 





Tasks (select all relevant) 
 
 
1. < >6mts 
2. 1-2 yrs. 
3. 3-5yrs  
4. 5-6 yrs 













Mill wage worker 
Caterer 
Cleaner 
Technical support  




1. On the average, how much do you earn per month ?....................................... 
2. In the lean season how much do you usually earn per month?....................... 
3. In the peak season how much do usually earn per month?.............................. 
4. How many days do you often work in a month in the past one year?............ 
5. How many months have you worked in the past one year?............................ 
6. In the past 1-3 years have you worked over time? 1.  [  ] Yes          2.[  ]  No 
7. Are you compensated for overtime work?    1. [  ] Yes          2.[  ]  No 
8. If yes, when is it paid and how do you get paid  (overtime payment system 
or rules)…………………………………………………………… 
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9. If no, why?................................................................................................................ 
10. What do you do for better wages and conditions…………………………. 
11. Have you ever been provided with loans or wage advances by employer 
generally or at times of difficulty or crisis?      1. [  ] Yes          2.[  ]  No 
12.  Did you leave any other paid job  to work with Volta Red? 1. [  ] Yes          
2.[  ]  No 
13. If yes, what job? …………………………………………..……………… 
14. If yes, what type of employment was it?………………………………….. 
15. If no, what were you engaged in ?………………………………………… 
16. Why did you decide to work with Volta Red?......................................................  
17. Did you migrate specifically for this job? 1. [  ] Yes          2.[  ]  No 
18.  If yes, did you migrate with all your nuclear family/household? 1. [  ] Yes          
2.[  ]  No 
19. If no, who did you move with?  
 1. [  ] Spouse    2. [  ]  children/and other dependents 3. [  ]  help
 4. [  ] Parents   5. [  ]others………………………….       
20. Who did you leave behind? 1. [  ] Spouse    2. [  ]  children/and 
other dependents 3. [  ]  help   4. [  ] Parents   5. [  ]others 
21. Where did you migrate from? 
 
Village/town/city District Region (Initials)  Country 
    
22. Would you consider where you migrated from as your hometown/or place 
where you have lived with your family for a long time (over 10 years)?  
1. [  ] Yes          2.[  ]  No 
23. If no, what brought you to that town? 1. [  ]Work  2. [  ] School   
 3. [  ]  Marriage  4. [  ] Others, ………….. 
24. What mobility plans do you have while working with VR? 
1. [  ] Permanently Settle here alone  2. [  ]  Move my family and 
Permanently Settle 3. [  ]Temporarily settle here alone 4. [  ] Move my family 
and Temporarily Settle 5. [  ]  Shuttle between here and home 6. [ ]others  
25.  How has VR benefitted you and your household?......................................... 
26. How has it affected you and your household negatively?.............................. 
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27. Is there any aspect of the work that is risky or dangerous to you?  
1. [  ] Yes        2.[  ]  No 
28. If yes, specify the task, and the risk involved……………………………… 
29. How long do you intend to work with the company? 1. [  ] As long as it 
exists  2. [  ]  For some time, while looking for a better job 3. [  ]  Until 
Pension/retirement   4. [  ] for some time to start own job 5. [  ]Do not 
know………………..  6. [  ] Other    
30. If for some time to start own job, please describe 
31. Further comments from the respondent in relation to his work at VR…… 
 
C. Other Employment 
1. In the last 12 months have you ever left or abandoned a  waged job for any 
reason? 1. [  ]Yes    2. [  ] No   92. [  ].Not applicable. 
2. If yes, what were the reasons for leaving? (circle  all relevant events) 1.[  ] 
Changed employer     2[  ]. Finished casual or seasonal work  3.[  ] Quit for 
family or personal reasons    4[  ]. Quit, wages too low  5[  ]. Insufficient 
work hours  6.[  ] Dismissed by employer     7.[  ] Dispute with 
employer  8[ ]Other, …………………………………… 
3. If  you quit for personal/family reasons what was the main reason? (Choose 
all relevant)  1 [  ]. Pregnancy  2[  ]. Marriage  3[  ]. No permission from 
spouse 4 [  ]. Need to care for household member  5[  ]. Request of 
spouse  6[  ] Health  7. Other ……………………………………. 
4. Describe the problems you have faced in finding and keeping decent wage 
employment during the past 5 years?................................................................. 
5. What other employment are you engaged in addition to work on the 
plantation? 1.[ ] Farming  2. [ ] petty trade  3. [ ] Construction 4.[ ]Transport 
5. [ ] service  6[ ] others …………………………… 




















        
*estimates or if records are available 
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Food Item 1. Eaten Daily 
2. Once a Week  




6. Never  
7. Others………………. 















Yams   
Rice    
 
1. Have there been any changes in the past 1-5 years in how you access food 
items?  
2. 1. [  ] Yes          2.[  ]  No 
3. If yes, how ………………………………………………………………. 
4. How often do you eat the food items below and how do you obtain them? 
5. Have there been any changes in your eating pattern since you started work 
with VR? 1. [  ] Yes          2.[  ]  No 
6. If yes how? ( Select all applicable)  1. [  ]Eat more    2. [  ]Eat less    3. [ ]Eat 
more regularly    4[ ] Eat less regularly  5. [  ] I eat more nutritious food         
6. [ ] I eat less nutritious food    7[  ]Others………… 
7. Have you had challenges with getting food since you started work with 
VR? 1. [  ] Yes          2.[  ]  No 
8. If yes, what kind of challenges?………………………………………. 
9. Have you had benefits with buying or producing food since you started 
work with VR? 1. [  ] Yes        2.[  ]  No 
10. If yes, how?…………………………………………………………….. 
 
E. Community  Development, Conflicts and Other Challenges 
1.  In your view, what are the major problems facing your community?……. 
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2. What solutions will you suggest to address these problems?............................ 
3.  Does your household have outstanding loans or debts to other households 
or institutions?   1.  [  ] Yes.        2   [  ]  No 
4. If yes, Who do you owe? 1.[ ] Family      2. [  ] Personal Friends      3 
[  ]Employer     4 [  ] Colleague at work  5. [  ]Others 
5. How much did you borrow? ……………………………………. 
6. How do you intend to settle it?....................................................... 
7.  Do you consider your household well off in the past five years?  1[  ] Yes   
2. [  ] No 
8.  Give Reason for your choice in question…………………………… 
9.  Does your household feel secure? [  ] Yes   [  ] No 
10.  What possible risk does your household face and how do you intend to 
manage them?…………………………………………………… 
11. Are you a member or do you participate in any group activities? [ ] Yes  [ ] 
No 
12. If yes what group/activity are you a member? 1[  ] Farming/Food 
Association    2 [  ] Village Savings and Loans    3[  ] Youth Group                    
4[  ] Women’s Group     5[  ]  Religious Group           6 [  ]Trades Union   
7[  ]Political Group/Association   8[  ] Others…….. 
13. What is the main benefit from joining this group?……………………… 
14.  Are there any incidences of conflicts within your community? 
1[  ] Yes    2. [  ] No 
15. If yes, what are the causes of these conflicts?……………………………... 
16. Have there been any land-related conflicts or disagreements related to VR?  
1[  ] Yes   2.[  ] No 
17. If Yes, describe what you know……………………………………… 
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Appendix 2: List of Institutions Contacted 
A. State Institutions and Agencies 
 
Institution (Department) Location  
Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA)  
Policy Planning Monitoring and Evaluation 
Directorate (PPMED) 
 
Coordinator, Modernizing Agriculture in 
Ghana programme (MAG) 
Accra 
(MOFA)  
Policy Planning Monitoring and Evaluation 
Directorate (PPMED) 
 
Programmes Accra  
MOFA Planting for Export and Rural 
Development in Ghana(PERD) Programme 
Accra 
(Telephone) 
MOFA Consultant for Ghana Commercial 
Agricultural Project office 
Accra 
Ghana Investment Promotion Centre 
(GIPC) 
Research  Accra 
Lands Commission 
(Volta Region) 
Valuation  Ho 
Lands Commission 
(Volta Region)  
Registry  Ho  
Ghana Agricultural Workers Union(of the 
Trades Union Congress (GAWU- TUC) 
Volta Region Office 
Office Ho 
GAWU -TUC Gender  Telephone 
Interview 
(Accra) 
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B. Chieftaincy Institutions  
 
Stool Name  Position Jurisdiction 
Nana Kwame Sewodie  Nifahene 
-holds the right flank 
of the traditional army's 
formation in times of 
war 
 










Nana Amenano Adontehene  
-in charge of secu-
rity and fronts the tradi-
tional arm in times of 
war  
Also doubles as the 
chief of Poase Cement 
 
Nana Tedebu Obanda Kora Paramount Chief Ntrubo Traditional Area  
Domabin from Dambai  
Gegenge from Togo 
Pusupu (Akyem Ntrubo) 
Bontibo 
Kumda 






Nana Bekoe Adontehene (see 
above for description) 
Ntrubo Traditional Area 
Nana Dahonso   Ntrubo Traditional Area  
Nana Saafo Atara II 
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Appendix 3: Farmworkers’ struggles and Everyday Politics 
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